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Abstract 
 
This dissertation investigates the management of the crown property and royal finance in 
Thailand during the era of the People’s Party. Drawing upon historical methodology which 
values the specificity of the studying period, this study argues that the constitutional concept of 
governance interpreted by the leader of the 1932 Revolution was the primary framework of the 
royal court reform. By this principle, the monarch was excluded from the power to manage the 
royal affairs, including the crown property and royal finance. This dissertation further suggests 
that the undertaking of the royal court after the reform became accountable to the public as other 
state affairs. It also examines accountability over the management of the crown property and 
royal finance by exploring cases in which those who were responsible for the affairs were taken 
in the investigating process.  
Moreover, this dissertation takes account of political conflicts among the leaders after the 
Revolution in its analysis by investigating how it altered the reform. Accordingly, it examines the 
results of the reform, which affected the social status and way of life of the royals. This might be 
helpful in understanding their political roles after World War II and answering why to have the 
palace affairs turned to be royal prerogative was one of their primary agendas. This dissertation 
argues that the situations in the early 1950s were significant parts of the end of the constitutional 
principles applied to the management of crown property and royal finance.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In 2008, Forbes, an American online business magazine, published a list of the richest 
monarchs in the world. Surprisingly, King Bhumibol (1927 – 2016, r.1946 – 2016), then 81 years 
old and the longest-reigning sovereign in the history of Thailand, was at the top of the list with, 
according to Forbes, 35 billion US dollar.1 Forbes reported that Bhumibol gained his fortunes 
from landholdings and stocks in Thai giant firms, i.e. banking, cement industry, and insurance 
companies.  In the next three consecutive years, Bhumibol would be at the same position on 
Forbes's list; however, his assets had decreased to 30 billion US dollars.2 Since 2011, other 
online magazines have created their own list of the world's richest royals, and King Bhumibol 
was always at the top of every list.3  
                                                            
1 Forbes staff, “In Pictures: The World’s Richest Royals,” 20 August 2008, Forbes 
(http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/20/worlds-richest-royals-biz-richroyals08-
cz_ts_0820royal_slide_2.html?thisspeed=25000) The first time the King was listed was in 2007; he was number 5 
with 5 billion USD. Please see Devon Pendleton and Tatiana Serafin, “In Pictures: The World’s Richest Royals,” 30 
August 2007, Forbes (http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/30/worlds-richest-royals-biz-royals07-
cx_lk_0830royalintro_slide_6.html) 
2 Devon Pendleton, Tatiana Serafin, and Cristina von Zeppelin, “In Pictures: World’s Richest Royals,” 17 June 2009, 
Forbes (http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/17/monarchs-wealth-scandal-business-billionaires-richest-
royals_slide_2.html, Tatiana Serafin and Cristina von Zeppelin, “In Pictures: The World’s Richest Royals,” 7 July 
2010, Forbes (http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/07/richest-royals-wealth-monarch-wedding-divorce-
billionaire_slide_2.html), Investopedia, “The World’s Richest Royals,” 29 April 2011, Forbes 
(http://www.forbes.com/sites/investopedia/2011/04/29/the-worlds-richest-royals/#2373bad162b1) 
3 Sammy Said, ”The Top 10 Richest Royals in the World,” 25 August 2013, The Richest 
(http://www.therichest.com/rich-list/world/the-top-10-richest-royals-in-the-world/?view=all), Kristen Duvall, “The 
World’s 10 Richest Royals,” 11 August 2014, The Richest (http://www.therichest.com/rich-list/world/the-top-10-
richest-royals-in-the-world/?view=all),  “Top 15 Richest Royals in the World,” 20 February 2017, Richest Lifestyle 
(https://richestlifestyle.com/richest-royals-in-the-world/7/) 
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Some responses, occurring immediately after the list was published, were due to the 
political conflicts which had taken place for years in Thailand, and 2008 was two years after the 
coup d’état which overthrew the administration of Thaksin Shinawatr, a telecommunication-
business tycoon turned politician. Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai [Thai love Thai] political party won 
the general election in 2001. Due to its populist policies, the party overcame its opponents again 
in the 2005 polling, and became the first political party in Thailand which had held the 
premiership for the full four year term and won two consecutive elections. Due to its landslide 
win of 375 of the 500 seats in the House of Representatives, the Thai Rak Thai formed a one-
party government. Nevertheless, the party’s populist policies and Thaksin’s CEO style of 
premiership brought criticisms. More importantly, his growing popularity among voters, 
especially in the North and Northeastern countryside, frustrated the old establishment. After 
months of motivation, the anti-Thaksin factions became a movement in late 2005. Of the 
accusations leveled against him, in addition to the abuse of power, human rights violation, and 
corruption, competing with the institution of the monarchy was the most sensitive allegation of 
which Thaksin was suspected.4 Eventually the coup d’état took place in September 2006 when 
Thaksin was not in the country. The interim government appointed by the junta drafted a new 
Charter replacing the 1997 Constitution and prepared for a new election in 2008. Surprisingly, 
the People’s Power Party (PPP), Thaksin’s new supporting political organization, which had  
replaced the Thai Rak Thai (which was itself disbanded by order of the Constitutional Court), still 
                                                            
4 Thongchai Winichakul, “Toppling Democracy,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 38, 1(February 2008): 11 – 37, 
Kasian Tejapira, “Toppling Thaksin,” New Left Review 39, New Series (2006), Andrew MacGregor Marshall, A 
Kingdom in Crisis: Thailand’s Struggle for Democracy in the Twenty-First Century (London: Zed Books, 2014), 
Kevin Hewison and Kengkij Kitirianglarp, “’Thai-Style Democracy: The Royalist Struggle for Thailand’s Politics,” 
in Soren Ivarsson and Lotte Isager (eds.), Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), pp. 179 - 202 
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won the election despite interventions by the bureaucracy and the military. The PPP’s win 
brought the anti-Thaksin movement back to the street again. This formed the background to the 
predictable response from royalist factions to the Forbes report; Thai Post, a royalist and anti-
Thaksin newspaper, immediately condemned it by headlining “Attacking the institution [of the 
monarchy]!”5  
Reactions from Thai society to Forbes’s report illustrated the confusion over the 
crown’s actual assets. Two days before Thai Post published its headline, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs explained that the online report was misleading. According to the Ministry, the assets 
included in the report were not the private properties of the King: rather, they were assets of the 
state and all Thai people.6 In 2011, when King Bhumibol was on the top of the richest royals list 
again, the Crown Property Bureau (CPB) replied to the report in the same fashion as the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, claiming that those properties should not have been counted because they 
were public assets managed by the Thai government. Chai-anand Samutvanich, a well-known 
royalist senior scholar, tried to protect the King by indicating that the reported assets were not 
Rama IX’s private possessions.7 This understanding became the pattern the Thai state used in 
replying when the institution of the monarchy was questioned about its wealth and prosperity.  
Replying to the response of the CPB, Somsak Jeamteerasakul, a historian from 
Thammasart University, argues that the Bureau’s disputation did not conform to the 1948 Crown 
Property Law (still enforced in 2011). Somsak cites the content and the interpretations of the Law 
                                                            
5 Thai Post, 24 August 2008, p.1 
6 “Ministry of the Foreign Affairs’ replying to Forbes: The List of Richest Monarch was misleading,” 22 August 
2008, Manager Online (http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9510000099614) 
7 Chai-anand Samutvanich, “Criticism of the Monarchy,” 24 March 2013, Manager Online 
(http://www.manager.co.th/Daily/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9560000035739) 
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by Krissadeeka (the government’s legal advisory bureau) to indicate that, legally and practically, 
the power over the properties retained by the Bureau belonged to the King.8 Thus, the argument 
that those assets were the state’s possession could not be sustained.  
This contention over the Forbes’s report implied a significant issue about royal affairs: 
the categories of the properties belonging to the royal court. Some, including the private property 
of the King and the crown property for instance, are difficult if not impossible to distinguish  
from each other, which brings to mind the questions of 1) do these two categories need to be 
distinct  and 2) if so how is this to be done. According to Somsak, the King acquired power over 
the properties of the crown as a result of the 1948 Law, which raises a third question: if the year 
1948 was the turning point of the management of crown property, how was it prior to that year?  
1.1 Research Questions 
1. How was the management of crown property and royal finance reformed when the 
country’s governance changed from an absolute state to a constitutional monarchy?  The 
beginning year for my dissertation is 1932 because that year was the point at which the 
management of royal affairs began to change; the end year of my dissertation was the turning 
point of the management of crown assets instituted by the new Crown Property Law. Thus, I am 
examining the period of time between the absolute regime and the Cold War era during which the 
power to control royal affairs was held by entities different from those of other periods in Thai 
history. When the Revolution took place in 1932, the royals lost their power over the country to 
the new leaders. The King’s cabinet was replaced by commoner administrators and Parliament. I 
examine how the revolutionary government reformed the management of the property of the 
                                                            
8 Somsak Jeamteerasakul, “Arguing the CPB’s 2010 Annual Report,” 19 June 2011, Prachatai 
(http://prachatai.com/journal/2011/06/35539) 
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crown and the royal budget. I hypothesize that a new pattern of management of the crown 
property was used during this 15-year period.  
2. What were the effects of the reform and how were they affected by other factors?  
Reforming the royal court’s affairs, including crown property and the royal budget, inevitably 
involves the royals’ former status and way of life. I examine these effects and how the royal 
family members viewed and responded to them. This may illustrate the royals’ opinion not only 
of the new system of crown property management, but also of the constitutional monarchy the 
new leaders established after the Revolution. 
1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 Monarchy and political situation 
During the last decade, several academic works examining directly the Thai monarchy 
have posited different concepts and frameworks. Although I cannot fully analyze these works in 
my dissertation, some remarks concerning these works should be mentioned here. First, before 
the coup d’état in 2006, there were scarcely any academic works critically studying the political 
role of the Thai monarchy, especially of King Bhumibol. A scholar ascribes this to the draconian 
Article 112 of the Criminal Code of Thailand which does not allow anyone to defame the King, 
the Queen, the Heir, or the Regent. 9  Somsak Jeamteerasakul argues that after the collapse of the 
socialist ideological movement in the late 1980s, when they produced academic works analyzing 
Thai politics and society, Thai intellectuals often ignored or were less critical of the monarchy, 
                                                            
9 Kevin Hewison, “The monarchy and democratisation,” in Kevin Hewison (ed.) Political Changes in Thailand: 
Democracy and Participation, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 58 - 74 
6 
 
because they generally thought that the institution was ‘no longer an issue’.10 Thus, despite the 
risk posed by Article 112, the monarchy would not be included in the discourse of the 
intellectuals. Being aware of the importance of the monarchy in Thai politics and society, 
Somsak himself in 2001 published a book critically scrutinizing the monarchy’s role in the 
modern history of Thailand, particularly in the momentous events of the 1932 Revolution, the 
1973 uprising, and the 1976 massacre.11 Although the importance of his book was recognized,12 
Somsak’s main request of Thai scholars that the monarchy should be more studied was not 
accepted. Until the 2006 coup, there were few major works critically studying the Ninth Reign of 
the Chakri Dynasty: Duncan McCargo’s well-known articles about the ‘network monarchy’13, 
Chanida Chitbundit’s master thesis which examines the royal development projects and their 
influences14, and Paul Handley’s famous political biography of King Bhumibol.15 
Further, the increasing number of publications was an effect of the political situations in 
Thailand in which the monarchy has openly been one of the players. A number of analytical 
writings were produced after the 2006 coup d’état. A common theme of these despite their other 
significant differences: anxiety concerning the future of the monarchy during the last decade of 
                                                            
10 Somsak Jeamteerasakul, “The Victory of the 14 October Intellectuals,” Midnight University Webboard, 23 July 
2004 
11 Somsak Jeamteerasakul, Prawatisart thee phueng sang (Bangkok: 6 Tula ramluek, 2001) 
12 Thongchai Winichakul, “Do not Underestimate Methodologies: a Reply to Ajarn Saichon,” in Countenances of the 
Royal Nationalism: On Thai History (Nondaburi: Fadeawkan, 2016), p. 207 
13 Duncan McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” The Pacific Review 18, 4(2005): 499 
– 519, Duncan McCargo, “Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai South: Network Monarchy Strikes 
Back?,” Critical Asian Studies 38, 1(2006): 39 - 71 
14 Chanida Chitbundit, The Royal Projects: the Establishment of Royal Hegemony (Bangkok: the Foundation for 
Textbooks in Social Science and the Humanities, 2007) 
15 Pual Handley, The King never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2006) 
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King Bhumibol’s reign, ascribed to the political turmoil. Deploying notorious declassified 
Wikileaks documents, Andrew M. Marshall, a former Reuters’s correspondent based in Thailand, 
strongly argues that conflicts among the elites especially in the palace circle over the uncertain 
royal succession was a true cause of the crisis.16  Somsak Jeamteerasakul suggests that the socio-
economic changes occurring since the late 1980s brought about the centralization of power into 
the parliamentary system, leading to the rise of politicians in Thai politics. However, at the same 
time, King Bhumibol established himself as the center of Thai political culture. Thaksin 
Shinawatr’s popularity (which peaked in his landslide electoral win) led to a conflict between the 
two powers. Somsak calls this ‘mass politics’ due to the wide participation throughout the 
country, and he coins a concept ‘mass monarchy’ to describe the new political culture centered 
on King Bhumibol.17 
Monarchical ideology was also conceptualized. Based on Antonio Gramsci’s Marxist 
theory, Kasian Techapeera proposes the concept of ‘royal hegemony,’ contending that as a king 
in a constitutional monarchy, Bhumibol did not gain his power through the administration of the 
country. Rather, the King obtained hegemony from the Thai people by activating royally-initiated 
development projects. Theoretically, King Bhumibl’s immense power had been accumulated 
through a consensual, not coercive, pattern.18 Serhat Ünaldi suggests that the sacred charisma of 
King Bhumibol was empowered by those who benefited from the high status of the monarchy. 
                                                            
16 Andrew M. Marshall, A Kingdom in Crisis: Thailand’s Struggle for Democracy in the Twenty-First Century 
(London: Zen Books, 2014) Marshall studied several documents concerning the modern history of Thailand 
especially those involving the monarchy and published his writings online. For some critiques of Marshall’s theory 
about the royal succession, please see Patrick Jory, “Review of Kingdom in Crisis,” 12 November 2014, New 
Mandala (http://www.newmandala.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Jory-on-Marshall-FINAL-9-November-
2014.pdf), Serhart Ünaldi, “A Kingdom in Crisis – What’s All the Fuss About?,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 46, 
1(2016): 120 - 129  
17 Somsak Jeamteerasakul, “Mass Monarchy,” in Chaithawat Tulathon, Yamyuk Ruksamai: Celebration for 40th 
Anniversary of October 14 Incidence (Bangkok: Foundation of Democratic Heroes, 2013), pp. 107 - 118 
18 Kasian Teechapeera, “The Great Public Intellectual of Thainess,” (1) and (2) in Crossroad and Thorn: Way to 
Thai Democracy (Bangkok: Matichon, 2008), pp. 21 – 29. Although these two articles were firstly published in 
2005, Kasian reprinted them in a book after the 2006 Coup.  
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The monarchy thus became the center of society which provided other kinds of capital they 
needed to retain, e.g., economic advantages. Any social operation could gain more legitimacy if it 
was linked to the King. Unaldi names this political culture ‘working towards the monarchy.’19 
These scholars agree that the monarchical ideology was vigorously shaken by the rise of 
Thaksin and especially the red-shirts movement. This led to a feeling of insecurity not only 
among the palace circle, but also those who were consumed by the monarchical ideology. This 
situation energized several aspects of what Thongchai Winijchakul calls ‘hyper-royalism’ 
diffused throughout Thai society. Politically attacking opponents by holding the monarchy as 
their weapon became abundant: disloyalty to the dynasty became a powerful accusation everyone 
in the political society could face. As a result, the number of lèse majesté charges grew 
exponentially in the decade of political turmoil.20  
1.2.2 Studies of Crown Property 
The topic of the crown’s property has been studied for decades. However, the literature 
on the topic can be regarded as exceptional in that there is frequently a non-academic reason for 
its publication; it can be categorized into three groups: publications which concern the Thai 
monarchy’s business investments, publications which concern the legal aspects of the crown’s 
property, and publications examining the political effects of changes in the management of crown 
property.  
The first group identifies the investment of the royal court into the changing economy 
of Siam in the 19th and 20th centuries as beginning with the Bowring Treaty which the Siamese 
court negotiated with Great Britain in 1855 during the reign of King Mongkut (1804 – 1868, 
                                                            
19 Serhat Ünaldi, “Working Towards the Monarchy and its Discontents: Anti-royal Graffiti in Downtown Bangkok,” 
Journal of Contemporary Asia 44:3 (2014): 377-403 
20 David Streckfuss, Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason, and Lèse Majesté (London: Routledge, 2011) 
9 
 
r.1851-1868). The expansion of the paddy fields due to the export-based economy resulting from 
this and other treaties motivated a need for land and led to growth in investment of rice mills and 
transportation modalities.  Before 1890, the Privy Purse Department (PPD), a royal organization 
with a central role in the growing capitalist economy functioned as the manager of the monies 
divided from the state’s budget for private expenditures of the monarchs. According to Prince 
Damrong (1862 – 1943), a revered historian held as the pioneer of modern historical studies in 
Thailand, the Privy Purse’s origins could be traced back to the early period of the Chakri Dynasty 
(began in 1782).21 In 1890, when King Chulalongkorn (1853 – 1910, r.1868 – 1910), the fifth 
monarch of the Dynasty, established a reformed bureaucracy for centralizing the country’s 
administration, the Privy Purse was re-assigned to the Ministry of Finance. In addition to 
management of the private budget of the King, the PPD also invested in various businesses. 
Chollada Watthanasiri has studied the investments of the PPD and indicates that its venture 
activity was correlated with the expanding economy after the Bowring Treaty was signed.22 
The PPD’s most prosperous period was the Fifth Reign. According to Chollada, its 
investments comprised both financial and industrial ventures. The PPD made profits from 
loaning money, leasing, and investment in real estate, land and buildings. The economic 
expansion produced new investors who needed capital for their investments. The PPD grasped 
this chance by turning itself into a large source of loans. Regarding land and building investment, 
due to its privilege as a royal organization, the PPD could accumulate real estate via transfer from 
the state. Renting land to farmers and to building developers brought very large revenues to the 
PPD. Chollada indicates that land in Bangkok and the nearby areas accumulated by the PPD 
                                                            
21 A History of the Privy Purse Bureau and the Thao San Pom Play (The funeral book of Arun Chandarangsu, 18 
December, 1967) 
22 Chollada Watthanasiri, “Investment of the privy purse, 1890-1932,” M.A. thesis, Silapakorn University, 1986. 
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during the Fifth Reign was amounted to approximately 20,000 rai (about 12.4 square miles; 1 rai 
= 0.16 hectare). This made the PPD the biggest land owner in the kingdom.  
The PPD also engaged in buying shares of stocks in banking and industrial businesses. 
Due to its royal support, the investors tended to persuade the PPD to join them by sharing free 
stock. The companies in which the PPD invested were the commercial firms, the industrial 
enterprises, financial institutions, and infrastructure organizations, some of which still exist 
today, such as the Siam Commercial Bank and the Thai Cement Company (the Siam Cement 
Group - SCG).23  
However, the revenues of the PPD decreased after Chulalongkorn passed away, 
primarily because his successor King Vajiravuth (1880 – 1925, r.1910 – 1925) was not as keen 
on investment as his father. Most of the capital resources of the PPD during the Sixth Reign had 
gone with the King’s private expenses instead of into business ventures.24 His annual up-country 
visits and initiative enterprises such as Sue Pa (the para-military training supported by the King), 
including the budgets provided for his intimate servants, resulted in the PPD incurring large 
debts. Although King Prajadhipok (1893 – 1941, r.1925 – 1935) would provide money from the 
state to resolve the debts, the PPD was not again prosperous until the absolute state was 
overthrown in 1932. Porphant Ouyyanont, an economist from Sukhothai Thammathirat 
University, argues that the 1948 Crown Property Law helped the Crown Property Bureau (CPB) 
be successful despite the 1997 economic crisis and downturn.25 According to Porphant, the 1948 
                                                            
23 Ian Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam c 1890 – 1920 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), chapter 
5 
24 Pornpen Hantrakool The Government Spending During the Reign of King Rama the Sixth (A.D.1910-25), 
M.A.Thesis, Department of History, Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University, 1974 
25 Porphant Ouyyanont, “The Crown Property Bureau from Crisis to Opportunity,” in Pasuk Phongphaichit and Chris 
Baker (eds.), Thai Capital after the 1997 Crisis (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2008), pp. 155-186 
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Crown Property Law modified the CPB (by removing several limitations implemented by the 
1932 leaders) to once again function as an organization investing for the monarchy and led to its 
privileges throughout decades in the reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej. This group can be 
considered as a continuation of the debate in the 1980s over the transitional period of Thai 
history. In such a debate, focus was on when and how the Thai economic system changed from 
feudalism to capitalism, in which the monarchy’s role was crucial.26  
The second group of literature concerning the crown property focuses on its legal 
implications. Most of these publications are law master theses. There are two main focuses of the 
publications in this group: the details of the laws on crown property and the legal status of the 
CPB. With respect to the first of these, the 1936 Crown Property Act has been generally thought 
of as the first law addressing the royal court’s assets after the 1932 Revolution; this law was the 
implementation of the transfer of the control of crown property from the royal prerogative to the 
government’s power.27 With respect to the second, the promulgation of the 1948 Law was held as 
the point at which the abolition of the management system of the crown property established by 
the People’s Party occurred. A common point made by these publications concerns the 
problematic legal status of the CPB after the Law was revised in 1948.  While Sakuna suggests 
that the CPB should be held as a public organization28, Kittisak suggests that the CPB did not fit 
any category of civic organization in Thailand.29 This scholarly disagreement reflects the wider 
                                                            
26 Somsak Jeemteerasakul, “Thai Society: from Feudalism to Capitalism,” Thammasart Journal 11, 2(2525): 128 - 
164 
27 Sakuna Thewaratmanikul, “The Management of the Crown Property,” M.A. Thesis, Faculty of Law, Thammasat 
University, 2000, Kittisak Uraiwong, “Background and Legal Status Problem of the Crown Property Bureau,” MA 
Thesis, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University, 2009) 
28 Sakuna Thewaratmanikul, “The Management of the Crown Property,” p. 51 
29 Kittisak, “Background and Legal Status Problem of the Crown Property Bureau,” chapter 4 
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ambiguous understanding of the status of the CPB described by Somsak and might be a factor 
which helps explain the confused responses of Thai officials to the Forbes reports. 
The last group of publications concerns the political impacts of the reform. The focus of 
this group is on the political context after the 1932 Revolution, in which the monarch and the 
palace court lost their power over public and royal affairs to the revolutionary government, which 
also affected the management of the crown property. In his dissertation, Bruce Lockhart describes 
the events occurring after King Prajadhipok left Siam for Europe and the end of World War II 
(residing in Siam for only a short period of time) which allowed the government to expand its 
power over the royal court’s affairs, including financial and crown property management.30 Parut 
Penpayap analyzes the laws concerning the crown property in relation to changing circumstances, 
i.e., the promulgations of the first two laws and the management of the crown property related 
thereto were analyzed in the context of the People’s Party’s control over the country, while the 
1948 Crown Property Law was depicted as one of the results of the coup d’état on 8 November 
1947.31 One publication in this group was the first to recognize the importance of the 1948 Act as 
the watershed of the crown property management and the changing status of the monarchy.32 Due 
to its provision of the power to manage of the Crown Property to the King, the Law was named 
“counter-revolutionary.” The authors in this group believed that the study of the crown property 
and its management might lead to a greater understanding of the development of the modern 
political history of Thailand. 
                                                            
30 Bruce Lockhart, “Monarchy in Siam and Vietnam, 1925-1946,” PhD dissertation, Faculty of the Graduate School, 
Cornell University, 1990, Lockhart could access a file of documents in the Thailand National Archives which are 
now restricted, namely, SR.0201.42.   
31 Parut Penpayap, “What is Crown Property?,” Fadeawkan 6: 3 (2008) 
32 Somsak Jeamteerasakul, “What is Crown Property Bureau?,” Fadeawkan 4: 1(2006) 
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1.3 Academic Contribution 
In my dissertation, I attempt to address some of the gaps in the literature. First, I 
analyze newly-available documents which have never been examined before; due to the 1997 
State’s Information Law, the government released previously-classified materials to the public, 
including an archive in Thailand’s Government House, which comprised the reports of the 
cabinet meeting recorded since 1932 and a large number of official documents, parts of which 
concern the crown property management during the time period of my dissertation. According to 
the list of the Office of Cabinet Secretariat (the manager of the archives) there are more than 180 
files directly concerned with royal affairs.33 These recently found materials, including documents 
from other sources such as the National Archives of Thailand, might help generate a new 
understanding of crown property management. Second, I present a different perspective for 
appreciation of the crown property and connect the following factors: constitutional principles of 
governance, changes in the management of crown property, the reform of the palace court, and 
the political situations after the 1932 Revolution.  
Thoughts of a constitution and constitutional governance initially emerged in Siam in 
the late 19th century. These western concepts were definitely imported by European educated 
students, including royal family members and a number of bureaucrats who had the opportunity 
to live in Europe. In 1885, a group of young Siamese royals and officials living in Europe 
submitted a document to King Chulalongkorn asking him to change the country’s system of 
governance from an absolute state to constitutional monarchy. The document indicated that the 
ongoing predicament Siam had to resolve was colonialism. To the western mind, it was the 
                                                            
33 The situation has changed since the coup d’état on 22 May 2014. Researching documents in the Office of Cabinet 
Secretariat’s archive has become stricter and inconvenient.  
14 
 
legitimate burden of the white man to liberate backward countries for the sake of humanity. The 
only way to prevent the advancement of colonialism, according to the document, was to change 
the country’s governance. Particularly, the Young Siamese pointed that the ideal government 
Siam should imitate was that of Great Britain.34 
The Young Siamese described the new governance and society. As detailed in the 
document, the monarch would still have much power. The sovereign was imposed as “the great 
chairman of the country” whose orders were decisive. The King did not have to manage 
everything; instead, a cabinet would manage the country’s affairs. The cabinet would include 
chiefs of departments who had full authority in their own organizations. According to the 
document, the succession to the throne would be systematized to prevent the possibility of the 
chaos during the transitional period. Further, the document suggested the ideal type of society 
and administration: an equal law system for both Siamese and foreigners, freedom of expression, 
and a merit system of bureaucracy.35 
However, the Young Siamese’s suggested governmental organization differed from 
their putative English model. In particular, the new government would not have Parliament. This 
meant that the electoral right of the Siamese people and the legislative institution, in which the 
representatives of the people would gather, would not be introduced. In other words, the cabinet, 
which was appointed by the monarch, would pursue its administrative duties without any 
accountability to a Parliament. In addition, although the senior officials who formed the cabinet 
would have authority in their bureau, the final decision would be the King’s. The main difference 
                                                            
34 Murashima indicates that this document was one of the origins of the idea about nation of the Siamese elites. See 
Eiji Murashima, “The Origin of Modern Official State Ideology in Thailand,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 19: 
1(March 1988): 80-96 
35 Chai-anand Samutavanich and Khattiya Kannasut, Thai Political Documents, 1874 – 1934 (Bangkok: Social 
Science Foundation of Thailand, 1975), pp. 47 - 75 
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between an absolute monarchy and their proposed system of government was that the former was 
ruled only by a monarch and the latter had a cabinet and a constitution; the similarity between the 
two was that the monarch still had power in the country’s administration. In the late 19th century, 
the Siamese absolutist state had just been established after the death of Somdej Chao Phraya 
Barommaha Srisuriyawong in 1882, the powerful former regent for the young King 
Chulalongkorn; thus, the King therefore likely perceived the cabinet and the constitution as a 
threat to his absolute power. Consequently, King Chulalongkorn refused the Young Siamese 
suggested changes.36 
In the 1911 Rebellion (Kabot R.S.130), thoughts of constitutional governance were 
combined with a military movement for the first time. Although it was unclear whether they 
intended to found a constitutional monarchy or a republic, a group of young army officials 
developed a plan to overthrow the absolute state. These military young men grew up in the 
modernized bureaucracy reformed by King Chulalongkorn; however, they had a critical attitude 
towards the system. They critiqued the absolutist state’s bureaucracy in which only the higher 
social class could gain profits. They were educated by a curriculum which included more than  
military courses and well informed of what happened in the rest of the world, especially Japan, 
which was had recently developed their economy and technology to the point where they could 
win a war against Russia. The young officials concluded that the poverty and backwards 
civilization of Siam were caused by its governance under the absolute power of the King. 
According to the memoir of a group leader, a prosperous country should have an impartial 
juridical system. He preferred a republic to a constitutional monarchy. However, this group could 
                                                            
36 Ibid., pp. 76 - 81 
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not implement their plan because they were betrayed and were sentenced to jail. 37 However, their 
movement served to inspire the leaders of the 1932 Revolution.  
Constitutional principles of governance were truly implemented after the 1932 
Revolution. The country’s governance was changed from one in which the king had absolute 
power to a new one in which the authorities were specified in the Constitution. New political 
institutions, such as the cabinet and Parliament, emerged, and performed administrative roles 
formerly carried out by the King in the old regime. Nevertheless, the enactment of these changes 
by the new regime did not mean that the debate over the constitution ended. Rather, the 
Revolution started the discussions and debates over the constitutional governance, which 
continued for decades. Each participant in the debate might want their definition and 
interpretation to be accepted, but no participant wished to return the country to an absolutist state; 
instead, they attempted to define and interpret the principles of a constitutional monarchy.  The 
Siamese governance would adapt itself to changes in the constitution resulting from the victory of 
any given interpretation in each period.  
Vernon Bogdanor, a constitutional theorist, argues that there are two definitions of 
constitutional monarchy. Generally, it is a system of governance in which the sovereign rules in 
accordance with the Constitution. However, a more particular meaning suggests that the monarch 
does not have the power to rule the country.38 Accordingly, the monarch’s exact role in the 
constitutional governance was a significant issue in the debate after the revolution. In this regard, 
those intellectuals who tried to explain the new regime may be categorized according to their 
perspectives on the royal power in the constitutional regime.  
                                                            
37 Acharaphorn Kamutphissamai, Kabot r.s.130: a Rebellion for Democracy and the Ideas of the New Military 
(Bangkok: Amarin Academy, 1997) 
38 Vernon Bogdanor,  The Monarchy and the Constitution ( Oxford University Press, 1995), p.1 
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Natthapol Jaijing, who studied the royalist reactionary thoughts and movement after the 
1932 Revolution, classified lawyers who participated in the debate over the royal prerogatives in 
a constitutional monarchy into two groups: the traditional school and the constitutionalist 
schools. According to Natthapol, most of the traditional lawyers were graduates of English 
universities and the constitutionalists were continentally-educated, especially in France and 
Germany. The former group believed that the monarchy was the center of Siamese governance, 
while the latter group’s arguments were based on western constitutional principles.39 
According to Natthapol, the traditional school often contended that Thai society had 
already been democratic even without the 1932 Revolution, due to the Buddhist concept called 
‘anek nikorn samosorn somutti’ (the monarch was elected by the community of aristocrats and 
the people). Further, Thai kingship was not based on divine right as were the western 
monarchies; rather, the King exercised his power in accordance with Buddhist doctrines for 
rulers.40 This interpretation implied that the Revolution was not necessary, a point which has 
been repeated in later texts, including textbooks on the study of law in Thailand.41 In addition, 
King Prajadhipok had prepared to enact a constitution and gradually changed Siam to democracy. 
Thus, after the revolution, the traditional school interpreted the concept of a constitutional 
monarchy in a way that provided much more power to the monarch.  
Providing the monarch more power than that specified by the Constitution was a 
common point made by authors in this group. Bawornsak argues that, in Thai constitutional 
monarchy, the proprietor of the sovereignty was both the people and the monarch; thus, the 
                                                            
39 Natthapol Chaiching, “The Legitimacy of the Regime: Debates over the Sovereign in the Explanations of the 
Constitutional Law (1932 – 1957),” in To Dream an Impossible Dream: The Siamese Counter-Revolution Movement, 
1932-1957 (Bangkok: Fadeawkan, 2013), pp. 65 - 100 
40 Murashima argues that the Buddhist elective theory of kingship was emphasized since the absolute era because the 
Siamese elites needed to handle with the colonial power from the West. See Eiji Murashima, “The Origin of Modern 
Official State Ideology in Thailand,” p. 80-96 
41 Bawonsak Uwanno, Public Law volume (Bangkok: Winyuchon, 2004), chapter 7 
18 
 
Constitution provided the king the power to enact and veto laws, appoint and dismiss the Prime 
Minister and other cabinet members, and the court of justice exercised its judicial power in the 
name of the King. However, the monarch was not accountable for these actions because there 
would always be a minister approving the action and taking responsibility, Bawornsak argues.42 
He also suggests that because of some specific features of Thailand’s monarchy, some public 
actions of the King not specified in the Constitution should be held as legal. For example, if the 
country encountered a political crisis the King should be able to dissolve Parliament, or even 
remove the Prime Minister and appoint a new one.43  
One of the writers in this group cited some principles from the English monarchy to 
promote the monarchist standpoint. In his Master’s thesis in law, Tongthong Chandransu states 
that as an example of the general power of the monarch, one of the royal prerogatives in the 
constitutional monarchy included the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to 
warn.44 He does not disguise that his statement came from the well-known British Constitutional 
theorist Walter Bagehot’s widely-cited book on English governance.45 Tongthong argues that 
King Bhumibol had performed his power, especially with respect to the royally-initiated 
development projects, in accordance with the principle of the constitutional monarchy suggested 
by Bagehot.46  
The constitutionalist school based their definitions and interpretations on the principle 
that the people were the true proprietor of sovereignty. This group recognized the significance of 
the 1932 Revolution as an event which turned the sovereignty over to the people. Thus, the 
                                                            
42 Ibid., p. 205 
43 Ibid., p. 207 
44 Tongthong Chandransu, “A Constitutional Legal Aspect of the King’s Prerogatives,” MA Thesis, Department of 
Law, Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University, 1986, p. 86 
45 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004[1865]). Another well-
known legal theorist in Thailand who referred to Bagehot was Yud Saeng-uthai. 
46 Tongthong Chandransu, “A Constitutional Legal Aspect of the King’s Prerogatives,” p. 91 
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constitutionalist lawyers preferred to limit the royal prerogatives in a written constitution. 
According to Yud Sang-uthai47, those who exercise public affairs in a democratic regime must be 
accountable to the people, i.e., by being ready to be criticized, scrutinized, or even impeached. In 
order to exclude the monarch from such processes due to his status as Head of State, the monarch 
must not be able to conduct any action without the approval of a minister, the representative of 
the people who had the real power.48 Further, the constitutionalist school suggested that in a 
democratic regime Parliament should have more power than the monarch, i.e., to have the power 
to enact legislation without royal approval, or in the face of a royal veto.  
I suggest that the leaders after the 1932 Revolution treated the monarchy according to 
the interpretation of the constitutionalist school. In addition to the first two Constitutions which 
specified the approval process, the leaders tried to manage royal affairs in accordance with the 
Constitution.  In 1934, for instance, King Prajadhipok wanted the Cabinet to revise a Bill which 
had already been approved by Parliament, but the government and the House decided to retain 
the same version of the Bill because the Constitution did not provide any prerogative for the King 
to make such a request.  
In this dissertation, I hypothetically relate the exclusion of the monarch from the power 
to conduct state affairs to the management of crown property and royal finances. The 
                                                            
47 Yud (1908 – 1979) graduated PhD in Law from Berlin University. He served in Krissadeeka and eventually was 
appointed as its Secretary-general in Phibul’s second premiership. Ironically, Yud was the secretary of the drafting 
committee of the 1949 royalist Constitution. His textbooks on several branches of legal studies have been used in 
universities in Thailand. Natthapol Chaiching, “The Legitimacy of the Regime: Debates over the Sovereign in the 
Explanations of the Constitutional Law (1932 – 1957),” p. 75 
48 Yud Saeng-uthai, The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E.2489 (Bangkok: Prachaniti, 1946), p. 33. Yud 
repeated this opinion in his several textbooks concerning constitutional explanation. For examples, please see Yud 
Saeng-uthai, An Explanation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Bangkok: Uthai, 1950), Yud Saeng-
uthai, An Explanation of the Constitution, B.E.2475 – 2495 (Bangkok: Chusin, 1952), and Yud Saeng-uthai, An 
Explanation of The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2511 (Bangkok: Bamrungsarn, 1968). In 1956, 
Yud broadcasted this view on radio which had an implied critique of King Bhumibol’s speech. This led to his charge 
on lèse majesté. Please see David E. Streckfuss, “The Poetics of Subversion: Civil Liberty and Lèse-Majesté in the 
Modern Thai State,” Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1998, pp. 110-111, For Yud’s script on radio 
broadcast see National Archives of Thailand (N.A.) (3)SR0201.1.44/28 
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constitutional principle of governance implemented by the new leaders had been reified through 
their reform of royal affairs. In other words, in a specific sense, the management of the palace 
court, including crown property and royal finance, was constitutionalized in the revolutionary 
regime. 
I also describe the ways in which the reform was modelled after a constitutional 
monarchy.  Some contemporary documents indicated that the English Civil List, the financial 
system of the palace, was an example the leaders after the 1932 Revolution used as a model for 
their reforms of the administration and finance of the Siamese royal court. Thus, some aspects of 
the development of the Civil List should be mentioned.  
The center of the development of the English parliamentary system was the monarchy’s 
power. The premodern British monarchs were simultaneously the head of state and head of 
government. However, the noble class had forced King John I to rule according to laws. This 
later developed and became a parliamentary system. The relationship between the monarchy and 
Parliament had been the focal point of political conflicts in the history of England; it was the 
main cause of the Civil War in the mid-17th century. Such a relationship developed over centuries 
until the administrative power was transferred from the monarch to Parliament. The changes 
made to the managerial system of the royal court’s finances reflected the development of British 
constitutional monarchy, and were also significant factors in the history of the parliamentary 
supremacy. 
The financial management of the British monarchy before the Glorious Revolution 
could be considered as an illustration of the situation in which the sovereign was both the head of 
state and the head of government. The incomes of the royal court were called ‘revenues’ which 
were specified by Parliament. After that, the revenues were managed as a completely royal 
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prerogative: the sovereign could spend the amount without any accountability to Parliament. The 
revenues usually comprised sources that could provide incomes for the monarch, including those 
held by the king as a hereditary right, such as lands and some kinds of taxation, and the sources 
of income which were provided by Parliament, e.g., ship tax.49  Until the late 17th century, it was 
not easy to separate the personal expenses of the king from the government’s expenditures.50 
Since the monarch also conducted administrative duties, revenues were used both for state 
business and the personal usage of the king and the royal court. The revenue of Charles II (1630 – 
1685, r.1660-1685) and James II (1633 – 1701, r.1685 - 1688) was 1.2 million pounds and 1.9 
million pounds, respectively. The revenue system of royal income was one of the causes of 
conflicts which led to the Civil War.  Thus, after the Glorious Revolution, negotiations between 
Parliament and King William III (1650 – 1702, r.1689 - 1702) resulted in a new system of 
financial management for the palace.51 
Theoretically, the compromise between Parliament and the King depended on a balance 
between the principle that held that the power to administrate the state must belong to Parliament 
and the principle that maintained the financial independence of the monarch.52 War with France 
forced William to ask for more money for the military, which provided Parliament opportunity to 
investigate the royal finances. Eventually, a new financial management approach for the royal 
court was initiated. While the military budget belonged to Parliament’s power, civilian finance, 
including the palace court’s expenditures, was the monarch’s prerogative (this budget was 
                                                            
49 E.A. Reitan, “From Revenue to Civil List, 1689-1702: The Revolution Settlement and the ‘Mixed and Balanced’ 
Constitution,” The Historical Journal, 13,4(December 1970): 571 
50 Phillip Hall,  Royal Fortune: Tax, Money & the Monarchy (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), p.3 
51 Ibid., pp. 4 - 5 
52 E.A. Reitan, “From Revenue to Civil List, 1689-1702: The Revolution Settlement and the ‘Mixed and Balanced’ 
Constitution,” p. 588 
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therefore called the Civil List). This was the initial point of the exclusion of the monarchy from 
political power, administratively and financially. 
Since the separation between the two budgets reflected political balance of the court and 
Parliament, E.A. Reitan named the period in which the Civil List was initiated as ‘Mixed and 
Balanced Politics’.53 After the Glorious Revolution, the monarch and Parliament shared the 
administration of the country. This lasted until the late-18th century. The Civil List at that time 
had many debts and the monarch had to ask Parliament to settle them. Thus, Parliament could 
investigate the ongoing expenses of the Civil List.54 During the late 1780s, with efforts of 
Edmund Burke, expenses of the Civil List were required to be approved by Parliament. Although 
this regulation was not practical, E.A. Reitan held that parliamentary supremacy began at this 
time.55 Eventually, the separation of the finances of the monarch and the state budget took place 
in 1830 when the Civil List of William IV (1765 – 1837, r.1830 – 1837) was specified to 
comprise only the expenses for the King’s personal usage and the integrity of the throne, and the 
civil administration budget was moved to the power of the House. In other words, the monarch 
was excluded from the power to manage state finances. Phillip Hall suggests that 1830 was the 
point in which the Civil List for the first time became modern.56 
The exclusion of the monarch from the power to control the crown property and the 
royal finance (e.g., the Civil List system) was the pattern the Siamese revolutionary leaders tried 
to emulate.  I will discuss the similarities and differences between the two systems in a later 
chapter. 
                                                            
53 Ibid. 
54 Phillip Hall, Royal Fortune: Tax, Money & the Monarchy, pp. 6 - 7 
55 E.A. Reitan, “The Civil List in Eighteenth-Century British Politics: Parliamentary Supremacy versus the 
Independence of the Crown,” The Historical Journal, 9, 3(1966): 318-337 
56 Phillip Hall,  Royal Fortune: Tax, Money & the Monarchy, p. 8 
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1.4 Analytical Framework 
I examine changes in Thai royal finance and crown property in the political contexts 
occurring after the 1932 Revolution. I argue that the most important factor affecting royal affairs 
during this time was the constitutional concept of governance introduced to Siam by the new 
leaders. This constitutional principle perceived by their contemporaries had a specific meaning in 
the field of Public Law that the rulers must perform their roles in conformity to democratic 
principles. This norm limited the monarch’s ability to exercise its prerogatives as the head of 
state. I argue that this principle was realized through the reform of the royal court’s affairs in 
general and the royal finance and crown property management in particular. However, there are 
factors which often prevent the conformity between the principle and the practice; thus, I will 
also analyze those factors and their influences. There were several circumstances in the modern 
history of Thailand which altered the implementation of constitutional monarchy. First, the 
military wing of the People’s Party grew stronger after the Revolution, which meant that the 
civilian faction was too weak to establish a strong parliamentary system in Thai politics. Second, 
the breakdown of the People’s Party due to World War II interrupted the development of the 
constitutional principle. Finally, the return of those royal family members and the royalists, who 
were prohibited from involvement in politics due to the 1932 Permanent Constitution, made the 
constitutional monarchy’s establishment more difficult, and they eventually made it impossible 
by collaborating with the authoritarian wing in the 1947 coup d’état. I will discuss how these 
factors affected the realization of the constitutional principle with respect to crown property 
management in later chapters.  
In order to verify my arguments, I juxtapose the management of royal finance and 
crown property with the factors mentioned above, and I consider how the alterations occurred; 
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specific examples include the constitutional monarchy principle, the reform of the royal court, 
and the political conflicts and negotiations among the leaders.  In each chapter, I will provide 
some concrete circumstances involving royal finance and crown property management after the 
Revolution, which I will attempt to relate to these factors. By this method the development of the 
management of the royal finance and crown property might hopefully be more comprehensive.  
1.5 Organization of Chapters 
The outline of my dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, I examine and analyze the 
process by which royal finance was reformed through the establishment of the Bureau of the 
Royal Household, with specific attention to the constitutional principle of governance and the 
political struggles among the leaders. In Chapter 3, I focus on the management of the crown 
property and investigate changes in that management due to several factors, such as the 
promulgations of each Crown Property Law. In Chapter 4, I describe how the revolutionary 
government manipulated royal family members through the management of the royal budget and 
examine political situations after World War II which altered the direction of the management.  
In Chapter 5, I describe the civil suit the People’s Party government pursued against the former 
King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni during 1939 and 1941, including the process of 
making the case, the decision and reasons of the government to pursue the lawsuit, the court’s 
judgement and its enforcement, and the resolution of the case. Finally, the last chapter will 
contain my conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
The Royal Court and Its Reformation 
 
Introduction 
In the mid-1934, during conflicts with the government, King Prajadhipok wrote in a 
memorandum as follows: 
It is widely said that the Ministry of the Royal Household will be changed according 
to the British royal court. […] It has to be pleaded to the government to abolish such a 
project; otherwise, they have to submit it to me beforehand.1 
Before abdication, King Prajadhipok had argued with the government over several 
issues, one of which was about the power to manage the Ministry of the Royal Household. 
Whether its control would be under the royal prerogative or the government’s jurisdiction was the 
main point. The King insisted that the appointment of the royal servants in the Ministry must be 
his prerogative. The argument regarding the Ministry of the Royal Household was part of the 
contention over the power of the monarch in the constitutional regime, over which the leaders 
after the 1932 Revolution had argued. The quarrel was not resolved, however, until King 
Prajadhipok eventually abdicated in March 1935.                  
In the Siamese absolute regime, the power over the royal court was definitely a royal 
prerogative as along with other administrative powers of the country. There were three 
organizations responsible for the administration and finance of the royal court: the Ministry of the 
                                                            
1 King Prajadhipok, “The Royal Memorandum no.1,” in The Government’s Declaration on King Prajadhipok’s 
Abdication (Bangkok: Lahuthos, 1935), pp.137-139 
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Royal Household, the Department of the Royal Secretariat, and the Privy Purse Department. The 
royal household [Wang], one of the four major organizations in the premodern period, was 
promoted to be a ministry in the administrative reform initiated by King Chulalongkorn in 1892. 
Its duties were to administer royal rituals, maintain royal palaces, and control the royal servants. 
The Department of the Royal Secretariat was formerly the audit office of which King 
Chulalongkorn was the commander himself since its beginning in 1875, according to a royal 
servant’s recollection.2 When the absolutist state had been gradually formed, nearly all official 
documents had to be authorized by the sovereign; then, the audit office was developed into the 
Royal Secretariat. The bureau was later claimed as important as a ministry. Its principal duty was 
to filter documents of state affairs prior to the King considering the documents and making a 
decision. This made the royal secretariat imperative. The last bureau, the Privy Purse Department, 
was responsible for the properties and the investments of the King and some royal family 
members. After the traditional period the King divided the state’s fortunes for his personal 
expenditures. After the administrative reform in the 1890s, the Privy Purse became a department 
in the Ministry of Finance. It would be annually allocated from the state’s budget for the personal 
expenses of the King and the royal court.  
The three bureaus mentioned above could be considered as significant organs in the 
formation of the Siamese absolute state. The founding of the Ministry of the Royal Household 
and the Department of the Royal Secretariat constituted a response to the situation in which the 
state’s power was centralized. The establishment of the modern ministries in 1890s was intended 
in a sense to separate the aristocrats and nobles from the administrative authority, and to gather 
                                                            
2 A story of Chao Phraya Mahithorn, Memory Funeral Book, 1956, p. 93 
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such power under the sovereign.3 Meanwhile, the Privy Purse created a significant role for the 
King in the new economy (initiated due to the 1855 Bowring Treaty) which opened business 
chances for the royals. The Privy Purse was one of the leading capitalist organizations in the 
Siamese economy for 30 years before the Revolution, investing in banking, industrial, real estate, 
and providing capital for large firms, all of which made lots of profits for the bureau.4 Changes to 
these three royal organizations after the 1932 Revolution were parts of constitutional reform in 
Siam. The revolutionary leaders therefore thought addressing the affairs of these three bureaus 
was a crucial task. 
Financially, the state yearly allocated a budget for the royal court. This allocation would 
be expended for the personal usage of the King, the allowance for the royals, the royal court 
expenditures, and investing in the King’s personal businesses. During the mid-1890s King 
Chulalongkorn had the budget specified at 15% of the annual state’s income: it was 1 to 2 million 
baht a year between 1892 and 1898. According to Chollada Wattanasiri, a foreign advisor 
suggested the King should have the budget fixed at an annual amount because this would help 
with acquiring foreign loans. The King agreed.5 In the initial year, the amount was 6 million baht, 
including the expenditures of the Ministry of the Royal Household (formerly a separate budget 
item). King Vajiravuth, Rama VI, increased the budget to 9 million baht before it was reduced 
back to the amount in the first year in the next reign due to an economic downturn. In the last 
year of the Old Regime, the budget was reduced again to 5 million baht. 
                                                            
3 Chaiyan Rajchagool, The Rise and Fall of the Thai Absolute Monarchy: Foundations of the Modern Thai State 
from Feudalism to Peripheral Capitalism, Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994, chapter 4 
4 Chollada Wattanasiri, “Investment of the privy purse, 1890-1932,” M.A. thesis, Department of History, Graduate 
School, Silapakorn University, 1986 
5 Ibid. 
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In this chapter, I examine the changes which were made to the royal court’s finance and 
administration after the 1932 Revolution. My principal argument is that the financial 
management of the royal court was reformed in the same process as its administration. In 
addition, the reform was framed by the constitutional concept of governance. Furthermore, as 
obviously explicated in King Prajadhipok’s memorandum quoted above, the reform also involved 
the political conflicts between the King and the new leaders. I should state here that the 
administrative process of the royal court became again important after World War II and the 
mysterious murder of King Ananda on 9 June 1946. Eventually, the Thai political scene after the 
coup d’état on 8 November 1947 saw the overthrow of Pridi Bhanomyong’s group and the 
deletion of the revolutionary legacies with respect to the administration of the royal court. The 
conservative 1949 Constitution was an endpoint to the retaliatory process.  
2.1 Economic Problems and the Royal Court Reform 
The reform of the royal court, financially and administratively, in the initial period after 
the Revolution seemed to respond mainly to economic problems, i.e. to address the fiscal 
difficulties unsolved since the old regime. It was noticeable that the aristocrats from the absolutist 
administration, for instance Phraya Mano (the first Prime Minister), were willingly collaborative 
in the reform. It therefore could be argued that the leaders during that period agreed that the royal 
court’s expenditure was a significant root of the country’s economic difficulties and the situation 
could be fixed by reducing the court’s budget. Under the political tensions present after the 
Revolution, to persuade King Prajadhipok to reduce the royal court allocation with the 
cooperation of Phraya Mano should be one of not so many successful collaborations between 
new and old leaders, besides the first permanent Constitution promulgated on 10 December 1932. 
29 
 
One of the purposes of the royal court reform after the Revolution was to reduce the palace’s 
expenditures to help address economic troubles. 
The impotence of the old regime government in its attempts to resolve the economic 
crisis was ascribed to the 1932 Revolution. Benjamin A. Batson, who studied the last reign of the 
Siamese absolute state, reported documentary evidence of the effects of the economic problems 
on King Prajadhipok’s government during the few months before the Revolution took place. The 
crisis affected not only the government’s fortunes, but also relationships between the ministers. 
As a result, Prince Baworadej, the Minister of Defense, quitted his position due to his failure to 
increase the military’s rate of salary.6 The government’s solution to the crisis mainly impacted 
the middle-rank civil servants, while the royal family members and the high-rank bureaucrats 
could avoid the effect. This made disgruntlement more widespread. In order to reduce its 
expenditures, the government removed many middle-rank civil servants and initiated new kinds 
of taxation such as the salary tax. This new tax directly affected the middle class, but did not have 
any impact on the royals, the aristocrats, or Chinese merchants.7 Dissatisfaction with the 
government was publicly expressed in the newspapers. Acharapon Kamutphisamai indicated that 
many newspaper writings before the Revolution illustrated frustration with the government’s 
economic solutions.8 The crisis also led the public to realize that the ineffective government did 
not have any ability to bring prosperity to the country.9 Lastly, the dissatisfaction over the 
economy was one of those factors which empowered the Revolution in June 1932. 
                                                            
6 Benjamin A. Batson, The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
pp.191-193 
7 Ibid., “The Salary Tax Act,” The Royal Gazette  49(17 April 2475): 25-45 
8 Acharaporn Kamutphissamai, Problems in Thai Society before the 1932 Revolution: Reflections from newspaper 
writings (Bangkok: Thai-Khadi Institute, Thammasart University, 1989), pp.223-319 
9 Matthew Phillip Copeland, Contested Nationalism and the 1932 Overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam, PhD 
thesis, Australian National University, 1993, pp.164-168. 
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Prajadhipok’s government was aware of the previous reign’s too-large expenditure. 
When ascending to the throne, he had to settle the debt amassed since Vajiravuth’s reign,10 and 
the economic crisis forced him to decrease the royal court’s budget twice in 1926 and 1931. 
Nevertheless, retrospectively, Prajadhipok’s attempts to resolve the situation were proven 
insufficient to protect the absolute state. 
The inability of the government to address the economic problems was likely due to the 
privilege enjoyed by royal family members. Since the Sixth reign the military and the royal court 
were prioritized in the annual allocation rather than other budgetary items directly involving the 
country’s development, such as infrastructure, agriculture, and education.11 During the year 
before the Revolution, the newspapers critiqued the higher class’s laziness and suggested new 
taxation for the rich, especially the royals.12 The royal family members who invested in land did 
not have any impact from the salary tax. The ascription of the economic problems to the royal 
privileges was very obvious in the first Declaration of the People’s Party read during the coup 
d’état on 24 June 1932. The text, written by Pridi Bhanomyong, severely condemned the 
absolutist rule of the Chakri Dynasty, indicating that the country’s economic difficulty was the 
result of the uneducated administration by the Dynasty. Comprised of corrupt aristocrats and 
royals, the King’s rule had gained the Dynasty huge fortunes from taxation, which was allocated 
to the monarch’s personal expenditures rather than being spent for the country’s prosperity. The 
Declaration indicated that the problems would not be fixed unless the absolute state was 
                                                            
10 National Archives of Thailand (N.A.), R.7 K.19/6 
11 Pornpen Hantrakool The Government Spending During the Reign of King Rama the Sixth (A.D.1910-25), 
M.A.Thesis, Department of History, Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University, 1974 
12 Benjamin a. Batson, The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam, pp.188-189, 221 
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abolished, and that the royals’ illegitimate assets would be confiscated so that the wealth could be 
diffused, so that the country could be more affluent.13  
The language style of the First Declaration and notifications in the post-revolution 
newspapers led to panic among royal family members about the confiscation of their assets.14 
Nevertheless, when the Revolution had already been accomplished, the general attitude of the 
People’s Party towards the royals softened, due to their wishes to build an inclusive 
collaboration. Lastly, Phraya Mano, then Head of the People’s Committee, had to publicly 
declare that the royals’ properties would not be seized.15 However, the takeover of the 
Bangkhunbhrom Palace from Prince Boribhat, and examples of revolutions from other countries, 
especially Russia, which resulted in the tragic fate of the Russian royal family members, still 
triggered panic among the royals. They feared the risk to their physical safety as well as their 
properties. Nevertheless, the government’s solutions which might have affected the royals’ 
fortune were not a straightforward confiscation; rather, they were indirect deployments such as 
the enactment of the Death Duty Act and the formal exclusion of the royals from politics, which 
caused many of them to be jobless. The royal family member who was affected the most was 
King Prajadhipok himself. He was asked several times to reduce the royal court’s budget, which 
would eventually lead to palace court reforms after his abdication. 
2.2 The Office of the Palace Administration 
As described above, the Department of the Royal Secretariat performed vital duties in 
the absolute state, since drafts of formal documents from the ministries had to be filtered by it 
                                                            
13 “First Announcement of the People’s Party,” in Chai-anand Samutwanich and Khattiya Kannasut Thai Political 
Documents B.E. 2417-2477) (Bangkok: Social Science and Humanities Textbook Project), pp. 209-211 
14 Benjamin A Batson, The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam,, p.239, Thamsuk Numnond, Political Drama 24 
June 1932 (Bangkok: Horattanachai Printing, 2002), Nakharin Mektrairat, The Siamese Revolution in 1932 
(Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social and Humanities Textbooks Project, 1992) 
15 Benjamin A Batson, The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam,, p.239 
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before the documents were submitted to the King. The bureau functioned in the same way as the 
Cabinet Secretariat of the modern government, yet the final decision absolutely belonged to the 
King rather than the Cabinet. Besides its important responsibility, the origin and development of 
the Department of the Royal Secretariat also reflected the formation of the Siamese absolute 
state. After King Chulalongkorn created the Revenue Control Office (Ho Rasadakorn Phiphat) 
for collecting and centralizing the state income, the central government needed an audit process 
to control the country’s finance. Then, the King established the Audit Office, which would be 
developed to the Department of the Royal Secretariat. The bureau’s history then was partly in the 
process of power centralization to the monarch. 
The 1932 Revolution put an end to the duties of the Department of the Royal 
Secretariat. The King had no function in the administration of the country anymore. The bureau 
was replaced by the Cabinet secretariat, and in September 1932 an announcement to abolish the 
Department of the Royal secretariat was formally issued.16 At the same time, Chao Phraya 
Mahithorn, the royal secretary, resigned.17 The abolishment of the Department of the Royal 
Secretariat was one of the landmarks defining the end of the administrative power of the absolute 
regime. 
The Promoters (Phu Ko Karn) of the Revolution did not change the country to a 
republic, but instead chose to preserve the monarchy. There was some continuity in bureaus from 
the old regime, one of which was the Ministry of the Royal Household. However, although it was 
not abolished, the Ministry’s administrative level was degraded and it was renamed to the Office 
of the Palace Administration (sala wakarn phraratchawang). Changes made to this bureau during 
                                                            
16 “Announcement to abolish the Office of Royal Secretariat,” Royal Gazette 49 (18 September 2475): 390-391 
17 “Announcement to abolish an Official Position,” Royal Gazette 49 (18 September 2475): 391-392 
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the eighteen months immediately after the Revolution illustrate the unique position of the 
monarchy in the post-revolution regime, administratively and financially. 
Information about the finances of the royal court after the Revolution was mentioned by 
Chollada Wattanasiri; although her main point of study was the business investment of the Privy 
Purse in the old regime, she was the first scholar to disclose the allocation for the royal court after 
the absolute state was overthrown, and her paper has been widely cited by other academics 
working in this area.18 Chollada’s information about the palace court’s annual allowance 
generally conformed to the contemporary documental sources; however, she made errors on some 
important points, which caused researchers using her data to have false information. What 
Chollada says about the royal court’s allocation are in the table 2.1 below.  
 
Table 2.1: The Royal Court’s annual Allocation, 1930 – 193719 
                                                            
18 For example, Porphant Ouyyanont, “The Crown Property Bureau from Crisis to Opportunity,” Pasuk and Chris 
Baker (eds.), Thai Capital after the 1997 Crisis, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2008, pp. 155-186 
19 Chollada Wattanasiri, “Investment of the privy purse, 1890-1932,”  p.38 
Year Amount (Baht)
1930 6,000,000
1931 5,000,000
1932 479,543
1933 590,230
1934 561,021
1935 470,610
1936 434,115
1937 409,480
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As mentioned above, in 1931 King Prajadhipok decreased the royal court’s budget from 
6 million baht to 5 million baht. Chollada’s data indicates that after the revolution the 
government reduced the royal allocation to 479,543 baht, and the amount would not surpass 6 
hundred thousand baht a year until Prajadhipok abdicated. Moreover, Chollada also states that: 
[F]rom 1932 on, the Privy Purse’s allowance was named “the budget 
for the monarch” composing of four categories of expenses: the 
budget for His Majesty’s use while he is young, the budget for the 
royal merit, the budget for the Regent, and the budget for the annuity 
for the royals. All of these budgets were reduced after the 1932 
revolution. King Rama VIII received his personal budget only 100,000 
baht annually.20 
If the above information was true, the royal allocation would have been reduced from 5 
million baht in 1931 to only about 480,000 baht in the next year, which raises the following 
interesting questions: How could the government force King Prajadhipok accede to that amount? 
How did the king react to such a request? However, when I examined Chollada’s source for this 
information, I found that Chollada had made some mistakes. 
Chollada’s first fallacy was that she misread the number. Her source for this point was 
from a referential work which documented the incomes and expenses of Thailand between 1892 
and 1974. However, there was no information in the book about the royal budget in 1932 and 
1933, for which years Chollada stated that the royal allowances were 479,543 and 590,230 baht 
respectively. However, these figures for 1932 and 1933 in her table were the allocations for the 
                                                            
20 Chollada Watthanasiri, “Investment of the privy purse, 1890-1932,” p, 39. 
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Cabinet in those two years,21 which suggests she confused the two categories. I have confirmed 
that the allowances for the royal court in the first two years after the revolution were not as 
indicated in Chollada’s work. 
Another of Chollada’s mistakes was her categorization of the royal budget. In fact, the 
allowance for the royal court was not determined immediately after the revolution as Chollada 
stated. These mistakes do occur in academic studies, and Chollada’s main focus was the Privy 
Purse’s investment during the period of the absolutist state. Nevertheless, the true data should be 
found. I report different information in more details.  
The royal allowances in the first two years after the Revolution inevitably involved the 
political circumstances. It is important to discuss changes in the royal court in order to understand 
the annual allocation for the monarch after the absolute period. The first circumstantial situation 
requiring explanation is the Office of Palace Administration.  
The Office of the Palace Administration was the organization responsible for the royal 
court’s work for the first eighteen months after the 1932 Revolution. According to documents 
about the changes made to the ministries due to the Revolution, although their ministers were as 
formally honorable as other ministers22, the Ministry of the Royal Household and the Ministry of 
the Royal Secretariat were not ministries any more. The Minister of the Royal Household was 
renamed to the Governor of the Palace and the Minister of the Royal Secretariat was renamed to 
the Royal Secretary.  No official documentation of these changes was published during the very 
first months; however, some announcements naming the bureau which appeared during the late 
                                                            
21 Phuangthip Phraisan and Mana Phattaratham A Collection of Thailand’s Incomes and Expenses, 1892-1974 
(Bangkok: Faculty of Economy, Chulalongkorn University, 1976), p.196 
22 “Announcement of Civil Servants shuffling and Ministries merging,” Royal Gazette 49(29 June 1932): 180-182  
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August 1932 provided documentation of the existence of the organization.23  When the Office of 
Royal Secretary was abolished in September 1932, the Office of the Palace Administration 
became the sole organization whose responsibilities were the affairs of the royal court. After the 
National Assembly was shut down by Phraya Mano on 1 April 1933, all ministries were formally 
reestablished by an Act in which the Office of the Palace Administration was mentioned. The 
Office was composed of ten divisions including the Department of the Royal Private Secretary, 
the Department of Palace Guards, and the Privy Purse Department.24 According to the Act, the 
Office of the Palace Administration’s function was to administer the royal affairs. Noticeably, the 
Office was separated from other organizations which were directly under the Cabinet’s control. 
This implied that it was not in the government’s power. Pridi Bhanomyong later mentioned this 
point in the National Assembly: 
Mano’s government separated the Office of the Palace Administration from other 
ministries, and appointed the Governor of the Palace as its commander. This position 
was not appointed in the same way as other ministers.25 
Financially, the Office of the Palace Administration was assigned annual allocations as 
were other state’s organizations; however, King Prajadhipok spent the budget as he pleased 
without approval of Parliament. The Office’s budget was divided into the private expenses of the 
King and the expenditures of the royal court. Generally, this budget was gradually decreased after 
the Revolution, but the reduction was not as much as described by Chollada. This was 
documented in a report titled “the Explanation of the 1933 State’s Budget” submitted to the 
                                                            
23 For examples, “Announcement of the Office of the Palace Administration,” Royal Gazette 49(9 October 1932): 
2426 and “Announcement of the Office of Palace Administration,” Royal Gazette 49(28 August 1932): 1807 
24 “The Ministries and Departments Establishment Act , B.E. 2476,” Royal Gazette 12 May 2476, pp. 172-178 
25 Minutes of the National Assembly Meetings, 26/1933, 23 November 1933 
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National Assembly by the Director of the Department of the Comptroller on 31 March 1933. 
According to the report, the budget for the royal court in 1925 when King Prajadhipok ascended 
to the throne was 6 million baht and the King reduced the budget to 5 million baht in 1931 due to 
the economic downturn. At this point, the Director’s information conforms to Chollada’s. 
However, he stated further that “[I]n 1932 the King cut more 500,000 baht. Therefore, the royal 
budget of that year was only 4.5 million baht. Due to the economic circumstances, the King had a 
command to further reduce the budget again about one million baht.”26   
Conforming to other contemporary sources, the Director’s report also significantly 
stated that the royal budget was reduced twice in 1932. The first reduction was directed by the 
absolute government itself around April, due to its anticipation of the economic situation.27 The 
second reduction was carried out by the post-revolutionary government. According to other 
evidence, such a reduction was a result of negotiations between the government and the King. 
The early records of the revolutionary People’s Committee (the then-Cabinet) detailed the 
discussion between committees on how to manage the royal budget. Phraya Mano, then 
Chairman of the Committee, argued that the government should not interfere with how the 
budget provided for the royal court was managed. However, Mano himself raised a question in a 
meeting concerning the possibility of a request by the government of the King to decrease the 
royal allowance a further 50%.28 Interestingly, Mano has been perceived by scholars as one of the 
conservative aristocrats left from the old regime.29 Nevertheless, he did acknowledge the 
                                                            
26 Minutes of the National Assembly Meetings 59/2475, 31 March 2476 
27 “The State Budget B.E. 2475,” Royal Gazette 49(27 April 1932): 309-315 
28 The Record of the People’s Committee Meeting number 31, n.d. (handwritten) This meeting should be held around 
the mid-August 1932. 
29 As described in Natthapol Chaiching, To Dream an Impossible Dream: The Siamese Counter-Revolution 
Movement, 1932-1957 (Bangkok: Fadeawkan, 2013). However, Princess Phunphisamai Dissakul considered Mano as 
a hater of the royals.  Please see, Phunphisamai Dissakul, What I have seen: the Ending Episode (Bangkok: 
Matichon, 2003), pp.114-115 
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necessity of decreasing the royal expenditures. It appeared that after years of economic difficulty, 
every group of Siamese elites had a consensus that the country had to cut down every budget as 
much as possible, including the royal expenses. 
How much the royal budget would be reduced was the issue the Cabinet had to 
negotiate with the King. According to the report of the Director of the Department of the 
Comptroller mentioned above, in mid-1932 the royal budget was decreased by approximately 1 
million baht. This meant that the government’s target of a 50% reduction was not accomplished, 
because the previous amount was 4.5 million baht. In addition, although the government missed 
their goal, the reduction still left Prajadhipok feeling insulted. He expressed this feeling at least 
twice, the first time in a letter the King’s private secretary sent to Mano as the Minister of 
Finance only a month after the reduction: 
His Majesty has a royal command to inform you [Mano] that in this year His Majesty 
is trying to spend the budget in accordance with the amount the Ministry of Finance 
provided him. Although the amount is enormously cut, the budget is still imbalanced; 
therefore, His Majesty will seek some compensation for helping the government. 
However, His Majesty insists that the government is going to provide him 3 million 
baht of royal budget next year. The reduction of the budget has made him feeling that 
he cannot properly maintain the honors of the Siamese monarch. [Siam] would be 
better off changing to a Republic if the government does not stop cutting the royal 
budget. If you want to have a king, then you must encourage him to preserve his royal 
integrities.30 
                                                            
30 The Government’s Declaration on King Prajadhipok’s Abdication (Bangkok: Lahuthos, 1935), pp. 175-176 
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Another occurrence of Prajadhipok’s mentioning his discontentment over the budget 
reduction was in his personal letter to Prince Jirasakti, his adopted son, in March 1933. After 
narrating the situation in Siam in which there were rumors about the decisive measure the 
government was preparing for the royal family members, the King mentioned his budget which 
had been reduced by the government. 
They ‘love the country’, so they seek power and money. If I ‘love the country’, then I 
have to let my power gone. I have to be enslaved. I have to let them to reduce my 
incomes. I have to sacrifice whatever I have. It seems not to be a square deal. I cannot 
stand this.31 
This information is therefore more definite that in the first year of the Revolution the 
royal court was allocated approximately 3 million baht. In 1933, as the King insisted in the letter 
above, the government provided exactly 3 million baht for the palace court. According to the 
Director of the Department of the Comptroller, the royal budget comprised the expenditures of 
the Office of Palace Administration, salaries and pensions of the royal court’s servants, the 
annual annuity for the royals, and the personal expenses of the King. 
The Office of the Palace Administration had a unique identity in the governance after 
the Revolution. The bureau’s budget was annually allocated by the state, but its administrative 
and financial managements were held to be internal affairs of the King. The highest commander 
of the bureau, Chao Phraya Woraphong, the Minister of the Royal Household in the old regime, 
was also held as the King’s personal royal servant, responsible only to the King. Although there 
was no specific document indicating their status, the officials of ten departments under the Office 
                                                            
31 King Prajadhipok to Prince Jirasakti, 1 March 1933 in Memory Funeral Book of Khunying Manee Siriworasarn (1 
December 1999) 
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of the Palace Administration thus might be held royal servants as well. Financially, when the 3 
million baht was allocated, it would be held completely at the King’s prerogative. The 
expenditures in the palace court, salaries of officials, the maintenance of palaces and royal 
residences, and ritual expenses were under neither the government’s nor Parliament’s authority.  
This exceptional status of the Office of the Palace Administration was maintained until the 
bureau was promoted to be a ministry again after the Baworadej Rebellion.  
Between June 1932 and December 1933, when the Office of the Palace Administration 
was the principal bureau of the royal court, the political conflicts among the leaders became a 
civil war. In October 1933, Prince Baworadej, the Minister of Defense of the old regime, led the 
provincial army, composed of some royals and royalists, to seize power from the People’s Party’s 
government. There is some evidence that the Office of the Palace Administration had a crucial 
role during the rebellion. The memoir of Phayom Rojanapruek, an ex-official of the Ministry of 
the Royal Household who began his career as a journalist, depicted his own roles during the civil 
war as the royal court’s secret agent. King Prajadhipok had formed an intelligence unit for which 
the Office of the Palace Administration was the center. Gaining intelligence from his career as a 
journalist, Phayom was one of those who were recruited. Chao Phraya Worapong drafted the 
spies himself and would filter information from them before submitting to the King.32 This 
intelligence circle did not avoid the government’s eyes, as Prajadhipok was accused by the 
Special Court of his conspiracy in the rebellion few years later.33 Arguably, the reform which 
took place after the rebellion would prevent the intervention in politics of the royal court as 
before. 
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In sum, during the first two years after the 1932 Revolution, the organizations 
responsible for the Siamese royal court were not ministries any more. While the Ministry of 
Royal Secretariat was downgraded and eventually abolished, the Ministry of the Royal 
Household was changed to the Office of the Palace Administration, which was still one of the 
King’s prerogatives. The unique status of the Office was its financial system which was annually 
funded by the state but was subject neither to the Cabinet nor the National Assembly; rather, its 
spending was completely under the King’s decision. However, each annual allowance of the 
royal court was a result of negotiations between the government and King Prajadhipok, and, 
according to documentary sources, the reduction of the royal court’s budget made the King feel 
insulted. 
2.3 The Reestablishment of the Ministry of the Royal Household 
Although there is not any specific evidence indicating how Bhahon government 
perceived the royal court during the rebellion, it was understandable if the Cabinet was frustrated 
by the King’s intelligence unit. Its movement could be held as threat to the government’s 
security. Changes happened to the Office of the Palace Administration after the rebellion which 
might have shown the new leader’s attitude toward the royal court. This reform should be 
considered, on the one hand, as a part of the political conflicts between King Prajadhipok and the 
government. On the other hand, it was a composition of the constitutional projects the leaders 
after the Revolution tried to establish in the Siamese government. 
In November 1933, only a month after the Baworadej Rebellion, the government 
submitted the Ministries Reform Bill to Parliament.34 There was no record of the Cabinet 
meetings during the rebellion documenting the real purpose of the government concerning the 
                                                            
34 Minutes of the National Assembly Meeting, 26/1933 (Regular), 23 November 1933  
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Bill. However, after the Act was promulgated, the Siamese executive branch would be composed 
of 8 ministries and one equal-ministry organization – the Office of the Prime Minister. Among 
the ministries, the Office of the Palace Administration was upgraded to the Ministry of the Royal 
Household. One significant change in the Minister of the Royal Household was that it was the 
first time in Thai history that the royal court organization was administratively and financially 
separated from the monarch, at least according to the law. Nevertheless, the most important 
organization of the royal court, the Privy Purse Department, was effectively practically still under 
the King’s control. 
According to Pridi Bhanomyong, who explained to the MPs in the National Assembly 
why the Bill was necessary, the new Ministry of the Royal Household would be under the 
government’s responsibility, so its minister would be subject to Parliament as were other 
ministers. Pridi’s explanation had an obvious implication that the Ministry of the Royal 
Household and its officials, especially the minister, would be transferred from the organization 
and servants of the King to be under the state’s authority. The minister, who was a political 
bureaucrat, had to perform his duties in accordance with Parliament’s approval, not with the 
King’s command as before. As explained by Pridi, “[T]he Ministry of the Royal Household 
becomes one of the state’s affairs, so do all of its departments, such as the Department of the 
Royal Guards, the Privy Purse, and Department of the Chamberlain.” What Pridi said reflected 
the government’s expectation over the reform of the royal court. 
How the royal court, especially King Prajadhipok, responded to changes in the Ministry 
of the Royal Household appeared in some documentary evidence. In a  letter (well known to 
those who study the modern history of Thailand) in 1934 Prajadhipok told Prince Naris, the then 
Regent, that one of the rumors which insulted him was that the government tried to change the 
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Ministry of the Royal Household to the  British model without informing him. What offended 
him the most was that the royal guard and the Privy Purse would be separated from his power.35  
What Prajadhipok expressed contradicted Pridi’s explanation to the National Assembly in 1933 
that the King had already approved the government proposal to reform the Ministry of the Royal 
Household. According to Pridi, before submitting the Bill to Parliament, the Cabinet appointed a 
group of persons to consult with the King over the changes, and Prajadhipok agreed with a 
proposal that the Ministry and its minister would be transferred to be subject to the government.36 
The King seemed not to worry about the changes in the Minister of the Royal Household in the 
initial step, for he authorized the Bill himself before leaving for Europe in January 1934. 
However, what Pridi explained to Parliament might be different from the King’s perspective.  
One of the impacts of the reform which made the Ministry of the Royal Household 
subject to Parliament was that its minister could not have any political role. Chao Phraya 
Woraphong, then, could not be the center of the secret agent unit as he was during the rebellion. 
One interesting question is why Chao Phraya was still appointed as the Minister of the Royal 
Household in spite of his role during the civil war. On the one hand, the government may have 
been attempting to compromise with the King for helping to ensure a smooth collaboration after 
the conflicts. On the other hand, appointing a person close to the King such as Chao Phraya 
Woraphong to a position which answered to Parliament meant that the government could keep 
his actions in control. This change in 1933 turned a royal bureau to an organization under the 
power of parliament. It could be held as part of the constitutional monarchy reform efforts in 
which the monarch was excluded from the state affairs. It also reflected the political struggles 
                                                            
35 King Prajadhipok, “The Royal Memorandum no.1,” in The Government’s Declaration on King Prajadhipok’s 
Abdication, pp.137-139 
36 Minutes of the National Assembly Meeting, 26/1933 (Regular) 23 November 1933 
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between the People’s Party and the royal court, in which the former could turn a figure who used 
to be an antagonist to be its controllable puppet. 
In addition to the effects of the new system of annual allocation of the re-established 
Ministry of the Royal Household, the power to manage the Ministry’s budget was removed from 
the monarch’s prerogative and was now held as a public affair. According to Pridi, the financial 
management of the Ministry would be changed in accordance with its administrative 
transformation. The annual budget would comprise the expenditures of the Ministry and the 
budget for the King. As Pridi claimed, the management of the expenses of the Ministry would be 
the government’s power, because its administration was changed. When the 1934 fiscal year Bill 
was submitted to the National Assembly, the budget of the Ministry of the Royal Household, 
instead of being a royal prerogative, became compliant with the parliamentary fiscal process 
(similar to other budgets). This process began with the Minister of the Royal Household setting 
up the budget and proposing it to the Minister of Finance. The Cabinet then considered all 
proposals. Afterwards, the budget would be submitted to the King for his approval. When 
Prajadhipok left for England, the Cabinet and the Regent considered the budget together again 
before submitting it to Parliament.  
The categorization of the budget was also changed. In the previous year, there were 
three sorts of expenditure: the salary and expenses of the Ministry, the salary and expenses of the 
Privy Purse, and the special budget comprising the personal budget of the King.37 In 1934, the 
Ministry of the Royal Household was still allocated approximately at 3 million baht, but its 
categorization was not the same. The expenses concerning the royal court now comprised six 
groups of budget: the private budget of the King, the annual annuity for the royals, the 
                                                            
37 Director of the Department of the Privy Purse to the Minister of the Royal Household, 1 January 1934 in N.A. (3) 
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expenditures of the Ministry, the expenses of the Privy Purse, the budget of the Royal Guard, and 
miscellaneous expenses. Prajadhipok’s personal budget was 600,000 baht. When the National 
Assembly approved the Bill, the budget of the monarch and the expenditure for the Minister of 
the Royal Household were located on different parts of the Act.38 Thus, the financial 
administration of the royal court was legally separated from the monarch. 
The separation between the personal budgets of the monarch from the allocation of the 
royal court could be explained by the government’s attempts to imitate the financial system of the 
British palace court. The essential of the English system was the exclusion of the sovereign from 
the power to control the public finances. The Civil List, initiated in Great Britain due to a 
compromise after the Glorious Revolution, began by covering the royal court’s expenditures and 
the civil administration’s budgets. However, after decades of negotiation between the palace and 
Parliament, the Civil List was limited to be only the personal expenses of the monarch and some 
expenditure for the throne’s honor.39  The development of the Civil List reflected English 
political history in which Parliament increasingly controlled public affairs. A Siamese post-
revolution leader mentioned the Civil List as the model of the reform of the royal court: 
[T]he budget was initiated last year for separating the personal expenses of the King 
from the budget of the Ministry of the Royal Household. The two kinds of budget 
used to be united. Nevertheless, the government considered that in the constitutional 
regime, it should be corrected in accordance with other country, England for instance. 
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This meant that the personal expenses of the King would be separated, as the 
foreigners called it the Civil List.40 
How did King Prajadhipok think of his loss of power over the royal court’s budget? 
Among his requirements to the government during the abdication crisis, Rama VII insisted that 
the Ministry of the Royal Household must not be modelled after the British royal court. He 
further maintained that the appointment of the royal servants had to be his prerogative, but the 
King did not mention the system of the budget management. 
Some information about changes in the Minister of the Royal Household might clarify 
this point. According to the Director of the Privy Purse, King Prajadhipok‘s personal allocation in 
1933 was 1 million baht. However, when the expenditures of the royal court increased during the 
year, the King had to divider-allocate his personal budget to compensate for the increased 
expenses, so his real amount of money in that year was only 530,000 baht.41 Thus, to allocate the 
King’s personal allowance in 1934 at 600,000 baht was actually to increase the amount compared 
to the previous year. Moreover, Prajadhipok asked the government to transfer the salaries of the 
ladies-in-waiting (which were formerly combined with his personal allocation) to be instead a 
part of the Ministry’s budgets, and the Cabinet approved this request.42 This meant that in 
addition to the increased annual personal budget, Prajadhipok had still more money due to the 
transfer of these expenditures to the Ministry of the Royal Household. At this point the King 
benefited from changes to the royal court, which might be why he did not oppose the 
transformation. 
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What Pridi misunderstood about the change in the royal court administration was the 
Privy Purse. He stated to the National Assembly that when the Ministry of the Royal Household 
was transferred to be under the state’s authority, other organizations under the Ministry, 
including the Privy Purse, would be accordingly changed. What Pridi said might reflect the new 
leaders’ expectation of the results of their manipulation of the royal court. However, although it 
was legally a bureau under the Ministry of the Royal Household, the Privy Purse was not yet 
controlled by the government. This point appeared when an MP inquired the government during 
the fiscal year Bill session as to why there was no detail provided about the Privy Purse’s 
incomes. The Prime Minister’s answer clearly indicated the status of the Privy Purse at that time.  
Regarding your question, I think you do not understand. The Privy Purse’s budget is 
not of the government; rather, it is the personal money of the King. The income from 
shophouses is not for the government: it is for the royal court. Then, we cannot 
examine the Privy Purse’s budget.43 
In sum, the reestablishment of the Ministry of the Royal Household in 1934 brought 
about the separation of some parts of the royal court administration from the King’s power. The 
new Ministry and its inferior organizations became the government’s responsibility, and its 
minister’s status shifted from that of a subordinate to the King to parliamentary control, which 
prevented the Minister from acting in an antagonistic role against the government. Furthermore, 
the transformation of power was precisely expressed through the annual allowance the 
government allocated for King Prajadhipok. The expenditures in the royal court formerly spent 
under the royal power were now controlled by the government. The exclusion of the monarch 
from the power to manage the royal court’s budget was modelled after Britain’s Civil List 
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system. King Prajadhipok did not seem to have an issue with these changes, at least in the initial 
part, in early 1934. According to the documentary materials, the government had consulted the 
King before implementing their project. Moreover, some evidence indicated that Prajadhipok 
benefited at least somewhat from the transfer of the budgets of the Ministry of the Royal 
Household to the government’s responsibility. The key point here is that the most important 
organization of the royal court, the Privy Purse Department, was still under royal power: the 
government allocated its budget, but had no authority to control it.  
2.4 The Ministry of the Royal Household and the Crisis of Abdication 
The abdication of King Prajadhipok was another significant turning point which brought 
about changes in the Ministry of the Royal Household. Financially, the budget for the monarch 
was reduced and re-categorized. Administratively, the palace’s organizations were transformed 
into smaller bureaus. 
2.4.1 Before the Abdication 
Before King Prajadhipok sent the Prince Regent a telegram in October 1934 stating that 
he wanted to abdicate, the conflicts between the King and the government comprised three main 
issues. The first conflict was about the Death Duty Bill. The Cabinet approved such a bill not 
long after the Revolution for collecting taxes from the rich.44 The process to enact the Bill took 
about two years, and the House of Representatives approved it in August 1934.  However, when 
the approved Bill was submitted to the Regent to obtain the royal endorsement, King Prajadhipok 
refused to authorize it. The King wanted the government to ensure the Bill specified more 
definitively that the properties of the crown would be immune to any tax. The Cabinet denied the 
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King’s request, because the sovereign had no power to rearrange the parliamentary approved Bill. 
What the King could do in this situation was only either to endorse the Bill or to return it to the 
National Assembly, according to the Constitution. The Cabinet then turned the issue back to the 
House to decide its resolution. The majority of the MPs voted to maintain their previous 
resolution. Unsurprisingly, this decision insulted the King. Phraya Bhahon, the Prime Minister, 
had to promise the King that the government would urgently formulate a new Bill which 
contained the content the King wanted.45 This promise could convince the King, and the Death 
Duty Bill eventually gained the necessary sovereign endorsement and was promulgated in late 
August 1934. However, during the abdication crisis, Prajadhipok claimed that he did not want 
any new Bill. The Prime Minister’s promise was just another trick the government used to 
deceive him into endorsing the law, the King believed.  
The second issue concerned the three Bills related to the execution penalty. Prajadhipok 
wanted to add to the approved Bills that, after being sentenced to death, the death row inmate 
could appeal for the royal pardon. Furthermore, the King added that if such an appeal was still in 
the process, the execution had to be postponed. Nevertheless, the House of Representatives 
maintained its approved version. The three Bills were promulgated without any royal 
authorization, which was possible due to Article 39 of the Constitution. Some interesting 
implications of this case were raised during the argument. Firstly, to skip the monarch’s power to 
grant a royal merci might affect the Siamese traditional concept about the monarchy in which the 
King was the Lord of Life who had the authority to decide whether to let his subjects live.46 
Secondly, if such an authority was shifted to the government’s power, they might make use of it 
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to get rid of their political enemies47, and the King was really concerned about this point. The last 
issue concerned the constitutional power of the King over the parliamentary approved Bills. 
However, the House’s decisions were not in favor of the King. 
The last controversy was about the second category of the members of the National 
Assembly. According to the Constitution’s interim provision, there were two categories of the 
House’s members: the elected and the appointed. The provision stated that either when half of the 
people in the country had graduated from primary school or ten years had elapsed since the first 
Constitution was promulgated, all of the appointed MPs would be replaced by the elected. 
Accordingly, the controversy was about the royal power to appoint the second category of MPs 
and about the King’s prerogative to veto the parliamentary approved Bills. After the first general 
election in November 1933, the second category of MPs was to be selected. However, 
Prajadhipok claimed that the list came to him too late for him to make a careful decision and that 
he had to approve the list to meet a deadline.48 His point was that the government did not want 
him to have any power to select those MPs. According to the King, the second category became 
the government’s mechanism in the National Assembly. Due to the formulation of the majority 
rules as stated in the Constitution, if the monarch vetoed a law, the House could override his veto 
if the majority was only 1 vote more than half of the number of MPs. Prajadhipok then suggested 
that the majority rule should be replaced by a super-majority rules, which required three-quarters 
of votes to override the King’s veto. Generally, King Prajadhipok wanted more power in the 
legislative process.  
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The royal court issues were part of the controversy between Prajadhipok and the 
government during the crisis of abdication. The first problem was that the government wanted to 
prosecute Prince Subha Svastivatana and other royal guards because they were accused of being 
involved in the Baworadej Rebellion. Prajadhipok ascribed the prosecution to the government’s 
belief that the King himself supported the Rebellion. He claimed that his royal guards had 
nothing to do with Baworadej’s supporters and asked the government to drop the case. This point 
led to another requirement the King wanted. Prajadhipok opposed the government’s proposed 
dissolution of the royal guard unit. He claimed that the situation in the country after the Rebellion 
was still confusing. The military was split into factions. Fighting between factions could happen 
anytime, so the King felt unsafe without the royal guard. Prajadhipok insisted that his guard unit 
had to be maintained both in terms of number and financing, and he requested that the 
government to provide more guns and bullets to the royal guard. Lastly, Prajadhipok was 
concerned that the government had a secret plan to reform the Ministry of the Royal Household. 
He doubted whether the government intentionally concealed the plan and also did not notify him. 
Furthermore, the government’s plan was to change the royal court into the English model, to 
which Prajadhipok himself was strongly opposed. He asked the government to stop any plan for 
the Ministry, and vigorously insisted that the power to shuffle the royal servants did belong to 
him. 
2.4.2 Criticism of the Royal Budget in Parliament 
The controversy between King Prajadhipok and the new leaders affected the 
parliamentary review of the royal budget for the new fiscal year. Since August 1934, the National 
Assembly continuously had had sessions about the royal power and the relations between 
themselves and the monarchy, and the House’s resolutions always were not in favor of the King. 
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The Fiscal Year Bill was submitted to the National Assembly in February 1935, during which 
month Prajadhipok’s reign entered its final days. What seemed unexpected for the government 
was that the budget provided for the royal court was strongly critiqued by some MPs. For 
example, after reviewing the Bill in general, Luang Woranitipreecha, Sakonnakorn MP, critically 
questioned if the Ministry of the Royal Household really benefited the people. He claimed that 2 
million baht was too high to allocate the Ministry. Phra Phinit Thanakorn, an MP from Chiang 
Mai, suggested that the government should ask the King to reduce the Ministry of the Royal 
Household’s budget by 2 million Baht in order to help the poor.49 However, the Cabinet did not 
reply to these questions. 
Luang Woranitipreecha also questioned the budget provided for the Privy Purse. He 
asked why, since the Privy Purse was a private bureau of the King, running its affairs for the 
personal benefits of the monarch and other royal family members, was it funded by tax monies 
obtained from the people for more than 300,000 baht? He concluded that the Privy Purse’s 
expenditures should be dismissed from the public budget. The mention of the Privy Purse 
triggered the government to reply in the House. Phraya Bhahon, the Prime Minister, said that: 
[R]egarding the Privy Purse’s budget, it actually is the private budget. If we had 
clumsily reduced it, then it might have affected the monarchy. Therefore the Cabinet 
did not decrease its allocation.50 
By early 1935 the last phase of Rama VII’s reign began, more than a year after the 
reestablishment of the Ministry of the Royal Household, most of the administrative and financial 
management of the royal court had been assumed by the government; however, the Privy Purse 
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was still practically under royal authority. The government and Parliament did not intervene in its 
administrative and financial affairs. Nevertheless, during the transformative period, in which the 
conflicts between the monarch and the new leaders took almost two years to resolve, there 
appeared in the House of Representatives some calls for an inquiry into the royal annual 
allowance. 
After discussion, the House approved the Bill at the first reading. A committee was set 
up to examine it in detail. Prajadhipok abdicated on March 2, 1935. The parliamentary enactment 
of the Fiscal Year Act was still in process, thus the royal financial management was altered 
during this transformative period. One point left from the discussion of Luang Woranitipreecha 
would be a critical part of the changes in the Siamese Palace court: “the Ministry of the Royal 
Household must be collapsed to a department, and its budget must be reallocated.” 
2.4.3 After the Abdication 
The allotment for the royal court was changed due to Prajadhipok’s abdication. 
Available evidence indicates that Phraya Nitisart Phaisan, the Chairman of Parliament’s Fiscal 
Committee, suggested that the royal allocation should be reduced.51 Interestingly, the MPs who 
questioned the Ministry of the Royal Household’s budget during the first reading of the fiscal 
Bill, Luang Woranitipreecha and Phra Phinit Thanakorn, were also voted to be committee 
members, as was Prince Wan, who had a significant role in explaining to the MPs the principle of 
the fiscal Bill regarding the royal budget.52 The amount of the reduction was the subject over 
which the royal court and the committee negotiated. The process began when the Minister of the 
Royal Household set the annual allowance for the royal court, after which the committee 
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considered and reduced it to the preferred amount. The Council of Regency then provided their 
comments. The Cabinet reviewed all comments and created the final draft. Finally, the National 
Assembly approved the Bill and promulgated it as law. Such a process affirmed again that the 
Siamese royal court’s allocation had become a part of the national budget procedure. 
A main purpose of the rearrangement of the Ministry of the Royal Household’s 
allocation was to save the state’s budget. The committee suggested that the new king was still 
young and was living abroad, so the expenses in the royal court should not be as high as in the 
previous reign. Moreover, the royal allowance was also re-categorized during the negotiation. 
First, the most important change was that the personal allocation of the King, which was named 
‘the budget for His Majesty’s use while he is young’53, was initially reduced from 600,000 to 
only 250,000 baht, including the budget for the royal merit and other expenses. Second, it was 
separated from the other expenses of the royal court and fixed at 100,000 baht.54 Significantly, it 
was also re-assigned to the Central Budget, as was the budget for royal merit, that of the Regent, 
and the annual annuity for the royals.55 The Central Budget was defined as expenses under the 
direct control of the government without being allocated through any ministry. At this point, the 
government could expand its power to manipulate the personal budget of the monarch at least in 
the administrative structure. Details of the royal court budget rearranged after King Prajadhipok 
abdicated are in table 2.2 below (compared with previous years). 
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Table 2.2: Budgets of the Royal Court after the 1932 Revolution56 
 
 
The budget for the Ministry of the Royal Household related to the royal affairs was also 
rearranged and re-categorized. The Committee proposed to cut some royal budgets from the 
Ministry’s expenses and to transfer some expenditure to the personal budget of the King. In 
                                                            
56 Minutes of the National Assembly Meetings 59/2475, 31 March 2476, “The Fiscal Year Act, B.E. 2477,” Royal 
Gazette) 51(5 April 1934): 11-25, Minister of the Royal Household to Cabinet Secretariat, 11 Jan 1934 in N.A. (3) 
SR 0201.4.1/4, and “The Fiscal Year Act, B.E. 2478,” Royal Gazette) 51(31 March 1935): 1457-1472 
Year
Personal 
Budget of the 
King
Office of Palace 
Administration
Personal 
Budget of the 
King
Budget of the 
Royal Court
Personal 
Budget of the 
King
Ministry of the 
Royal 
Household 
Budget
Personal Budget of 
the King
100,000
Royal Merit 150,000
Regent 55,200
Annuity for Royals 200,000
Ministry of the 
Royal 
Household 
Budget
1935
1934
Royal Prerogative
Cabinet's Control / Parliamentary Process
1932
1933
Discretion of Princess Mother and the Regent
Parliamentary Process
Status
1,003,115 Cabinet's Control / Parliamentary Process
2,464,326
Royal Prerogative
Royal Prerogative
Central Budget
    Amount (Baht)
535,674
600,000
2,380,000
initially 4,500,000 baht, reduced 
to about 3,000,000 baht
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addition, sub-departments in the Ministry were merged together. The Department of the 
Chamberlain and the krom wang were collapsed to form the Office of the Permanent Secretary 
(samnakngan palad krasuang). Some bureaus were not changed but instead added more officials 
to their budgets. The deputy private secretary to the King and private secretary of each Regent 
were added to the Department of the Royal Private Secretary.  
Other important budgets included the Privy Purse and the Department of the Royal 
Guards. The Committee provided the budget of the Privy Purse only for its Director and other 
four Heads of Divisions, so other positions in the bureau had to be funded by the bureau’s own 
revenues. This rearrangement was in accordance with a plan which prepared to transfer the Privy 
Purse to be under the Ministry of Finance. The Regent disagreed with this change, however; the 
Regent argued that the Privy Purse was responsible for the personal properties of the King, so its 
separation from the Ministry of Finance was in accordance with the government’s policy which 
tried to separate the King’s personal assets from the Crown properties. The Committee removed 
the budget of the Department of the Royal Guards from that of the Ministry of the Royal 
Household and re-assigned it to that of the Ministry of Defense. The Council of Regency did not 
oppose this change but asked to retain the power to select the royal guard for themselves.  
Furthermore, the Regent claimed that the personal allowance of the King was too low, 
and argued that it should be combined with the special budget and the annual annuity for the 
royals. This amount of money should be spent arbitrarily by the King without any restriction by 
the conditions the Committee set up; otherwise, the royal prerogative would have been infringed, 
the Regent stated.  
In conclusion, the Siamese royal court again underwent many administrative and 
financial alterations during the abdication crisis. The unpleasant relationship between King 
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Prajadhipok and the new leaders lasted throughout 1934 (particularly when the King tried to 
increase his power). These conflicts could be traced in the discussions of the MPs in Parliament 
over the royal court’s budget. After the abdication in March 1935, the Ministry of the Royal 
Household was renovated in both its administration and finance. The King’s personal budget and 
the Ministry’s expenses were reduced. The internal organizations of the Ministry were amended 
to prepare for more thorough later reforms. 
2.5 Establishment of Bureau of the Royal Household 
The establishment of the Bureau of the Royal Household in accordance with the 
proposal of the Committee appointed by the Cabinet resulted in the government achieving 
complete control of the royal court, both in administrative and financial aspects. One of the most 
significant changes was that the Cabinet completely controlled the Privy Purse. 
2.5.1 The Committee and Its Proposal 
A few days after the 1935 Fiscal Year Act was promulgated, the Cabinet appointed the 
Committee for Reform of the Ministry of the Royal Household (hereafter the CRMR). 
Committee members included Prince Sakolwannakorn Worawan (Prince Sakol) as the committee 
chairman, Phra Dulayatharn Preecha White, Khun Worasithi Darunwech, and Praya 
Bamruaphakti.57 The committee’s principal duty was to remodel the Ministry of the Royal 
Household. To accomplish this, the CRMR was required to consider the notices of Parliament’s 
Fiscal Committee, the criticism of the MPs, and the concerns of a ministry official whose 
anonymous letter about the enormously reduced budget was submitted to the Regent and passed 
thence to the Cabinet. 
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This letter raised three significant issues. The first of these was that the annual annuity 
for the royals would be reduced, which, the letter’s author felt, could worsen relationships in the 
royal family as well as the relationship of the Cabinet and Parliament. The author suggested the 
government should retain the same amount for the annual grant. The second point of the letter 
was about the reduction of the salaries of the officials in the Ministry of the Royal Household’s 
organizations. If the salaries were reduced to the amount desired by the Fiscal Committee, more 
than 600 civil servants would be laid off. The third issue the letter mentioned was that the budget 
could not meet the entire expenses of the Ministry if the expenditures were to be exorbitantly 
reduced.58  The letter’s author might be one of the high rank administrators of the ministry, since 
the letter contained details of the reform.  The Regent agreed with the same concerns as detailed 
in the letter and submitted it to the Cabinet. 
There were no specific details concerning the notice of the Fiscal Committee mentioned 
by the Cabinet. However, as mentioned above, the committee wanted to regulate the annual 
annuity for the royals and this point had not yet been settled. Meanwhile, the MPs’ criticism of 
the budget of the Ministry of the Royal Household was that its amount was too high, and they 
wanted its administrative rank decreased to that of a department (Krom). This last point would be 
realized a few months later. 
Prince Sakol, the committee’s chairman, had the most significant role in the 
establishment of the BRH. He contended with the Regent over issues of the royal court reform. 
Prince Sakol (1888 – 1953) was a son of Prince Naradhip and mom Phan Worawan. He started 
his studies in his father’s residence and Rachawitthayalai School and received a state scholarship 
to study in England. The Prince graduated in Political Science from Cambridge University. He 
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was also trained at the Inner Temple and became a barrister in 1914. Prince Sakol began his civil 
service career in the Ministry of Interior. He was appointed a Privy Councilor and a Privy 
Councilor Committee member in the sixth and seventh reigns, respectively.59 His career was not 
affected by the 1932 Revolution. On the contrary, he seemed to be secure in the new regime, 
provided that he had usually been appointed by the Cabinet to one of its several committees. In 
his official biography, his duty in the CRMR was not mentioned. Prince Sakol’s thoughts 
occurring during the discussion with the Regent might have resulted from his education in 
Europe. In 1950s, the Prince publicly said that he joined the Fabian Socialist group when he was 
in England in the 1900s.60 However, in his argument with the Regent, his reasoning was 
obviously based on constitutional monarchical principles rather than socialism. 
The process of the establishment of the BRH was pursued as follows. The process 
began with the report of the CRMR. Next, the Regent considered the report and provided critical 
comments, to which the CRMR replied, mentioning points they did not agree with. After that, the 
Cabinet considered all proposals and comments and issued a final resolution. Lastly, the proposal 
was submitted as a Bill to the National Assembly for approval, and eventually the Act was 
promulgated. The following significant points of change to the Siamese royal court occurred 
during this process. 
First, the Ministry of the Royal Household was reduced in administrative level to be 
only a department, thus its head was no longer a minister. The CRMR ascribed this change to the 
decreasing importance of royal affairs after Prajadhipok’s abdication.61 Although agreeing with 
this point, the Regent expected that when King Ananda became sui juris, the royal court’s 
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administrative level would be increased again.62 The Cabinet did not guarantee this; rather, they 
left the issue to be resolved by future governments. Initially, the CRMR suggested that the new 
organization should be named ‘Department of the Palace’ (Krom Wang). However, Pridi 
Banomyong stated in a Cabinet meeting that there were other bureaus under the new organization 
which also held Krom status and argued that these hierarchically-different entities could not be 
the same level.63 Pridi suggested the name ‘Bureau of the Royal Household’ (Samnak Phra 
Ratchawang), which was approved by the Cabinet and Parliament. This name has been used until 
the present day. 
Regarding the BRH’s hierarchical command, the CRMR proposed that it should be 
directly under the Prime Minister’s control. This suggestion confused the Regent who argued that 
there were some discrepancies between being under the command of the Prime Minister and the 
Office of the Prime Minister. If the latter was appointed to instruct the BRH, it would be 
untraditional because the Siamese royal court, which had never been under any lower 
organization, would lose its integrity. Moreover, such a control could be misunderstood by those 
who believed that the government tried to unfairly manipulate the palace, the Regent argued. On 
the contrary, the Regent indicated that if the BRH was directly commanded by the Prime 
Minister, it would conform not only to the English pattern of the constitutional monarchy, but 
also to the Article 57 of the Constitution which stated that every royal affair must be 
countersigned by a minister. The CRMR had in fact suggested that the BRH be placed under the 
Prime Minister, so the Cabinet merely approved the proposal. When the Bill was submitted to 
Parliament, although some MPs did not agree that the royal court should be under the Prime 
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Minister’s power,64 these comments did not have a guarantor, so there was no discussion in 
Parliament, and the proposal remained unchanged. Regarding the comments of the Regent, it 
could be argued that after King Prajadhipok’s abdication, there was a consensus among the 
Siamese leaders that the royal court should be reformed in this direction. Even the Regent who 
considered themselves the representative of the King and the royal court did have an argument 
based on constitutional monarchical principles. However, it should be remarked that this change 
occurred when there was no King permanently residing in the country. Three years after the 1932 
Revolution, the royal court became an organization commanded by the Prime Minister. 
The Office of the Royal Private Secretary (hereafter called the ORPS) was established 
at the same time as the BRH as another royal organization under the command of the Prime 
Minister. Initially, the CRMR suggested that the ORPS should be a bureau under the BRH. 
However, the Regent disagreed with this point because the duties of the two organizations were 
different. The ORPS was responsible for the coordination between the royal court and the 
government, the consideration of Bills, and other documental work. The amounts of such work 
did not decrease after the abdication. The Regent therefore suggested that the ORPS should be 
separated from the BRH.65 The Cabinet agreed with the Regent. Thus, in effect, the Ministry of 
the Royal Secretariat, a royal court organization of the absolute era, which was downgraded to 
the Department of Royal Secretariat after the revolution, was simultaneously reestablished in 
1935 with the BRH. 
In the attempt to continue to reduce the state’s budget, the CRMR tried to merge some 
redundant organizations and to transfer some bureaus to other ministries. For example, the 
CRMR proposed that the documental work of every department should be relocated under the 
                                                            
64 Minutes of the National Assembly Meeting, 2/1935, 6 August 1935 
65 Royal Private Secretary to Cabinet Secretariat, 15 June 1935 in N.A. (2) SR 0201.14.1/10 
62 
 
BRH’s Office of Secretariat. The Division of the Royal Cloths and the Division of the Ladies in 
Waiting should be merged together. Moreover, the craft work, the amusement work, and the 
musical work, should be transferred to the Department of Fine Arts. Unsurprisingly, this 
suggestion did not have the Regent’s approval, since, as they argued, the royal tradition would be 
affected by the organizational breakdown. For instance, the Division of the Royal Cloths and the 
Division of the Ladies in Waiting had different functions. The first Division closely involved the 
monarch and other royal family members, but the second Division concerned ordinary people; 
therefore, combining these Divisions would be unconstitutional because Article 3 of the 
Constitution stated that ‘the person of the king is sacred and inviolable’.66 Furthermore, the 
Regent did not agree that the musical work should be transferred to the Department of Fine Arts 
because: 
[T]hose who performing the musical work are not normal artists. Rather, they carry 
out the higher royal performance which is necessary to be combined with other royal 
decorations, so it would be really wrong if the royally musical work is going to perform with 
those playing dramas.67 
It was obvious that the Regent’s concerns were about the royal traditions which might be 
changed due to the reform. The Cabinet did not want to insult the Regent by implementing this 
issue, since it was not a major concern for the new leaders. The Cabinet therefore promulgated a 
compromised resolution of this topic. The Division of Royal Cloth and the Division of Ladies in 
Waiting would function separately in the same department. The musical work was also 
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maintained in the BRH. After all of the organizational changes were accomplished, the BRH 
comprised 4 departmental bureaus and 10 inferior divisions.68 
In addition, the Regent was concerned by the reform-induced layoffs of so many civil 
servants in the Ministry of the Royal Household. According to the CRMR’s report, the old 
Ministry had 1,528 servants and after the reform only 919 positions would remain, including 
those who were transferred to the Department of Fine Arts. This meant that 709 public employees 
had to be laid off (which was a greater number than the author of the anonymous letter had 
anticipated). The Regent worried that the lay-off might lead to suffering among those servants. In 
order to relieve the effect of the unemployment, the CRMR negotiated with the Civil Service 
Commission to find available positions in the government organizations.69 Due to this major 
dismissal, the CRMR expected that the government would be able to reduce the budget by 
300,000 baht a year. 
Beyond reducing the state’s budget, the CRMR intended to make some changes to the 
royal court’s traditions. Reform of the religious rituals was one of the purposes of the Committee. 
The CRMR suggested that the royal court should retain only those rituals based on Buddhist 
tradition and dismiss all of those contained Brahmanism. According to the CRMR, ‘Brahmanism 
is obsolete…it should be cut down as much as possible because it is useless for either religious 
purpose or education.’  The Committee suggested that if any rituals required a Brahman, the royal 
court would consider hiring them case by case. The Regent strongly opposed this suggestion, 
since, as they argued, nearly almost every royal ritual had Brahman aspects, thus if Brahmanism-
based rituals were discarded, then all the royal ceremonies would not be correctly performed. 
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Interestingly, to support their position, the Regent proposed an argument based on parliamentary 
principles, claiming that any royal ritual could not be changed unless it was approved by the 
National Assembly. The Regent also stated that since the Brahman knowledge was transmitted 
orally to later generations within Brahman families, such knowledge would disappear if not 
supported by the royal court. The Regent suggested to retaining only necessary Brahman 
positions in the palace court. In the Cabinet meeting, there was no minister who opposed the 
Regent, thus the Brahman position was maintained in the royal court. 
The CRMR further proposed merging the experts in law and foreign affairs into the 
documental division of the ORPS. The committee argued that work in the royal court did not 
really relate to legal and international matters, so those experts were not necessary. This point 
brought about interesting debates. The Regent claimed that the CRMR proposed their plan 
without a thorough understanding of the royal court’s work. The expert in law’s duty was to 
submit his legal comments to the King on any Bill under consideration along with the legal issues 
affecting the monarch and other royals. Interestingly, in order to argue how indispensable the 
position was, the Regent even cited a resolution of the National Assembly which recognized the 
possibility that the monarch might be sued.70 In the case of the expert in foreign affairs, the 
Regent claimed that only knowing some languages was not enough; rather, the position required 
the thorough understanding of cultures of other countries.  The Regent further stated that while 
the young King resided abroad, the need for the expert was even increasing. The CRMR replied 
to the Regent that it was not necessary to have any legal expert in the royal court under the 
constitutional regime due to the possibility of misunderstanding between the monarchy and 
Parliament. These debates reflected the awareness of the leaders after the 1932 Revolution that 
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the reform of the royal court must be pursued in accordance with constitutional monarchical 
principles. Noticeably, despite their different standpoints, both the Regent and the committee 
based their arguments on constitutional concepts.  
Eventually, the Bureau of the Royal Household was established in August 1935 when a 
new Law concerning royal court reform was published in the Royal Gazette.71 This was the first 
time after the Revolution that the government could definitely control the royal court, since the 
BRH was located under the direct command of the Prime Minister. Financially, the BRH 
maintained the system of the Ministry of the Royal Household, in which the royal court’s budget 
was managed by the government through the parliamentary process similar to other state 
organization’s budgets. 
The Privy Purse was also reduced from a Department in the Ministry of the Royal 
Household to a Bureau (Samnakngan); only five of its officials received salaries from the state, 
the salaries for the remainder had to be provided from the bureau’s own revenues. This change 
may have been the most significant of those made to the royal court because now the investment 
organization of the monarch and high rank royals was under the control of the government, since, 
due to its legal status, every business transaction of the Privy Purse had to be approved by the 
Prime Minister.  
2.6 The Royal Court without the Royal Power 
The changes to the management of the BRH was a major concrete example of the 1932 
Revolution pattern of the reforms made to the royal court in accordance with constitutional rules. 
The power to control the royal court became a part of the government’s domain. 
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2.6.1 Financial Process 
In contrast to the Office of the Palace Administration (whose financial management was 
completely a royal prerogative), the BRH was since its beginning a state organization which fell 
under the same public investigation process as other bureaus. In such a process, when the fiscal 
year term was ending, the Cabinet would order all ministries to offer their next year budget plan. 
First, the Ministry of Finance would screen all proposals, and there might be some negotiations 
with individual ministries. When the budget was settled, the Cabinet would submit it as a Fiscal 
Year Bill to Parliament. After the Bill was approved in the first reading, Parliament would 
appoint a committee for considering and amending it. During this step, the committee might 
summon ministers for cooperative consideration of their budgets. After that, the Bill would be 
considered again through the second and third readings, and it would be promulgated as a Fiscal 
Year Act if it obtained the approval of a majority of the MPs.  
The Regent certainly understood this parliamentary pattern of financial allocation. As 
documented in archival evidence, sometimes the Regent even warned the government when they 
saw something altered from the constitutional scheme. For example, in the approval process of 
the 1936 Fiscal Year Bill, Parliament decided to cut the budget for the royal merit by 30,000 
baht. However, there was no specific list of the expenses which would be cut. Thus, the Regent 
refused to authorize the Bill because to require the Regent to decide which of the merit 
expenditures would be eliminated was, according to the Regent, unconstitutional.72 The Regent 
indicated that Parliament had to exactly specify the removed lists. This warning showed that the 
Regent were aware of the constitutional principle behind the royal court’s financial management. 
The Regent also pointed out that ‘Parliament on behave of the people is definitely able to remove 
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any expense.’73 This illustrated that the relationship between the Regent and the government, 
which was usually described in that the former was subordinate to the latter74, could be explained 
by the constitutional framework, especially during the premiership of Phraya Bhahol before 
Luang Phibul Songkram’s ascending to power.75  
In spite of adjustment to the constitutional practice of the royal affairs, the Regent tried 
to maintain the palace court’s benefits as much as possible. As well as other state organizations’ 
heads, which wanted larger budgets for their bureaus, the Regent sought a greater annual 
allocation for the royal court. Some negotiations with the government became noteworthy. When 
Parliament cut 30,000 baht out of the budget for the royal merit, the Cabinet ordered the Minister 
of Finance to hold a meeting with the BRH for selecting the expenses which would be removed.76 
The meeting was held on 9 April 1936. Phraya Chaiyossombat, the Minister of Finance, listed the 
expenses he thought should be cut out. In addition to the expenditures directly involving religious 
affairs, such as those for maintaining some temples, the lists included scholarships for students 
under the patronage of some high ranking royals. The Minister of Finance explained that the 
money for temples was already in the allocation for the Ministry of Education and that there was 
no regulation requiring the government to support those students. The scholarships provided 
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depended on the King’s pleasure. Lastly, the Minister of Finance suggested that to allocate the 
budget for the royal merit, which included the scholarships, should be approved by the Cabinet.77 
Such a suggestion originated a contention. The Prime Minister agreed with Phraya 
Chaiyossombat’s ideas, and issued a command to apply them for subsequent allocations.78 
Nevertheless, the Regent held a different opinion concerning the idea that the Cabinet would 
authorize the budget for the royal merit. The Regent contended that the Minister of Finance’s 
suggestion would alter the nature of the budget, which was conceived as the King’s own intention 
and that such a suggestion had not yet been granted parliamentary approval. Furthermore, 
according to the Regent, the suggestion conveyed the appearance that the government did not 
have any trust in the royal court.79 Lastly, the Regent argued that this expense was spent 
especially for beneficial purposes and attached a list of the expenditures in this category in the 
previous year.80 The Regent then strongly insisted that the traditional pattern of this budget 
should be maintained. The Minister of Finance explained that his suggestion was only 
preliminary and could be modified if the Regent disagreed.  However, the Minister still 
recommended that the budget spending should be regulated.81 As the mediator, the Prime 
Minister wanted the two sides to end the contention, so that the 30,000 baht allocation reduction 
would be settled. However, both the Regent and the Minister of Finance maintained their 
standpoint, so the management of the royal allocation was delayed. The government had to ask 
Prince Wan, the advisor to the Office of the Prime Minister, to suggest a resolution to the 
problem. 
                                                            
77 Minister of Finance to Cabinet Secretariat, 11 April 1936 in N.A. SR 0201.4.1/4 
78 Handwritten note of the Prime Minister, 15 April 1936 in N.A. SR 0201.4.1/4  
79 Royal Private Secretary to Cabinet Secretariat, 30 April 1936 in N.A. SR 0201.4.1/4 
80 Royal Private Secretary to Cabinet Secretariat, 19 May 1936 in N.A. SR 0201.4.1/4 
81 (copy) Minister of Finance to Cabinet Secretariat, n.d. in N.A. SR 0201.4.1/4 
69 
 
Prince Wan seemed to be trying to achieve a compromise between the two contenders. 
On the one hand, he maintained the autonomy of the royal court. On the other hand, the Prince 
tried to frame royal affairs in constitutional principles. Prince Wan indicated that he did not agree 
with the idea that the budget for the royal merit would be approved by the Cabinet; however, the 
expense, held as one of the state affairs, had to be spent in accordance with the Constitution, i.e., 
there had to be a  Minister’s countersignature. The Prince therefore suggested that the charity 
budget should be maintained under its traditional aspect in which the King could spend it as he 
pleased, yet it had to be countersigned by the Prime Minister.82 
In spite of the Prince’s maintaining of the traditional aspects of the royal court, it could 
be argued that after the 1932 Revolution when the People’s Party was in power the 
countersignature was not merely a formally meaningless procedure. Yet, reform was genuinely 
pursued as a process which illustrated the constitutional conformity of the monarchy. The 
Minister who countersigned the royal command was held as the one who had true legitimate 
power. Thus, to impose on the budget for the royal merit the requirement of a countersignature by 
the Prime Minister implied that it did not depend on the monarch’s pleasure as its title appeared 
to suggest. Prince Wan’s suggestion, which was later approved by the Prime Minister, apparently 
changed the real power over the budget from the King to the government’s leader.  
2.6.2 Procedure Regulations in the Royal Court 
Immediately after the establishment of the BRH and the ORPS, regulations of the 
working process in the royal court were accordingly modified. There was a meeting of high 
ranking royal court officials to create working procedures for the two royal bureaus, which, since  
the royal court was under the Prime Minister’s control amounted to a framework under which 
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every task performed by in the palace court must be reviewed by the Premier before becoming 
valid. For example, the Prime Minister, not the Minister of the Royal Household as before, now 
issued the schedule of the royal court’s rituals. Except for internal dispatches between the royal 
court organizations, every formal letters of the two departments was required to be reviewed by 
the Premier. The appointment of the civil servants in the palace court was regulated in 
accordance with the amended Civil Servants Act which also yielded power to the Prime Minister. 
The meeting created a correspondent rule as well.83 This meeting and its resolutions emphasized 
the changes in the power over the Siamese royal court whereby the royal prerogative had been 
eclipsed by the new leaders’ authority. 
2.6.2.1 Regulations about the King’s Duties 
The new leaders also tried to frame the sovereign’s duties, beginning about a year after 
Luang Phibul started his first premiership. During that time, the power of the revolutionary 
leaders had been secured and strengthened due to the suppression of their political enemies. The 
government’s cultural policies, including measures to deal with the royal family members, had 
had more certain direction.84 This was the politico-cultural context in which the regulation for the 
King’s duties was created. Initially, there was no evidence who was its mastermind. There was a 
dispatch from the Cabinet Secretariat to the Secretary of Krissadeeka ordering him to examine 
how the sovereign in other constitutional monarchies conducted rituals and ceremonies and to 
propose some suggestions for the Siamese monarch.85 Practically, the Regent’s duties and 
procedures would be the main target of the proposed regulations because the King would not 
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reside in the country for years.  In addition, this regulation was initiated by the government 
without any recognition of the Regent. 
The implementation of the regulation was reluctant. Deuon Bunnak, the Secretariat of 
Krissadeeka who was ordered by the Cabinet, delayed for eight months the submission of his 
tentative report. He lacked sufficient information, so was forced to request the content he wanted 
from other countries. Due to the beginning of WWII, only the English and Japanese embassies 
replied to his inquiry.86 When receiving Deuon’s report, Phibul himself did not hasten to 
authorize it; rather, he just ordered the report forwarded to Prince Wan.87 The Prince’s review 
was even more sluggish than that of Deuon, however. He received the report in November 1940 
and took over a year to consider it. Eventually he submitted his recommendation concerning the 
report in February 1942. Such reluctance of the leaders, including Prince Wan (who was 
normally enthusiastic about royal affairs) might be explainable. After Phibul became the Prime 
Minister, the government almost completely controlled the royal court.   
Deuon’s report comprised three major points of the regulation of the King’s duties, and 
Prince Wan’s comments were not different conceptually. Deuon’s first issue concerned the rituals 
which the King should be invited to attend. According to Deuon, Britain had two sorts of ritual 
which their sovereign attended: the rituals which obtained national value and the traditional 
rituals. However, the information from England lacked detail, so Deuon turned to the Japanese 
pattern as a model. The King would attend three major ceremonies: the military marches, the 
state’s levees, and the graduation ceremonies of the military schools. In the case of the traditional 
ritual, Deuon left this to the power of the Cabinet to decide. Prince Wan suggested that the first 
kind of ritual should be called ‘rituals of state’ (ratha phithi), which were regulated by the 
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government, and argued that graduation ceremonies at Chulalongkorn University and 
Thammasart University, were not rituals which the Kings in other countries would generally 
attend, but that the graduation ceremonies of the military schools (at which the Thai King had 
always appeared) should be conducted as they always had been.  
Deuon’s next issue concerned the rituals for which a commoner would preside, to which 
the King should not be invited (although Deuon’s report lacked concrete detail and Prince Wan 
had no comment). The last issue was the regulation for having an audience with the King, which 
Deuon divided into two parts: regulations for Thai people and for foreigners. Thai audiences 
meant only the newly appointed and retiring ministers, the Prime Minister and other ministers 
reporting official work to the King, and the ambassadors to other nations. The foreign audiences 
comprised foreign ambassadors and honorable persons from other countries.  
After that, the regulation was considered twice before it was formally announced. 
Firstly, it was reviewed and drafted by the BRH’s officials; it was then submitted to the Prime 
Minister again. Phibul left the matter to the responsibility of Thawi Bunyaket, the Cabinet 
Secretariat. Thawi passed the draft back again to Prince Wan, and asked the Prince to work with a 
group composed of Deuon, officials of the BRH and members of the Division of National 
Culture. Finally, the draft formulated by this group would be approved by the Cabinet and 
promulgated in April 1943, almost four years after it was initially conceived.  
The BRH’s draft was almost the same as Prince Wan’s. The difference was that the 
regulation of foreigners’ audiences with the Regent was added. In the enacted regulation, there 
were two kinds of the ritual which the King attended: the royal and the national ceremonies. The 
royal ceremonies included 11 rituals, most of which were related to Buddhism. There were only 
three rituals directly relevant to the monarchy: the Chakri Dynasty Memorial Ceremony, the 
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King’s Birthday Ceremony, and King Chulalongkorn Memorial Ceremony. The national 
ceremonies consisted of the National Ploughing Ceremony, the State Opening of Parliament, and 
the Constitution Celebration Day. The regulation recommended that these national ceremonies 
which the King would attend might be amended only by the Cabinet’s resolution. To have an 
audience with the King, Thai people were required to submit their wish to the Royal Private 
Secretary who would ask for final permission from the Cabinet Secretariat. Foreigners would first 
notify the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs. If it was a traditional audience, such as one with an 
ambassador, then the Ministry would contact the Royal Private Secretary. If it was an occasional 
case, then the Cabinet Secretariat decided whether to approve the request. This rule obviously 
reflected not only the power of the Cabinet over royal affairs, but the idea of the nation over the 
King, implemented through the official regulation.88   
Interestingly, some items did not appear in the regulation. Regarding Prince Wan’s 
questions about the King’s attendance at the graduation ceremonies of the universities and the 
military schools, the Ministry of Defense informed him that there was no tradition of inviting the 
King to attend the army’s ceremonies, according to the BRH’s report. In the case of the 
universities’ graduation ceremonies, which King Prajadhipok used to attend, the BRH’s official 
suggested that the Prime Minister or the Minister of Education should be invited rather than the 
King.89 This was the reason why there was no rule about the graduation ceremonies in the 
enacted Regulation. Again, the state ceremony was another area in which the monarch’s authority 
was replaced by that of the new leaders.  
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2.7 The Royal Prerogative Restoration 
The constitutional pattern of power pursued for the Siamese royal court did not last 
long. The most significant reason for this was the political changes in which the leaders modified 
their standpoints. This resulted in the return to the political arena of the conservative group, by 
which they could realize their political agendas, including the ending of the constitutional scheme 
for the management of the royal court.  The end of the former status of the royal court (which had 
been under the government’s control), however, did not result from any single event; rather, it 
was expressed through several circumstances happening between the time of the mysterious 
death of King Rama VIII and the early 1950s. Changes of interest here include the power to 
appoint the civil servants in the royal court and the discontinuity of the constitutional orientation 
of the royal court management during the second premiership of Field Marshal Phibul Songkram. 
2.7.1 The Authority to Appoint the Royal Servants 
After the War, the power to nominate the officials in the royal court had gradually 
shifted from the government to the palace. Before the establishment of the BRH, the management 
of royal servant had been in accordance with the 1933 Civil Servant Law which assigned the 
power to the Minister of the Royal Household, with the requirement that the appointment had to 
be formally approved by the monarch.90 Although the royal court at that time was held as an 
organization under the government’s authority (see 2.3 above), such a law preserved some 
aspects of power for the King. On the date the BRH was established, the government announced 
another law cancelling such a provision and assigning the power to appoint the royal servants to 
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the Prime Minister.91 Legally, this regulation would be nullified in the 1949 Constitution. 
However, changes could be occasionally traced after the death of King Ananda. 
The most obvious example of such changes might be the Lord Chamberlain 
(Lekhathikarn Phrarachawang) who was the royal court’s highest administrator. When the 
Ministry of the Royal Household was re-established in 1933, one of its subordinate organizations 
was the Department of the Palace (Krom Wang)92 of which Phraya Charti Dej-udom was the 
Director. After King Prajadhipok's abdication, the Department of the Palace was merged with the 
Office of the Permanent Secretary, and there was no document indicating what position Phraya 
Charti Dej-udom held. During the process of the royal court reform, the Cabinet asked the 
Council of Regency who should be the Director of the new organization.93 The Regent suggested 
Phraya Charti.94 When the new bureau was named the Bureau of the Royal Household, Phraya 
Charti was appointed as the Lord Chamberlain and held the position until his retirement in 
December 1946. 
Thawiwong Thawanyasak (Mom Rajawongse Charlermlarp) then assumed the position. 
There was some evidence indicating that the royal court had effectively masterminded him as the 
new Lord Chamberlain and forced the government to accept the offer. In a meeting in late 1946, 
Luang Thamrong’s Cabinet tried to find a candidate to replace Phraya Charti, while the Regent 
strongly recommended Thawiwong, who by then was the Director of the Department of Public 
Welfare. The ministers, especially Prime Minister, were firmly aware of their authority over the 
appointment: however, the troublesome circumstances after the mysterious death of King Ananda 
made the Cabinet hesitant. Initially, the government replied the Regent that Thawiwong had no 
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experience in the royal court, and offered Phraya Anurak Rajamonthien the nomination.95 
Nevertheless, the Regent insisted on Thawiwong and the Cabinet did not dare to refuse. As a 
result, Thawiwong became Lord Chamberlain who was effectively appointed by the royal court 
rather than the Cabinet, reflecting the transference of the power to control the royal court’s 
servants from the government to the palace.  
This change of power became legalized when it was written in the  1949 Constitution 
which, as known to those studying modern Thai history, includes several provisions  favoring the 
royal prerogative, an example of which concerns the King’s authority to appoint the Senators and 
the Privy Councilors. The latter was the consulting organ for the monarch which was recreated 
after the 1947 coup d’état and which became a major political figurehead for the royal court. 
According to the Constitution, the Privy Councilors were appointed by royal command, even 
though they had some significant authority in the political system such as countersigning the 
appointment by the King of the Senators. Another example involves the increase in the cultural 
powers of the monarchy whereby the King was named the Generalissimo of the Thai Army. In 
addition, some new prerogatives were added, one of which was that the monarch was made 
immune to any lawsuit. The change in the authority to appoint the royal servants was one of the 
significant changes in this Constitution. Article 17 stated that the appointments of the servants in 
the palace court and the Chief of the Royal Guard were under the royal command. The 
Constitution formally provided this power to the monarch. Thus, the 1949 Charter brought to the 
royal court some changes such as the status of the Office of the Palace Administration, which 
although part of the state’s budget was administered under the royal prerogative. 
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2.7.2 The Discontinuity of the Constitutional Principles in the 1950s 
Several regulations restoring royal prerogatives promulgated during the second period 
of Phibul’s premiership indicated the discontinuation of the constitutional principle of 
governance that the People’s Party government had tried to establish. This was due in large part 
to the disunity of the People’s Party. Conflicts between Phibul’s and Pridi’s factions due to 
different attitudes toward the advance of the Japanese troops during the beginning of the Pacific 
War in Thailand brought about the end of the People’s Party as a unified political group. 
Although Pridi’s rise to power after the War and the 1946 Constitution paved the way for civilian 
politics, the mysterious death of King Ananda brought that possibility to an end, since this left 
Pridi’s faction in a disadvantageous position, as indicated by the appointment of the Lord 
Chamberlain mentioned above. Eventually, the coup d’état on November 8, 1947 returned Thai 
politics to a state of authoritarianism. In 1948, Phibul again took the position of Prime Minister 
after being out of power for years due to his leadership during the War. The 1947 coup d’état 
eliminated Pridi’s group from Thai politics, but brought more strength to the royalists, who 
collaborated with Phibul to remove Pridi’s faction from power. Phibul and other coup leaders 
allowed the conservatives to run the government. However, the Democrat Party had only held its 
power for four months. Kuang Abhaiwong, the Democrat Prime Minister, was forced to leave his 
position.96 According to Thak, Phibul’s return was the beginning of an exceptional period in Thai 
politics, during which there was a government running the country with a House of 
Representatives, yet the coup leaders were still in power.97 
                                                            
96 Suthachai Yimprasert, Plan to Seize the Thai Nation (Bangkok: 6 Tula Ramluek, 2010), pp. 126 - 127 
97 Thak Chaloemtirana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, Bangkok: Thammasart University Press, 
1979 
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Interestingly, when Phibul again became Prime Minister, he had to restore the 
regulations regarding the royal affairs, especially during King Bhumibol’s time in-country. For 
example, in 1950, the King travelled back to Thailand to attend or conduct three significant royal 
rituals: the royal funeral ceremony of King Ananda, the royal coronation, and the royal wedding 
ceremony. Due to such royal ceremonies, several individuals, including Queen Sirikit, the royal 
family members, and some commoners were provided with royal insignias, the process of which 
was accomplished before the government recognized it. A report of the Cabinet meeting at this 
time implied some clues to changes in royal affairs. “To provide the royal insignias in the 
constitutional regime, in which a minister must countersign, should have consulted the 
government first.”98 In addition, during his stay, King Bhumibol had been invited to preside at 
several public events. The government found that some practices of the King, e.g., replying to 
foreign telegraphs and giving public speeches without a countersignature, did not conform to 
constitutional principles, and Phibul made the following demand: 
Please get it settled regarding how to make the replying letters to the heads of the 
states and the King’s public speeches constitutional. Previously the Cabinet used to 
provide such affairs. Is it right that the Royal Secretariat issues the things without 
informing the Cabinet? Please reconsider this matter with Krissadeeka and the 
Minister of the Foreign Affairs.99 
The issue later became the subject of a resolution of the Cabinet that all organizations 
wanting to invite the King to preside at their ceremony had to inform the Cabinet prior to the 
event and submit a draft of the King’s speech to the Cabinet beforehand. 
                                                            
98 Topic of the Cabinet Meeting, 20/1950, 24 April 1950 
99 Handwritten note of the Prime Minister (n.d.) on Royal Secretariat to Cabinet Secretariat, 9 May 1950 in Office of 
the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK 3.22.1/4  
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The government must be accountable of every public speech of the King, including 
those telegraphs to foreign heads of states. Therefore, every bureau inviting the King 
should prepare the invitation earlier and submit a draft of the King’s speech to the 
government. And the telegraphs are applied to the same pattern as well.100 
When King Bhumibol returned in 1951 to reside permanently in the country, the issues 
of the constitutional pattern of royal affairs again became important. About a month after the 
King’s return from Europe, the Cabinet approved a report of Krissadeeka concerning the official 
schedules of the royal ceremonies, state ceremonies, and the royal attendance. The report argued 
that those schedules of the royal attendance recently were issued with the countersignature of the 
Lord Chamberlain instead of a minister as prescribed by the Constitution. The secretariat of 
Krissadeeka’s report suggested that those schedules should be approved strictly in accordance 
with the Constitution.101 After approving the report, the Cabinet ordered all state organizations to 
implement the report’s suggestion as a regulation for royal attendance at any ceremony.  
These practical treatments of royal public performances as affairs of state were 
previously conducted under the control of the government in accordance with constitutional 
principles of governance, especially in the 1930s when the People’s Party was in power. 
Arguably, there were a few reasons for Phibul’s administration’s review and restoration of these 
practices in the 1950s. Firstly, the 1950s was the first time since the abdication of King 
Prajadhipok that Thailand had an adult monarch permanently residing in the country. Most of the 
constitutional patterns the People’s Party initiated functioned practically the Council of Regency. 
Thailand, in other words, had had no experience with constitutional monarchy with an adult 
monarch. Secondly, those individuals who had significant roles in the foundation of 
                                                            
100 Topic of the Cabinet Meeting, 24/1950, 15 May 1950 
101 N.A. M.T.0201.2.1.29/38 
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constitutional control over royal affairs in the 1930s, i.e., Prince Sakol and Prince Wan, did not 
have advisory positions in Phibul’s second administration. In addition, in the 1930s, Phibul 
himself did not express any particular interesting in the royal affairs. The palace court was 
reformed in accordance with constitutional principles due to the influence of bureaucrats such as 
Prince Sakol and Prince Wan.  
Retrospectively, the uncertainty of the constitutional pattern of royal affairs in the 1950s 
could be considered as the transformative period between the 1930s during which the People’s 
Party established the revolutionary framework for royal affairs and the dictatorial governance 
introduced by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat under which the royal authority was revived.102  
Phibul’s administration clashed with royalists who tried to restore the power of the monarchy, but 
were not themselves certain of the constitutional principles which applied to royal affairs. In 
other words, the 1950s was the beginning of the end of the constitutional monarchy in Thailand.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the changes which were made to the Siamese royal court 
organization after the 1932 Revolution. The Office of the Palace Administration was an 
adjustment of the royal court which occurred after the 1932 Revolution. Its administration and 
finance had special characteristics.  In this chapter I argue that this change was affected by both 
political conflicts and principles of constitutional governance. However, in practice, a vital 
organization in the bureau, the Privy Purse Department, still was held a royal prerogative immune 
to the parliamentary investigation. Thus, despite the expansion of its authority into most of royal 
court management, the new leaders did not control one of the most important royal prerogatives. 
                                                            
102Thak Chaloemtirana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, chapter 6 
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King Prajadhipok’s abdication in March 1935 was a watershed in the Siamese politics 
which illustrated the political weakness of the conservative group. As a result, the new leaders 
could extend their authority to control the organization of the royal court more completely, 
beginning with the reduction of royal budgets and ending with major changes to previously-
palace-controlled organizations.  These changes heralded the end of the royal prerogative in the 
palace court. Authority over royal affairs was transferred to the government. 
The control over the royal court established by the government also had an economic 
reason. The leaders after the 1932 Revolution, both the aristocrats of the old regime and the 
revolutionary leaders, agreed that one of the important causes of the country’s economic 
difficulties was the high expenditure of the royal court. Thus, one goal of the reform of the royal 
court’s finances was to reduce the state budget and thereby solve the country’s economic 
problems. 
When the BRH was established, the Siamese royal court became an organization under 
the government’s administrative and financial investigation processes just like other state 
bureaus. The privileges the Office of the Palace Administration had formerly enjoyed were 
abolished.  For a decade after the establishment of the BRH, the Siamese royal court was truly an 
organization without royal prerogatives. 
However, the political situation after World War II was a crucial factor affecting royal 
court management. In order to overthrow Phibul, Pridi had secretly allied with the royalist camp. 
Thus, the conservatives came back into politics, but the death of King Ananda caused the 
conservatives and the army to form a coalition to remove Pridi from the political scene. This 
conflict brought the royals and royalists power to again manage the royal court and was the 
beginning of the end of the separation between the monarch and royal affairs. 
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Chapter 3 
Crown Property Management 
 
Introduction 
In addition to the finances of the royal court, the leaders after the Revolution had to 
address another significant fiscal affair remaining from the old regime as well: the property of the 
crown. In the absolute state, Privy Purse Department, established in 1890 as a subordinate 
organization of the Ministry of Finance, was responsible for two main financial items: the annual 
budget allocated by the state and the private business investment of the king and some royal 
family members. In this chapter, I examine development of the management of the second of 
these, in particular for the period after the 1932 Revolution. Due to the financial and 
administrative reforms, the crown property management was to exclude the monarch from the 
power to manipulate the assets of the royal court, which were now held to be the state's 
properties. To illustrate this process, I investigate the promulgation and results of two laws. Some 
significant results of the reform will be examined. In a section below, I describe how the 
principle of accountability was applied to the crown property management. In addition, Thai 
politics after World War II affected the system of crown property management the People's Party 
had established. Eventually, the monarch regained the power to control these items due to the 
enactment of the 1948 Crown Property Law. 
3.1 The Beginning of the Separation of the King from the Property of the Crown  
Academic papers and political documents both refer to the 1936 Crown Property Law 
when describing the crown property management after the 1932 Revolution. This is not 
necessarily strange, because the Law was the first code which imposed rules for managing the 
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crown property. Moreover, it was the foundation of the 1948 Crown Property Law (despite the 
significant changes made to the 1936 Crown Property Law in the process of creating the later 
law) which has been the principal reference for the management of the properties of the crown in 
Thailand for decades. However, the principle focus of the management of the crown property 
after 1932 was to separate the King from the power to control the properties of the crown, which 
began with another law named the 1934 Tax Exemption for Crown Property Law. 
The 1934 Tax Exemption for Crown Property Law had its origin in conflicts between 
the government and King Prajadhipok over the Death Duty Bill.  This Bill was initially conceived 
to improve the country’s economic inequality but became a source of the disagreements between 
the royal camp and the new leaders. The economic situation was one of the emergent problems 
the Siamese government had encountered after the absolute era. The 1st Declaration of the 
People’s Party, published on 24 June 1932 at the start of the Revolution, affirmed clearly that 
economic prosperity was one of the priorities of the revolution.1 All ministers of the first Cabinet, 
composed of both aristocrats of the old regime and the new leaders, seemed to agree that the 
country’s economic problems must be solved immediately. Moreover, they seemed to ascribe the 
problem to the inequality between Siamese social levels. Thus, the Cabinet asked King 
Prajadhipok to reduce his annual allocation, and the King permitted this2; at the same time, they 
approved the proposal to enact a Death Duty Law.3 Surprisingly, Phraya Mano, the conservative 
Prime Minister, submitted the Bill to Parliament himself.4 
Although it was widely accepted at the start, the Death Duty Bill’s enactment process 
was very slow. In the first place, the Bill was approved by the first reading in October 1932, then, 
                                                            
1 Benjamin A. Batson, The End of the Absolute Monarchy in Siam, chapter 8 
2 See chapter 2 
3 Record of the People’s Committee Meeting number 31, n.d. (handwritten) 
4 Minutes of the National Assembly Meeting, 32/1932, 28 October 1932 
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Parliament appointed a committee to refine it. However, the committee membership was then 
shuffled several times. It was not until February 1934 when the Bill was approved by 
Parliament.5 After that, to promulgate it as an Act, the Prime Minister had to submit the Bill to 
the King for his signature. While this process was unfolding Prajadhipok had left Siam for 
England, so Prince Naris (the Regent) took on the duty of authorizing the Bill. At this point, the 
Death Duty Bill became a source of conflict over royal power. 
Prajadhipok himself questioned the Cabinet via the Regent as to whether the assets 
under the management of the Privy Purse would be immune to the Death Duty Bill. The Cabinet 
replied that the Bill had covered the Privy Purse, so its assets would be under the regulation of 
the law, but the crown property would not be affected by the Bill, except for the heritage items 
which the King might will to persons other than the next monarch. However, it was not the 
answer which could satisfy the King. He wanted to have the Bill clearly indicate that the crown 
property would be immune to the law. Prajadhipok’s wish was unconstitutional, because, 
according to the 1932 Constitution, the monarch could only either authorize the parliamentary 
approved Bill or refuse it.6 He had no prerogative to revise or add to the Bill’s contents. In the 
Cabinet’s opinion, if they were to concede to the King’s needs, an irregular meeting of 
Parliament would be called, which would affect the King’s honors. Thus, the Cabinet appointed 
Chao Phraya Srithammathibes, the Minister of Finance, and Prince Wan to explain their reasons 
to the Regent, yet the King was still unsatisfied. The Cabinet then commanded René Guyon, a 
French legal advisor, to make a report for their case. Guyon explained that legally the monarch 
did not die so the royal properties were not held as an inheritance; the Death Duty Bill therefore 
did not cover the crown property. However, King Prajadhipok replied that he remained 
                                                            
5 Minutes of the National Assembly Meeting, 14/1933 (Regular), 15 February 1934 
6 Article 39 of “Constitution of the Kingdom of Siam,” Royal Gazette 49(10 December 1932): 529-551 
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unconvinced unless the sentences he wanted were added to the Bill. The Cabinet had no choice 
except to call the irregular parliamentary meeting; however, the Speaker of the House suggested 
that the matter could wait until the House was regularly called again in August 1934. 
When Parliament was opened, the main issue of the discussion over the Death Duty Bill 
was whether the House would approve the King’s wish to add some sentences to the Bill. After 
the debate, in which some MPs were strongly critical of the King, the majority of the House 
dismissed Prajadhipok’s wish. The Cabinet then re-submitted the old version of the Bill to the 
Regent on 8 August. According to the Constitution, if Parliament approved the same Bill, after 15 
days the Cabinet could promulgate it without royal authorization.  However, the Cabinet did not 
really want to do this because doing so would increase tensions between the royal court and the 
government. On August 24, after the 15 days had passed, the government agreed to draft another 
Bill indicated clearly that the crown property was tax immune.7 When word of this condition was 
sent to Prajadhipok via international telegram, the King allowed the Regent to approve the Death 
Duty Bill. After that, the drafting of the new Bill began in October 1934; however, it was 
submitted to Parliament after King Prajadhipok abdicated. 
The main objective of the new Bill was to exempt properties of the crown from 
taxation, thus its principal content was to define and differentiate the meanings of the private 
properties of the King and properties of the crown. Initially, the drafting committee appointed by 
the Cabinet intended to hold exempt only for real estate held by the crown, as the Bill’s first 
name was the ‘Personal Real Estate of the King Bill’. When the Bill was submitted to Parliament, 
an MP asked why it covered only real estate. Phraya Manawaratchasevi, the then-Minister of 
Finance who was one of the committee members, replied that there was no tradition in any 
                                                            
7 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 45/1934, 24 August 1934 
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country of taxing chattels of its own monarch, so it was not necessary to include this in the law. 
The Bill was composed of two main parts. The first part defined the King’s personal real estate: 
those immovable properties the monarch could dispose of before his enthronement, those which 
the King received from any person but the monarchs of the Kingdom of Siam, and those which 
he bought with his own money. These definitions would be the model for the first Crown 
Property Law and the management of the crown property for more than a decade. The second 
part of the Bill defined the amount of tax. The Bill indicated that the private real estate of the 
monarch should be taxed just as those of general individuals, and the tax had to be paid with the 
personal money of the King. However, these immovable properties of the monarch were 
excluded from death duty taxation.8 This was the first time after the 1932 Revolution there would 
be a law intended to collect taxes from the King. The Bill’s content did not exactly conform to 
what King Prajadhipok and the Prime Minister had agreed on, however. The King wanted to have 
the Death Duty Law contain a sentence indicating that the properties of the crown would be 
exempt from any taxation. Moreover, although government memoranda and letters often referred 
to it as “The Tax Exemption of the Real Estate of the Crown,”9 the first draft of the Bill 
determined only how to tax the private immovable properties of the King.  
The Cabinet edited the Bill before submitting it to Parliament, revising its title to align 
better with the original intention of defining “The Tax Exemption for the Real Estate of the 
Crown”. The content about the taxation of the private properties of the monarch was replaced 
with new text clearly indicating that the real estates of the crown were immune from taxation.10 
                                                            
8 Minister of Finance to Prime Minister, 28 February 1935 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK 3.22.9/1  
9 For examples, Prime Minister to King Prajadhipok, 24 August 1934, and Cabinet Secretariat to Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee of the Tax Exemption for Crown Property Bill, 22 October 1934 in Office of the Cabinet 
Secretariat, SLK 3.22.9/1 
10 Record of Cabinet Meeting, 67/1934, 1 March 1935 
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Thus, the Bill approved by the Cabinet included the definition of the private real estates of the 
monarch and the provision to exempt the crown’s immovable properties from taxation. In 
addition, the Cabinet deleted the sentence defining the annual allocation the state provided for the 
monarch as one of his private monies. This proviso would be brought back in the 1948 Crown 
Property Law. 
The Bill which was approved by the Cabinet, however, still contained some legal and 
practical problems. The chattels of the crown were not exempt from taxation, as an MP argued in 
Parliament that when the succession took place, the royal regalia would be taxed as well.11 The 
Minister of Finance conceded this argument and replied that, if the majority of the MPs wanted 
the chattels of the crown exempted, the Bill would be revised in the second reading to cover this. 
Unfortunately, there was no evidence of relevant discussion in the second reading.12 When the 
Bill was submitted to the House again, its content already covered crown property of all kinds. 
The Bill approved by Parliament defined the personal properties of the King as follow: 1) the 
properties or rights the monarch acquired before his enthronement, 2) properties the monarch 
received from persons who were not the previous sovereign, and 3) properties or rights the 
monarch bought with his personal funds. Other assets were held as properties of the Crown and 
therefore immune from taxation.13 The enforcement of this Law would be the foundation of 
management of the crown property for two years after King Prajadhipok abdicated. 
3.2 The Crown Property Categorization Committee 
As stated previously, the separation between the private properties of the King and 
properties of the state during the absolute regime was obscure. Such a separation was more 
                                                            
11 Minutes of the National Assembly Meeting, 39/1934 (Regular) 12 March 1935  
12 Source only informed that the parliamentary committee was composed of Chao Phraya Woraphong, Prince Wan, 
Luang Woranitipreecha, Phraya Thephassadin, Mr.Nate Phunwiwat, Khun Worasit, and Phra Phinitthanakorn. 
13 “The Tax Exemption for Crown Property Act, B.E.2477” Royal Gazette 52, 21 April 1935, pp. 79-81. 
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precise after the 1932 Revolution due to the existence of the 1934 Tax Exemption for Crown 
Property Law.  
Since the most important part of the 1934 law was the exemption of crown property 
from any tax, separating the crown property from the private property of the King became the 
first priority. After the Tax Exemption for Crown Property Act was promulgated in March 1935, 
the Cabinet appointed a group of bureaucrats to form the Crown Property Categorization 
Committee (CPCC), which would perform significant roles in identifying crown property after 
the abdication of King Prajadhipok. The committee included those who had experience both in 
financial and royal affairs; specific members of the CPCC included Phraya Nitisatphaisal (former 
Chairman of the Fiscal Committee of the House), Phraya Chaiyossombat (Director of the 
Department of Comptroller), Chao Phraya Sriphiphat (Director of the Privy Purse), and Prince 
Wan, who served as principal advisor for the Bhahol administration.14 The Cabinet provided the 
committee authority to access every account in the responsibility of the Ministry of the Royal 
Household. Initially, the Regent wanted the Minister of the Royal Household to provide only 
those accounts directly concerning the crown property to the Committee, and to require their 
approval before submitting other documents.15  However, when the committee informed the 
Cabinet that their duties also involved other kinds of properties, the Cabinet extended its power to 
include the ability to investigate all properties in the Ministry of the Royal Household.16 Thus, 
within the three months after Prajadhipok’s abdication the government increased the power of its 
committee over all accounts of the Ministry of the Royal Household. 
                                                            
14 Record of Cabinet Meeting, 1/1935, April 3, 1935 
15 Royal Private Secretary to Minister of the Royal Household, 20 April 1935 in N.A. (3) SR 0201.65.1/1 
16 Record of Cabinet Meeting, 16/1935, May 24, 1935 
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However, although the committee now had the ability to examine all properties 
controlled by the Ministry of the Royal Household, the power to decide whether the considering 
property was crown property was not within its authority. Rather, the committee’s main duty was 
to submit its opinion concerning the crown property to the Cabinet, which had the real power to 
decide. This process reflected the change in the control of the crown property from the monarch 
to the Cabinet. Practically, because there were a large number of properties under its 
investigation, the committee’s approach was to wait for any royal asking to withdraw their assets 
from the Privy Purse, at which point the investigation process began: the committee examined the 
property then made a recommendation to the Cabinet concerning the property’s status, after 
which the Cabinet made the final decision. Due to the complexity of this process, the committee 
was required to include within its scope a large number of properties. The accounts which King 
Prajadhipok claimed as his personal properties were significant and interesting examples. 
The examination of the properties King Prajadhipok held as his personal assets led to 
the decision by which some significant properties became properties of the crown. After his 
abdication, Prajadhipok’s first legal representative in Siam was Prince Anuwat-chaturon, the 
President of the Council of Regency. Prince Anuwat committed suicide in August 1935, after 
which the former king appointed Prince Upaleesan Jumbala. Prince Upaleesan Jumbala (1899 – 
1974) was born to Prince Jumbala Somphoch (krom luang Sapphasitthiprasong), a son of King 
Monkut, and mom Chiengkham. Prince Upaleesan began his studies in Vajiravuth School, and 
worked for the Ministry of the Royal Household after finishing secondary education. After the 
First World War he left Siam for England to study history and law at Cambridge University. 
Upaleesan graduated in 1926 and returned to Siam to again work for the Ministry. The Prince 
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resigned his position due to King Prajadhipok’s abdication in 1935. He was later appointed by 
King Bhumibol in 1958 to be the manager of his personal assets.17 
Prince Upaleesan would perform significant roles in negotiation with the government 
regarding the separation of the private properties of Prajadhipok from the crown’s properties. 
After his appointment in 1935, Prince Upaleesan submitted a document claiming that some 
properties in the Privy Purse were the former king’s personal assets, which led to an investigation 
of the Privy Purse accounts. 
According to the committee’s report, the property of the crown, which included cash, 
lands, buildings, stocks, and mortgages, were sorted into two accounts in May 1932 by King 
Prajadhipok’s order. ‘The Privy Purse’s account number 1’ contained assets of the crown, 
including the benefits which would later be accrued to the Privy Purse. ‘The Privy Purse account 
number 2’ comprised the budget annually provided for the monarch and 20% of the ‘account 
number 1.’ The budget in the second account was for the King’s personal use. This was the 
account which Prince Upaleesan claimed as the private property of King Prajadhipok. 
To decide the status of this account, the CPCC asked Krissadeeka for its legal 
recommendation. The secretariat of Krissadeeka argued that the monarch could arbitrarily 
manage the crown property in the same way as his personal assets, because at that time there was 
no specific regulation for the management of crown property.18 This interpretation led to the 
suggestion that the monies in the Privy Purse account number 2 were private assets of the former 
king not the property of the crown. If this suggestion had been approved, the government would 
have given the account to Prajadhipok as he requested. However, Krissadeeka also indicated that 
                                                            
17 Principles of Buddhism in Twelve Collections of Phra Sutr (Prince Upaleesan Jumbala’s Funeral Book), 21 
November 1974 
18 Secretariat of Krissadeeka to Cabinet Secretariat, 13 June 1936, in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK 3.22.9/1 
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Prajadhipok’s separation of the asset into two accounts did not have any legal force because it 
was done by the King only for his convenience. Using only this latter interpretation in its 
recommendation, the CPCC argued that these funds were less private assets of King Prajadhipok 
than the budget he received from the state and that the account therefore should be held as a 
property of the crown.19 This recommendation was later approved by the Cabinet.20 
This example reveals some points of interest. First, suggestions of Krissadeeka were 
generally not decisive; rather, the CPCC would treat them as legal references for their decision. 
The real power belonged to the Cabinet. However, this case was part of the small minority of 
incidences where the committee’s decisions went against Krissadeeka’s recommendation. 
Second, Krissadeeka’s suggestion that there was no regulation for management of the crown 
property may have caused the new leaders to realize that it was necessary to have a new law for 
crown property management. Finally, the CPCC also recommended that Klai Kangwon Palace, a 
royal residence located in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province, was a crown property rather than 
Prajadhipok’s personal asset. This decision would lead to conflict between the government and 
Prajadhipok to the point where the government considered suing Prajadhipok, the details of 
which will be described below.  
3.3 Under the Tax Exemption Act 
For the two years between Prajadhipok’s abdication and the enactment of the first 
Crown Property Law in 1937, the properties of the crown were managed in accordance with the 
1934 Tax Exemption for Crown Property Act, under which the Cabinet controlled crown 
property. The government also controlled the royal court through its establishment of the BRH. 
                                                            
19 Chairman of the CPCC to Cabinet Secretariat, 15 August 1936 in N.A. (3) SR 0201.65.1/5 
20 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 30/1936, 17 August 1936 
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Thus, the People’s Party had extended their power over the royal court’s administration and 
finances. However, there were some managerial problems. The management of the crown 
property under the Tax Exemption for Crown Property Act encountered some difficulties, i.e., the 
legal status of the Privy Purse, the expenses of the royal residences held as crown properties, and 
lastly, the taxation of the crown’s property. 
The legal status of the Privy Purse was one of the difficult situations the government 
tried to resolve after the promulgation of the Tax Exemption for Crown Property Act. The 
Cabinet was informed that the Privy Purse’s bureaucratic status (degraded from Department to 
Bureau) affected its legal transactions. In early September 1935, the Civil Court dismissed a case 
in which the Privy Purse was the defendant. The plaintiff was ordered to pay the Court charges 
and the attorney fees. However, when Privy Purse officials tried to claim those monies, the Civil 
Court ruled that the bureau was not entitled to the monies because it was not a person in the legal 
sense. Moreover, according to the Court’s judgement, the Privy Purse could not pursue any legal 
transaction without the approval of the Prime Minister. The Cabinet asked Krissadeeka to 
determine whether the Lord Chamberlain could approve the legal documents of the Privy Purse.21 
While Krissadeeka was considering this, the Cabinet passed a temporary resolution authorizing 
the minister commanding the BRH to approve the Privy Purse’s documents.22 The suggestion of 
Krissadeeka was that the best way to resolve the problem was to promote the Privy Purse to 
become a legal entity once again, so that it could conduct its own legal transactions. However, at 
that time, the government was engaged in separating the private property of the King and other 
royals from the crown property; thus Prince Wan warned that to have the Privy Purse become a 
legal entity might endanger this process. The Cabinet agreed with the Prince, and decided to 
                                                            
21 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 62/1935, 9 September 1935 
22 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 68/1935, 25 September 1935 
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maintain the Privy Purse’s status as it was. The Prime Minister was required to approve the 
bureau’s documents or authorize the Lord Chamberlain to do so (using a case by case approach). 
As stated previously, the non-legal entity status of the Privy Purse meant that the bureau could 
not conduct on its own any business transactions and this was a significant turning point in the 
history of this royal organization. The Privy Purse, which used to be the main organ controlling 
the business of the royal family in the old regime, was legally defunct due to the reform of the 
royal court and finance after the 1932 Revolution. 
The royal court suggested upgrading the Privy Purse’s status to be a legal entity. Phraya 
Manawaratchasevi, who had been appointed to be the acting Director of the Privy Purse Bureau 
(PPB)23 and the Regent agreed that there was some discord between the BRH and the Privy Purse 
and suggested that the Privy Purse should be legally promoted. In a Cabinet meeting, Prince Wan 
disagreed with that suggestion. He argued that to change the status of the Privy Purse required the 
promulgation of another Law, which needed the approval of the House. The Prince also 
mentioned the ongoing separation of the personal property of the King and the crown property. 
He said that when such a process was finished the government should create a law for the use of 
the crown property. Prince Wan said that the government could choose either the Privy Purse or 
the Ministry of Finance to manage crown property, a point which would significantly affect the 
management of the crown property for decades. The Cabinet decided to choose the latter option, 
thus there was no need to promote the Privy Purse again.24 About a year later (under the Tax 
Exemption for Crown Property Act), the Cabinet became aware that the management of the 
crown property needed a specific law.  This would push the government a step forward.  
                                                            
23 Record of Cabinet Meeting, 95/1935, 13 December 1935 
24 Record of Cabinet Meeting, 122/1935, 19 February 1936  
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The expense of the palaces, such as Klai Kangwon palace, which were held as public 
assets became a financial problem the government had to resolve. In September 1936, the 
Cabinet decided that this royal residence was one of the properties of the crown and tried to force 
Prince Upaleesan (at the time, the proxy for King Prajadhipok) to move out of the Palace, but the 
BRH had prepared in its budget for the cost of the palace’s  maintenance for the rest of that year. 
There was a question raised in a Cabinet meeting concerning the methods by which other 
constitutional monarchies managed such a case. Prince Wan clarified that in principle the 
properties involving the crown would be divided into three groups as follows: the state’s assets, 
the crown properties, and the personal properties of the monarch. One example of the first group 
was the Grand Palace, which was maintained by the state. Prince Wan claimed that Klai 
Kangwon palace’s maintenance must be financed under the crown’s budget because it was a 
property of the crown. The Prince also informed the Cabinet that to separate those properties into 
three groups as he said was one of the principal contents of a bill then being drafted.25 This bill 
would become the first crown property law enacted the following year. 
Another question concerning the crown property law was how to tax the crown 
property. According to the Tax Exemption for Crown Property Law, all crown property was tax-
immune. Nevertheless, in January 1937, the Council of Regency informed the Cabinet that they 
were worried by the tax exemption of the crown property because it could cause the monarchy to 
appear to be at fault for fiscal mismanagement. The Regent asked the government to consider 
whether there were some kinds of crown property which could be taxed.26 Later, the Minister of 
Finance reported that according to Sir E. Cook, a former British financial advisor to Siam, the 
British monarchs were tax-immune because taxation had been pursued in the name of the King. 
                                                            
25 Record of Cabinet Meeting, 43/1936, 23 September 1936 
26 Record of Cabinet Meeting, 68/1936, 6 January 1937 
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However, the Minister of Finance suggested that in practice the King might allow the state to tax 
him on a case by case basis. Prince Wan suggested that the issue needed a new law for managing 
the crown property. Thus, the Cabinet assigned the CPCC to draft a law for the management of 
crown property, which, the Cabinet specified, should be done in accordance with the British 
model.27  
It took about a month until the CPCC submitted the first draft of the Bill to the Cabinet 
meeting. The draft delegated responsibility for crown property to the Ministry of Finance.28 
However, the royal court members, especially Queen Savang Vadhana, were worried that such a 
determination would transform crown property into a state asset. The Council of Regency then 
asked the Prime Minister to share the responsibility with the Minister of Finance. The Cabinet 
disagreed with the Regent because the management of the crown property required specific 
knowledge in fiscal affairs which might make the responsibility more suited to the Minister of 
Finance. During the debate, Pridi, by the time the Minister of Foreign Affairs, suggested that a 
committee should be appointed to be responsible for the crown property. The Cabinet agreed with 
Pridi.  
3.4 Content of the 1936 Crown Property Law and Its Enactment 
The first Crown Property Law was composed in four parts. The first part concerned the 
definitions and categories of properties concerning the crown. The new Act was different from 
the Tax Exemption for Crown Property Law in that it categorized properties of the crown into 
three groups, where the third (new) group was the properties of state, defined as the properties of 
                                                            
27 Record of Cabinet Meeting, 80/1936, 26 February 1937 
28 Record of Cabinet Meeting, 87/1936, 22 March 1937 
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the monarchy used for state affairs, such as palaces. The other two groups - the personal 
properties of the King and the property of the crown – retained their previous definitions.  
The most significant part of the law was the determination of organizational 
responsibilities. The new law recognized two bureaus: the BRH and the Ministry of Finance. The 
first of these would be responsible for the private properties of the King, the properties of the 
state, and the consumable properties. The second was designated to manage the properties of the 
crown especially those involving business investments. This was a very important turning point 
in the history of the management of crown property in Thailand, in which the post-Revolution 
leaders expanded their power by enacting a law to control one of the most valuable royal assets. 
This determination also had another important implication. After the establishment of the BRH in 
August 1935, the Prime Minister became its commander. Thus, placing the personal properties of 
the King under the BRH implied that in practice the Premier could control the King’s private 
assets. When the Bill was submitted to Parliament, an MP asked about the correctness of this 
determination, but there was no answer from the government.29  
The next part of the law was the determination of the expenditure of the net income 
from the crown property. According to the law, this income would be submitted to the King and 
would be used only for royal affairs, but not for the monarch’s personal expenditures. During that 
time, the Regent controlled the net profits of the crown property, since King Ananda was still 
young and did not reside in Siam.  
The final component of the Crown Property Law concerned the taxation of crown 
properties. The private properties of the King were not exempt from taxation, but the other two 
                                                            
29 Minutes of the National Assembly Meeting 21/1936 (second irregular term), 29 March 1937 
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categories of crown property were, which implied that the personal affairs of the monarch would 
be treated in the same way as ordinary people in the country. 
Most of the MPs who discussed in the House of Representatives tried to delay the 
promulgating session of the Bill to the next term of the parliamentary meeting. They argued that 
the Bill, which directly involved royal affairs, was too important to be considered in a short 
period of time. However, a majority of the MPs voted in favor of the government. After that, 
Parliament appointed a committee to amend the Bill within a day and approved it in only two 
days after the first reading. 
After the parliamentary approval, the Bill was to be authorized by the Council of 
Regency and to be published in the Royal Gazette. Such processes, however, were not as urgent 
as the Cabinet had implied when introducing the Bill in the House. According to the Bill, the 
properties which had been controlled by the BRH were to be transferred to the Ministry of 
Finance; the government waited for the completion of this process before publishing the Law.30 
However, the Minister of Finance suggested that the enactment could be done before the transfer 
was complete; thus, the Cabinet prepared to enact the Law.31 By June 16, 1937 (or more than two 
months after Parliament had approved the Bill), the Cabinet had approved lists of candidates for 
the Crown Property Advisory Committee and the Regent had already signed the Bill. However, 
the royal court asked the Cabinet to delay the Law’s publication because the BRH had not yet 
settled the relocation of the properties with the Ministry of Finance.32 
The discussion between the BRH and the Ministry revealed why the Law’s publication 
was so delayed. Phraya Chaiyossombat, the Minister of Finance, reported to the Cabinet in early 
                                                            
30 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 3/1937, 5 May 1937 
31 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 4/1937, 12 May 1937 
32 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 10/1937, 16 June 1937 
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July that at that time the Privy Purse Bureau controlled 122 property accounts, including 9 
accounts deemed to be crown properties, 84 private asset accounts, and 29 indeterminate 
accounts. The Cabinet decided to delay the publication of the Crown Property Law until the 
designation of those 29 accounts was concluded.33 After that, the account investigation was 
complete. The CPCC reported that among the 122 accounts, there were 28 crown property 
accounts and 94 personal accounts.34 The first Crown Property Law was eventually published in 
the Royal Gazette on July 19, 1937.35 
The enactment of the 1936 Crown Property Act affected the management of the 
property of the crown and the private property of the monarch. The first two Constitutions 
excluded the monarch from state affairs by determining that every royal public appearance had to 
be approved by a minister. However, there was no direct regulation of the royal property. The 
Tax Exemption Act separated the private property of the King from the crown property but also 
did not determine how to manage those properties. The 1936 Act for the first time determined the 
pattern of authority over crown property. This was a very new approach for Siam, since, with the 
BRH under the Prime Minister’s control, the law implied that even the private assets of the 
sovereign were under the government’s authority.  
3.5 The Scandal of the Privy Purse 
Of all the accusations leveled at the People’s Party over crown property management, 
the sale of the Privy Purse’s land in 1937 was well known and written about especially by the 
royalists. From their perspective, this case showed the abuse of power which could result when 
                                                            
33 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 14/1937, 2 July 1937 
34 Record of the Cabinet, 18/1937, 12 July 1937 
35 “The Crown Property Act, B.E. 2479,” Royal Gazette 54, 19 July 1937, pp. 778-781 Due to the lunar calendar, of 
which the last month of a year was March, the first Crown Property Law has been held published in 1936. 
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the royal affairs became controlled by the new leaders.36 However, I argue that the scandal of the 
sale of the Privy Purse’s land was an example of the management of the crown property when 
who had power over public affairs were required to be accountable for their power.  
The separation of the monarch from the power to manage the crown property, 
concretely illustrated through the promulgation of the Crown Property Law in 1937, resulted in 
not only the removal of royal prerogatives, but also the establishment of accountability for the 
crown properties. This relationship between power and accountability was obviously different 
from the old regime, when the monarch ruled the country without having to be responsible to the 
people. Before the 1932 Revolution, kings exercised power without accountability. 
The management of the Privy Purse reflected this pattern of power. In addition to its 
juxtaposed position between the private enterprise of the monarch and state affairs, the operations 
of the Privy Purse, especially those of the King, could not be investigated or criticized, and its 
undertakings could not be convicted for conducting its operations. A study of the investments of 
the Privy Purse under the absolute regime indicated that King Vajiravuth’s personal spending 
was the principal factor behind the loss of the crown’s investments during his reign. His 
successor, King Prajadhipok, had to provide the state with funds to settle the Privy Purse’s debts. 
Chollada suggests that King Rama VI’s private expenses led to the decline of the properties held 
by the Privy Purse, which is confirmed by empirical evidence indicating that the Privy Purse’s 
financial status was in the red only four years after Vajiravuth ascended the throne. According to 
the Director of the Privy Purse’s report, in October 1910 when King Chulalongkorn passed away, 
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the organization’s resources amounted to 8.9 million baht.37 However, during the first four years 
of Rama VI’s reign, the Privy Purse spent more than 26 million baht but had an income of only 
approximately 18 million baht, insufficient compared to its expenditures, forcing its administrator 
to draw money from savings instead. In October 1914, the amount of savings remaining to the 
Privy Purse was only 14,000 baht. In addition, the Director of the Privy Purse indicated that King 
Vajiravuth had ordered to pay some additional expenses (more than 4.8 million baht) in advance. 
Thus, at that time the Privy Purse was in debt by approximately 4.7 million baht. 
Chollada indicates that the main reason for the less-profitable performance of the 
business investments of the Privy Purse was the private spending of King Vajiravudh. Chollada 
categorizes this expenditure into three groups. The first of these was visits to several areas in the 
country, which reportedly exceeded the allocated budget in every year and caused the Privy Purse 
to be indebted to the Ministry of Interior until the end of the Sixth Reign.38 The second was the 
Sue Pa affair (Wild Tiger Corps), the para-military unit created by the King and abolished when 
his reign ended. As it was one of the King’s private affairs, Sue Pa also wasted the Privy Purse’s 
capital. The last category was the money King Vajiravudh provided for his intimate servants. 
According to Chollada, King Rama VI built residences for his servants and gave them a large 
amount of money; for example, more than 20 aristocrats received an annual allowance from the 
Privy Purse by the King’s order, increasing the organization’s expenses by more than 100,000 
baht a year.39 The Ministry of Finance, whose main duty was to manage the state’s budget, was 
required to resolve the Privy Purse’s debts, which caused conflicts between the King and his 
Minister. King Vajiravudh asked the Minister to loan him 3 million baht for settling the debts of 
                                                            
37 Director of the Privy Purse to King Rama VI, 12 October 1914 in N.A. R.6 K12.3/6  
38 N.A. R.7 K19/7 
39 Chollada Wattanasiri, “Investment of the Privy Purse, 1890-1932,” pp. 214-216 
101 
 
the Privy Purse, in addition to the 3 million baht already provided by the Ministry to resolve the 
Privy Purse’s debts. However, Prince Chanthaburi, the Minister of Finance, resigned because he 
strongly disagreed with the King.40  
The failure of the management of the Privy Purse in the Sixth Reign reflected the 
pattern of the exercise of power in the absolute regime. Although mistakes led to the Privy 
Purse’s enormous debt and also affected the state’s budget, the King, as its direct commander, 
could not be publicly criticized or investigated, let alone be convicted of any misdoing, a pattern 
which was obviously different under the constitutional regime. 
The 1937 sale of the Privy Purse’s land is a good example of the constitutional pattern 
of the power. Lieng Chaiyakan, an MP from Ubonratchathani Province, set off an investigation 
by submitting a question to the House Speaker about the sale on July 20; just one day after the 
Crown Property Act was formally published in the Royal Gazette. His question was comprised of 
two main parts: 1) his claim that many of those involved in the land sale between July 1st and 
July 20th were government officials intimately involved with the 1932 Revolution’s Promoters 
(Phu Ko Kan), including ministers such as Phraya Rit Akkhanae, Wilas O-sathanond, Khun 
Nirandornchai, Phra Dulayatharn, and those who were in the royal court circle, such as 
Lieutenant Wan Ruyapon, and Khun Likhitsurakarn; and, 2) his allegation that the price of the 
lands sold was too low, possibly due to a conspiracy between the Privy Purse and the buyers. He 
included in his question a list of every transaction, including the buyers’ names, size of every 
piece of land, locations, and prices.41  
                                                            
40 Ibid., p.218 
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Although the sale was a scandal seemingly in urgent need of resolution, it was not until 
a week later the ministers considered the case in a meeting. The Cabinet reviewed Lieng’s 
question and addressed three specific points. In the first point, the Cabinet attempted to explain 
why the sale of the Privy Purse’s land had become a scandal. Phra Dulayatharn, the commander 
of the BRH, was one of those accused by Lieng; he stated his belief that it was Phraya Surakaset 
who tried to discredit the government because his offer to buy a piece of land from the Privy 
Purse was denied. Interestingly, Phraya Bhahol, the Prime Minister, believed this explanation. He 
even claimed that ‘In my opinion, it was because Mr.Lieng was a relative of Phraya Surakaset. 
When the latter could not buy the land, he got jealous.’42 Second, the Cabinet considered what to 
do about the lands bought by ministers and some high-rank civil servants. On the one hand, 
Phraya Rit Akkhanae, one of the ministers who were accused by Lieng, claimed that he had 
bought the land properly and correctly. However, as he was one of the 1932 Promoters, he stated 
that he would return the land to prove his innocence and maintain the reputation of the 
Promoters. However, other ministers disagreed with Phraya Rit, arguing that the return of the 
land damaged the Promoters’ reputation still more since this would imply that the sale was 
conducted improperly. Third, the ministers considered how to answer Lieng’s question in 
Parliament. Khun Samahan Hitakhadi, the Deputy Minister of Finance suggested that the Prime 
Minister should respond by making reference to royal prerogative, since at the time of the sale, 
the Crown Property Act had not yet been promulgated; thus, the management of those lands 
should be held as a royal power. Further, because the King was still young, any power to conduct 
royal affairs was legitimately in the hands of the Council of Regency. Thus, the sale was not 
illegal. Prince Wan was responsible for drafting a document for the Prime Minister’s reply 
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denying Lieng’s accusation in the House. However, the Prince suggested that appointing a 
committee to investigate the sale was the best way to address the problem, and that only MPs 
should be committee members to ensure transparency. Initially, the Cabinet approved Prince 
Wan’s draft. 
Unfortunately, the Deputy Minister of Finance’s suggestion was problematic in 
principle; the Prime Minister’s reply in Parliament using the suggestion, which was terse, 
ambiguous and did not clarify individual points, did not satisfy the MPs since it contradicted the 
constitutional principle of governance. Instead, the reply essentially refused to answer Lieng’s 
question. Lieng claimed that the normal time required to survey land was more than a month, yet 
the Privy Purse’s lands were surveyed within two days. Phraya Bhahol replied that it was the 
internal affair of the Department of Lands. To the part of Lieng’s question which listed 
transactions occurring during the 20 days before the enforcement of the Crown Property Law, for 
example, Phraya Bhahol only replied that “some [lands] were really transferred during that time, 
but some others were not.”43 To the part of the question concerning the low price of the sale, the 
Prime Minister claimed that all sales were pursued under the royal prerogatives. When Lieng 
repeated his question and asked about the suitability of that method, Phraya Bhahol responded: 
If one has already gained the royal mercy, then one actually doesn’t 
need to pay. I think it’s not illegal. … [If] we would like to get the 
royal permission, then we asked the monarch. Whether it was 
approved depended on the royal decision and the Regent. The Regent 
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has not been appointed to be only a figurehead; rather, the position 
had a duty to consider every affair in the name of the King.44 
To argue that the sale of the Privy Purse’s land before the promulgation of the Crown 
Property Law was proper implied that the royal court during that time had the legitimate power to 
manage its properties, which did not conform to the constitutional principle holding that all 
enterprises of the royal court were state affairs under the control and accountability of the 
ministers. By making this response, the government was (perhaps unwittingly) using arguments 
from the absolutist regime to legitimize their action, and, although he said in the last question that 
he personally believed that the Prime Minister had nothing to do with the scandal, by mentioning 
ministers in his question, Lieng obviously wanted the Cabinet to take responsibility. 
Lieng’s question led to a general discussion in the House. At first, the argument 
between Lieng and the Prime Minister concerned the suitability of the land sale. Lieng questioned 
other aspects of the sale in which the Privy Purse had lost benefits, e.g., Phra Dulayatharn, who 
bought a piece of land from the Privy Purse for 14,000 baht and spent 100 baht per month on the 
land but received 150 baht rent per month from the land, for a net profit of 50 baht. However, the 
Prime Minister still claimed that the price of the land was at the Regent’s discretion. After that, 
the House began a general discussion of the appropriateness of the selling price. Tai Panikabutr, a 
Bangkok MP, who required the House to open such a session, started the discussion. He noted 
that when the King was young and not residing in the country, the Regent should not have had 
the power to provide the royal mercy.  
This discussion also touched on the delay in the promulgation of the Crown Property 
Act. Several MPs questioned the delay, since nearly all of the problematic transactions happened 
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between parliamentary approval and the promulgation of the law. The government’s replies did 
not satisfy the MPs. The Prime Minister still maintained that to sell the land by royal mercy was 
not wrong. Luang Thamrong, the Minister of the Interior, argued that the sale was really legal, 
but it might be morally unsuitable depending on each person’s perspective. He also explained the 
delay in promulgation was due to many important required adjustments before implementing the 
law, such as the transfer of many assets of the crown from the Privy Purse to the Ministry of 
Finance. However, this explanation did not persuade the MPs. Most of them agreed that the 
House should appoint a committee to investigate the sale or else pursue a vote of no confidence. 
Nonetheless, before a vote was taken on which alternative the House would choose, the session 
(which had run for hours) closed. The Speaker assigned the discussion to continue next day. 
An importance of this discussion was that the MPs criticized not only the government 
and the civil servants responsible for the royal court’s properties, but also the Council of 
Regency, especially Prince Aditya, the Council’s President. Although not a direct critique of the 
monarch, the discussion was the first time a representative of the Head of State was outspokenly 
investigated through a parliamentary process. In his second and third questions, Lieng attacked 
the Prince directly. According to his information, Prince Aditya sold a piece of land to the Privy 
Purse. The land was of a poorer quality than other areas, yet the Prince earned 90,000 baht. Thus, 
the transaction was obviously abnormal, Lieng argued. He also satirically questioned that “who 
did authorize this deal? Did that person consider if it was morally and legally trustworthy?”45 The 
ministers and the MPs did know well the person to whom Mr. Lieng was referring. He repeated 
this point several times in his discussion. 
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In addition to the direct critique of the Regency President, the MPs criticized the 
process in which Prince Aditya was a significant participant. The ministers tried to explain that 
the sale was pursued under the royal prerogative which was decided by the Council of Regency, 
so the price of the land was not illegal no matter how low it was. Thong-in Phuriphat, an MP 
from Ubolratchathani, contended that the sale of land by the process described was of the 
absolute state which should have been not followed under the constitutional regime. The 
management of the properties of the crown in a constitutional monarchy should be pursued in 
accordance with the law, Thong-in argued. Thong-in’s discussion implicitly criticized the royal 
prerogative exercised by the Regent which resulted in the abnormal transactions. Thus, this 
discussion was not only about the person who exercised the power of the Head of State, but also 
the process by which the position performed its duties.  
A day later, the Cabinet held a meeting before the House met again in the afternoon. 
The Prime Minister and all ministers decided to resign. All Regents determined to resign as well. 
Before the Cabinet reached agreement, Phraya Chaiyossombat, the Minister of Finance, sourly 
mentioned the scandal of the Privy Purse. He said he himself had already examined the events 
and concluded that the delay in the promulgation of the Crown Property Act was for the benefits 
of those involved in the transactions. According to the Minister, prices of lands were lower than 
the prices initially proposed by officials; thus, the sale did really benefit the buyers. Phraya 
Chaiyossombat told the Cabinet that he wanted to resign.46  The Minister of Finance’s 
information corroborated Lieng’s accusation. Phraya Bhahol said that he himself was responsible 
for the BRH’s affairs as he was its highest commander. He wanted to resign as well, so that an 
investigation committee would be appointed. Luang Phibul Songkram, whose name also 
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appeared in the buyer list, did not want to maintain his position either. Eventually, the 
government decided to step down. 
Phra Dulayatharn, the Minister commanding the BRH on behaves of the Prime 
Minister, was one of the targets of Lieng’s questions, because he was not only one of the buyers 
but also the one who was responsible for royal affairs. He tried to defend himself. He claimed 
that the rental he received from the land was only 50 baht, not 150 baht. Phra Dulayatharn also 
revealed that some of the land sold was not approved by the Prime Minister. This point involved 
the problem of the power to command the BRH and the Privy Purse. According to the law 
established by the new leaders, the BRH and its affairs were administratively under the Prime 
Minister’s command. In practice, the Prime Minister could not handle every task of the bureau 
due to his responsibilities as the government’s leader, so he appointed a minister to assume the 
position as the BRH’s commander. Phra Dulayatharn was the minister appointed. To conduct the 
transactions without the Prime Minister’s approval might not be illegal because Phra Dulayatharn 
had legitimate authority, but to use his power to approve so many land sales in the few days 
before the Crown Property Law was promulgated was obviously unusual.  
The resignation of the Cabinet and the Regent altered the parliamentary session from 
discussion of the land sale to that of the Council of Regency. By the time, the country’s 
administration had been halted. There was not either a Cabinet or Regent. Thus, the House of 
Parliament was the only main institution remaining, by which the Regency would be appointed as 
determined by the Constitution. The process to appoint the new Council of Regency would not 
have been delayed if the MPs had not been confused by the resignation of Prince Aditya. 
Initially, the Prince had sent a letter to the Speaker of the House stating that he wanted to resign 
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due to the discussion in Parliament, which had severely damaged his reputation.47 Two other 
regents, Chao Phraya Yommarat and Chao Phraya Phitchayenyothin, submitted their resignations 
a day later.48 
Those letters from the Regent resulted in confusion among the MPs. Two days later, the 
Regents submitted another letter withdrawing their resignation. All of them claimed that after 
they resigned, there were groups from the military, police, MPs and civil servants asking them 
not to quit. In addition, during the two days of interregnum in which there was no Regency 
Council, the Regent claimed some confusion took place in the country, politically and fiscally. 
They also indicated that Parliament had not yet responded to their letters of resignation, so the 
resignations were not valid. The Regents argued that their position should be maintained. 
As a matter of fact, on the day the Regent submitted their first letters, Parliament held a 
secret meeting considering the resignation. There was no formal record of this meeting; however, 
a newspaper reported the MPs’ discussion. Prachachart reported that the House had already 
selected a royal family member and two more commoners to be the new Council of Regency. 
While the royal selected was Prince Naris, the commoners were Chao Phraya Sri Thammathibes 
and Chao Phraya Wongsanupraphat.49 According to the report, the two Chao Phraya had already 
accepted the position of Regent. Prince Naris was abroad on vacation and the House sent a 
telegram to inform him. This report would be confirmed by an MP during a parliamentary session 
discussing the withdrawing letters of the Regent. Yukieng Thonglongya, an MP from 
Kanchanaburi, disagreed with the notion that the resignations were invalid, and said that 
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[b]ecause Parliament has already selected new Regent, and we have 
contacted them. If we reappoint His Royal Highness [Prince Aditya] 
to be the regent, how will the persons who we have reached 
understand? Is Parliament just kidding? By this time I consider the 
Siamese politics is pervert.50 
The House of Representatives met on the two following days and held two additional 
secret meetings to consider the purported resignations of Prince Aditya and the other Regents. 
The MPs mentioned during the meetings their consideration of Article 57 of the Constitution in 
their decision of whether the resignations were valid. Lastly, Parliament had a formal meeting in 
which they determined that the resignation of the Council of Regency was completed.51 
The appointment of the new Regency was open and inclusive. The House discussed not 
only the persons to be appointed, but also the number of members in the new Council. As it 
turned out, those chosen by Parliament to be Regents did not accept the position. According to 
Phraya Manawaratchasewi (the House Speaker), Prince Rangsit declined the proposal, implying 
that Prince Naris had also refused the offer. Phraya Manawaratchasewi said in a parliamentary 
meeting that “it is very difficult to find a royal [to accept the position].” He asked the MPs if it 
was suitable to appoint a commoner to be the Chairman of the Council of Regency. Some MPs 
disagreed, contending that the position should be held by a royal because the Chairman’s duty 
was to be a mediator between the government and the royal family members. In addition, the 
Council’s Chairman had to conduct the royal ceremonies, so a commoner might not be 
appropriate. Thus, the House had no choice. They had to accept the former Regents.  
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Initially, Parliament decided to maintain the former number of Regent at three people (a 
royal, a civilian, and a soldier). The royalty would be the President of the Council, so that the 
communication with other royal family members would be convenient. Several names of royals 
were listed in the meeting: Prince Bidyalongkorn, Prince Rangsit, Prince Chula Chakrabongse, 
and even Queen Savang. However, some of them lived abroad, and some obviously did not 
accept the job. Eventually, the last four royals from whom Parliament could choose were Prince 
Aditya, Prince Alongkot, Prince Wiwathanachai, and Prince Thossiriwong. The majority of the 
MPs voted for Prince Aditya, so he returned as a Regent. The civilian the House selected was 
Chao Phraya Mahithorn, who won a majority of the vote over Chao Phraya Yommarat (one of 
the former Regents), and Chao Phraya Thammasakmontri. Lastly, the military Regent chosen by 
Parliament was Chao Phraya Wongsanupraphat (rather than the former Regent Chao Phraya 
Phitchayenyohin and Phraya Bahol, the former Prime Minister.) Thus, at this step, only Prince 
Aditya remained from the old Council of Regency.  
After that, Parliament assigned Phraya Thep Hassadin, the Deputy Speaker of the 
House, to approach those who were chosen. However, Chao Phraya Mahithorn and Chao Phraya 
Wongsanupraphat both refused to accept the position due to their old age. In the meantime, 
Prince Aditya stated that he would not accept the position unless all of the former regents were 
reappointed.52 The House of Representatives did not acknowledge Prince Aditya’s request. 
Instead, Parliament voted for Chao Phraya Phitchayenyohin (a former Regent) and Chao Phraya 
Thammasakmontri.53 While Phitchayenyohin accepted the position, Thammasakmontri said that 
he was too old. Parliament had to select another candidate; however, the majority of MPs still 
                                                            
52 Minutes of the National Assembly Meeting, 17/1937 (Regular) , 1 August 1937 
53 It was interesting that Phibul and Bhahol were ones of the candidates; however, their names could not win the 
majority of the MPs. 
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chose Chao Phraya Thammasakmontri. The Speaker of the House was not sure whether Chao 
Phraya Thammasakmontri would accept Parliament’s decision, so he saw Thammasakmontri 
personally to ask him. Chao Phraya Thammasakmontri still refused. Thus, there was only one 
choice left: Chao Phraya Yommarat who was a former Regent. This is why all three former 
regents were appointed by Parliament after much confusion.54 
When the Council of Regency was functioning again, the next step was to appoint the 
Prime Minister. According to the 1932 Constitution, the Prime Minister would be appointed from 
among the MPs by the King and the Speaker of the House would countersign such an 
appointment. After the scandal, the leaders apparently agreed that Bhahol would again be 
appointed the Prime Minister. However, Parliament had not yet decided whether Bhahol was 
innocent of involvement in the land sale scandal. Although almost all MPs believed that the 
former premier was not involved in the corruption which led to the scandal, the House could not 
formally approve his innocence because there still had been no official investigation. The leaders 
solved this puzzle by allowing the Regent to appoint Bhahol as the Prime Minister. After that, 
when his new Cabinet was approved, the government appointed a committee to investigate the 
Privy Purse’s land sale scandal. Through this process, Phraya Bhahol was again named as Prime 
Minister. 
After setting up the new Cabinet, the investigating committee was to be arranged. 
However, there was no bureaucrat willing to get involved. Initially, the Cabinet named five 
officials to the committee, of which Chao Phraya Srithammadhibes was the chairman. Others in 
                                                            
54 However, Bruce Lockhart, “Monarchy in Siam and Vietnam, 1925-1946,” p.506 describes this event as “A comic-
opera scene.” It should be noted here that both Lockhart and Weena raise a possibility in which Pridi might have 
been the mastermind who tried of discredit Phibul by this scandal. According to Lockhart’s and Weena’s sources, 
this belief seemed to be widespread among the diplomat circle. See Bruce Lockhart, Ibid., pp.507-508, and Weena 
Manopimoke, “Conflicts within the People’s Party,” Master of Arts Thesis, Department of History, Graduate School, 
Chulalongkorn University, 1977, p.139 
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the committee were MPs and senior judiciaries.55 The names were even published in the Royal 
Gazette56 and other newspapers. However, Chao Phraya Srithammadhibes did not accept his 
appointment due to his intimacy with Phraya Bhahol, which he said might affect the 
investigation. Furthermore, Phra Atcharatsongsiri, one of those named to the committee, refused 
to accept the position, claiming that his administrative position was hierarchically subordinate to 
Phraya Rit Akkhanae, one of those accused in the case.57 Thus, the Cabinet had to find other 
bureaucrats to form the committee. Eventually, Phraya Phalangkul Thammaphichai accepted the 
Cabinet’s invitation. The government appointed Phraya Nonratchasuwat to be the committee’s 
chairman. 
The Cabinet permitted the committee full clearance. Prince Wan suggested in early 
August that the investigation should be comprised three main issues: the legal aspects, the 
administrative procedures, and the morality of the sale.58 Phraya Nonratchasuwat was concerned 
about the limits of the committee’s investigation, so the Cabinet determined the boundaries of the 
examination – the committee could obtain all related documents from every state’s department,59 
and call every level of bureaucrat for answers, except those at the ministerial level, whose 
cooperation the committee would have to request of the government, and the Council of Regency 
(who could not be investigated due to Article 98 of the Criminal Code).60 The Cabinet tried to 
convince the committee that the investigation would not be stymied or hindered due to the 
                                                            
55 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 2/1937 (Special), 12 August 1937 
56 “Appointment of the Investigating Committee of the Privy Purse’s Land,” Royal Gazette 54, (16 August 1937): 
1064-1065 
57 Record of the Cabinet Meeting (Special), 14 August 1937 
58 Record of a Special Meeting, 10 August 1937 
59 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 7/1937 (Second Administration), 18 August 1937 
60 Announcement of the Privy Purse’s Land Sale Investigation (Bangkok: Chatiniyom, 1937), p. 4 
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clearance granted. Prince Wan said in a Cabinet meeting that “unless to allow them that much 
power, the committee would accuse that [the government] trying to conceal the truth.”61 
About two months later, the committee submitted its investigation report to the Cabinet. 
The report consisted of many details. It investigated the Privy Purse’s land sale and examined 
every person concerned except the Regent. It listed every transaction, including the names of all 
sellers and buyers, the location and size of the lands sold, the time period of each sale, and the 
prices. According to the report, the transactions began in November 1935 and ended in July 1937 
(the same month as the promulgation of the Crown Property Law). There were 30 sales, 23 of 
which were occurred in July 1937, and 12 of these occurred specifically on July 17. The report 
documented that the Council of Regency had approved all of the sales and set the prices. 
According to the report, the Regent ordered officials to skip some important processes for some 
of the land sales. Table 3.1 below shows some significant details extracted from the report. 
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Table 3.1: Buyers and Sellers of the PPB Land in the Report of the Investigation Committee62 
            * 1 square wa = 4 square meters 
 
 
  
                                                            
62 Announcement of the Privy Purse’s Land Sale Investigation (Bangkok: Chatiniyom, 1937) 
Lands Sold
Buyers Transaction Date
Amount of 
Land    
(square wa)*
  Previous 
Price  (baht)
       Sold Price    
      (baht) Payment
PPB Advisory 
Committee 
Notification Notes
1 Khun Nirandonchai (1) November 12, 1935 400 4,000 4,000 100 baht/month no
2 Khun Nirandonchai (2) January 7, 1937 392 3,915 3,915 100 baht/month no
3 Luang Phibul Songkram January 7, 1937 812 7,120 7,120 unknown no returned
4 Lt.Wan Ruyapon January 18, 1937 364 4,400 4,400 700 baht/year no
5 Phra Dulayatharn (1) April 14, 1937 649 8,662.50 8,000 100 baht/month no returned
6 Luang Chamnan Yuthasilp May 11, 1937 926 unknown 9,260 1,160 baht/year no returned
7 Khun Namnarunart June 23, 1937 720 unknown 7,200 600 baht/year no
8 Phraya Rit Akkhanae July 1, 1937 982 15,000 10,000 1,200 baht/year no returned
9 Nares Thirak July 12, 1937 447 unknown 4,000 500 baht/year no
10 Wilas O-sathanond July 15, 1937 784 17,504.10 6,000 1,200 baht/year no
11 Phra Phichit Ratchasarn July 15, 1937 1,224 13,100 5,954 600 baht/year no
12 Khun Likhitsurakarn July 15, 1937 100 22,600 5,924 500 baht/year no
13 Luang Nitheskolkij July 16, 1937 224 19,268.83 7,000 50 baht/month no
14 Aek Suppodok July 16, 1937 474 6,382.23 2,844 600 baht/year no
15 Luang Adul July 17, 1937 1,436 unknown 18,650 1,800 baht/year no returned
16 Luang Chamnan Nitikaset July 17, 1937 1,478 28,010.24 9,231 1,200 baht/year no returned
17 Luang Atthasartprasit July 17, 1937 544 22,820 10,724 1,200 baht/year no returned
18 Lt. Kulap Kanchanasakul July 17, 1937 190.5 10,202 6,834 500 baht/year no
19 Son Bunjung July 17, 1937 524 36,000 4,584 600 baht/year no
20 Cap. Krawi Sawatdibutr July 17, 1937 264 16,000 5,480 600 baht/year no
21 Luang Yutthasartkosol July 17, 1937 1,909 37,828.12 10,303 1,000 baht/year no
22 Phra Wiset Aksornsarn July 17, 1937 249 9,105 3,557 200 baht/year no
23 Phra Noraratchamnog July 17, 1937 440 21,441.77 6,614 500 baht/year no
24 Chamnog Ratchakij July 17, 1937 202 18,122.28 6,134 500 baht/year no
25 Sawang Mahakayi July 17, 1937 282 13,000 4,070 300 baht/year no
26 Prachuap Buranond July 17, 1937 1,179 unknown 11,790 600 baht/year no
27 Phra Dulayatharn (2) July 19, 1937 403 37,080 14,000 1,000 bath/year no
28 Direk Jayanam July 20, 1937 1,131 72,216.79 18,590 1,200 baht/year no
Lands Bought
Sellers Transaction Date
Amount of 
Land 
(Square wa ) Previous Price Bought Price Payment
PPB Advisory 
Committee 
Notification Notes
1 Prince Aditya June 18, 1937 2,734 unknown 90,000 no
2 Jittasen Panja July 17, 1937 119 unknown 6,000 no
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An important issue investigated by the committee was whether there was any effort to 
delay the promulgation of the Crown Property Law so that the transactions would be legal. The 
committee found that there were three points at which the promulgation was delayed: 1) the 
process of bringing the Bill to the royal court; 2) the approval of the Council of Regency; and, 3) 
the publication in the Royal Gazette. According to the Cabinet meeting records, the first step was 
delayed because the consulting committee had not been determined, the transfer of the crown 
property had not yet been settled, and the Minister of Finance (who was to be in charge of the 
entire process) was not in Bangkok at that time, so the Cabinet decided to wait for him. 
Regarding the second part, the report of the committee recorded that the Prime Minister 
submitted the Bill to the Regent on May 14.63 A week later, the Regent proposed to the Cabinet 
that the regulation of the royal court organization should be revised before the Crown Property 
Bill was authorized. However, the Prime Minister did not support the Regent’s idea, arguing that 
it was not necessary and said the Bill should be immediately enforced. After another week, the 
Regent still maintained that the crown property reserved by the BRH had not yet transferred to 
the Ministry of Finance and thus the Bill could not be promulgated (the Regent sent the Bill back 
to the Prime Minister).  
At that point, a constitutional conflict might have occurred. According to the 
Constitution, if the sovereign did not authorize the Bill within one month, it was to be sent back 
to the Prime Minister and the House for reconsideration. Thus, the Cabinet secretary re-sent the 
Bill to the Regent to prevent the potential constitutional conflict. The Regent seemed to have no 
choice but to authorize the Bill. As appeared on the Act, the Council of Regency, acting for the 
                                                            
63 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 2/1937, 12 May 1937 
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King, approved the Bill on June 15. At this point, the Bill would have become a law if it had been 
published in the Royal Gazette. 
However, the Regent asked the Cabinet to delay the publication of the law, arguing that 
the BRH and the Ministry of Finance should reach an agreement over the regulation of the crown 
property before the law was published. During this time, the Ministry of Finance had established 
the consulting committee in accordance with the content of the Bill. However, the Bill was not 
yet enforced. A month later, Phraya Chaiyossombat, the Minister of Finance, sent a semi-secret 
letter to the Prime Minister, informing him that Chaiyossombat had learned of the scandal about 
the Privy Purse land sales. According to the Minister, during that week, some civil servants had 
irregularly bought properties from the Privy Purse, so he asked Direk Jayanam, the Cabinet 
Secretariat, to quickly enforce the law. Eventually, the Crown Property Law was published in the 
Royal Gazette and became an Act on 19 July 1937. 
Given this information, the investigative committee concluded that no one in the 
Cabinet intended to delay the promulgation of the Crown Property Law. The committee 
contended that although the Prime Minister did not immediately submit the parliamentary-
approved Bill to the Council of Regency, this was not wrong because the Cabinet wanted to wait 
for the Minister of Finance to return to Bangkok. In next step, when the Regent proposed to delay 
enforcing the law so that the revision of the regulation of the royal court could be completed, the 
Cabinet not only rejected this idea but also asked the Regent to quickly authorize the Bill. Thus, 
the delay of the promulgation was not the mistake of the Cabinet. 
Further, when the committee examined the buyers, it considered three points: the legal 
criteria, the bureaucratic factors, and the moral guilt. While the committee indicated that there 
was no guilt in the first two points due to the facts they found, the last point was not immoral 
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because the transactions were approved by royal authority. The conclusion of the report did not 
conceal that the sale of the Privy Purse’s lands before the promulgation of the Crown Property 
Law was approved under the royal prerogative exercised by the Regency Council. The only 
reason the transactions occurred was because the Council of Regency had exercised its right to 
grant the royal mercy. The committee met with each Regent to ask them about the selling process 
and how they decided to approve the sale. All regents maintained that they decided to sell the 
lands in accordance with royal tradition. Prince Aditya indicated that the sale was an exercise in 
maintaining loyalty to the monarchy so that the institution would not lose too much of its 
benefits. However, since the Council of Regency was immune from investigation due to Article 
98 of the Criminal Code, the committee could not state that they were responsible for the delay 
nor could it determine the moral status of the transactions. This conclusion implied that the 
abnormal transactions involving the Privy Purse’s land were possible due to the delay of the 
promulgation of the Crown Property Law. Many MPs had emphasized this point in the 
parliamentary discussion. Another implication of this conclusion was that the Regent was guilty.  
In spite of the imposed limitations, this investigation was one of the few examples in the 
modern history of Thailand in which the representative of the Head of State was brought into the 
investigative process. Prince Wan maintained in a Cabinet meeting that the committee should 
have clearance to access all levels of the bureaucracy, including the Regency Council.64 
Interestingly, although the committee’s report was only for purposes of information, its readers 
might have apprehended the entire picture.  
The committee’s report contained two significant findings: to name the convicted 
officials and to interpret the legal effects of the Privy Purse’s land sale. The committee attempted 
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to determine whether any officials were at fault for the suspiciously low land sale prices, but 
since the prices were determined by the Regent, the committee concluded that the officials were 
not at fault. As mentioned previously, the committee also determined that the buyers and sellers 
were also not at fault legally since there was no incorrectness with regard to bureaucratic 
regulations. However, the committee indicated that they could not decide whether this group was 
morally blameworthy because the transactions were authorized by the royal mercy. Thirdly, the 
report indicated the committee’s judgement that the high ranking officials in the royal court were 
guiltless. The committee noticed that all transactions were completed without being submitted to 
the PPB Advisory Committee. However, all cases had been granted the royal mercy, thus that 
exemption was not incorrect.  
According to the report, only one transaction was deemed incorrect: a piece of land the 
Privy Purse bought from Prince Aditya, the then-President of the Council of Regency. The 
committee indicated this case was not a transaction executed by the royal mercy; it was therefore 
required to be submitted to the PPB Advisory Committee. Nevertheless, the penalty for this 
erroneous transaction was just a formal letter of condemnation sent to the officials involved. 
Eventually, only one official of the Privy Purse Bureau (Khun Likhit Surakarn, the Deputy 
Director of the Privy Purse) was punished (he was fired) for dishonesty in estimating the price of 
two pieces of land.  
The most important judgement of the committee was that all transactions involving the 
Privy Purse’s land were unconstitutional. The land sales were authorized by the Regent but there 
was no countersignature, thus these sales had to be held invalid. The Cabinet did not object to the 
report and issued a resolution to pursue the committee’s suggestions. The Ministry of Finance 
was required to re-acquire those lands of the Privy Purse. Two officials were threatened with 
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punishment: Phraya Charti Dejudom, then Lord Chamberlain, and Phraya Amaressombati, the 
Director of the Privy Purse Bureau. Lastly, Phra Dulayatharn, the Minister who commanded the 
BRH, would have been punished had he not retired before such a Cabinet resolution was issued.65  
How important was the Privy Purse’s land sale? Narong Phuangphis and Prachan 
Rakpongsa, who accessed significant related documents, proposed that the resignation of Bhahol 
was a good example for politicians by taking responsibility for the actions of his subordinates and 
was willingly open to the investigation by the committee. Moreover, Lieng’s question in the 
House showed the proper actions taken under the parliamentary system where the legislative 
section tried to scrutinize the executive actions.66 From another perspective, however, following 
the constitutional pattern of power, the crown property after the 1932 Revolution was held as the 
state’s assets, the management of which could not be done arbitrarily as in the old regime. Rather, 
it was the responsibility of Parliament (the people’s representatives), under a new principle 
created after the Revolution which could not have occurred in the absolute period. Furthermore, 
the Privy Purse’s land sale was the only instance in the history of Thailand in which the persons 
who functioned as the Head of State as the Council of Regency were directly and publicly 
discussed both in Parliament and the newspapers. Although the committee could not convict the 
Regent due to the limits imposed by the Criminal Code, that the royal authority was dismissed 
reflected the principles of the new regime. 
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3.6 Under the 1936 Crown Property Law 
The 1936 Crown Property Law provided the Ministry of Finance with the authority to 
manage the crown property. The Law also determined how to spend the income obtained from 
the crown property. Article 7 indicated the conditions for transferring crown property or its 
disposal. According to Article 6, the net profit from crown property transactions would be 
reserved for the monarchy under an account named the ‘Budget of the Head of State’. Article 6 
was important because it allowed the government to manipulate crown property assets. In other 
words, the significance of the 1936 Law was its separation of the monarchy both as person and as 
an institution from the power to manage the property of the crown.   
3.6.1 Confusion and the Interpretation of Article 6 
The section of the Law designating how the income from the crown property was to be 
spent led to some confusion during the first year of its enforcement. After the scandal of the Privy 
Purse’s land sale, the government tried to pursue the management of the crown property in 
accordance with the content of the 1936 Law. Regarding the will of the Law, Prince Wan (who 
drafted the Law) maintained that it would prevent the monarch from providing the crown 
property to anybody.67 As a result, several expenses over which the royal court previously held 
authority were no longer managed by royal command. This change can be illustrated by some 
examples which occurred in August 1937. The Council of Regency had already approved funds 
to support the residence of the Regent Chao Phraya Phitchayenyothin; however, the spending of 
these funds was suspended by the Minister of Finance since such support did not conform to the 
Law. The Minister explained that such an expense had to be paid by the Budget of the Head of 
State. Since the net profit from crown properties for 1937 had not yet been calculated, any 
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expenditure of these funds had to be suspended. Such a suspension of expenditures authorized by 
royal command by a Minister was novel to crown property management and it was soon applied 
to other expenditures of the royal court, for example, the royal mercy for marriage ceremonies 
and donations to build hospitals. The suspension of the expenditures resulted in discontinuity of 
royal court business. The Cabinet solved this problem by allowing the Ministry of Finance to 
provide a loan to the royal court to use for its expenses in 1937. When the net profit of the crown 
property was determined by the end of the year, the royal court’s expenditure would again 
become normal.68 In addition, the Cabinet permitted the Regents to issue a regulation for 
spending the monies of the loan for routine and occasional expenses, which was later named ‘the 
Expenditure of the Head of State’. According to this regulation, the spending would be 
authorized by the Regent under the approval of the Prime Minister as the commander of the 
BRH.69 
The management of the crown property enacted in the 1936 Law also led to curiosity 
about the authority to spend the royal court’s budget, and the Cabinet asked Kissadeeka to 
interpret the Law since the Minister of Finance and the royal court did not agree over its content. 
The royal court maintained that to spend monies in accordance with Article 6 required royal 
approval. Phra Sarasaspraphant, the BRH Minister, strongly insisted that Article 6 only indicated 
the categories of the royal budget and that it did not allow the Minister of Finance to spend the 
royal monies arbitrarily.70 The Minister of Finance contended that the expenditures listed in 
Article 6 were routine and did not require royal approval. In principle, the two sides were arguing 
whether the monarch still had authority to manage the crown’s property. Krissadeeka arranged a 
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meeting of those directly involved, such as Phraya Atcharatsongsiri from the Ministry of Finance, 
Phra Sarasaspraphant as the representative of the royal court, and Prince Wan, the advisor to the 
Office of the Prime Minister. Interestingly, the final interpretation of Krissadeeka was identical 
to Prince Wan’s initial proposal during the drafting of the Law in 1935, i.e., that Article 6 of the 
1936 Law provided special authority to the Ministry of Finance to manage the crown’s property. 
Thus, the Minister could spend the monies without royal approval.71  
3.6.2 The designation of authorities 
According to Article 5 of the 1936 Law, the crown property was determined to be under 
the Ministry of Finance’s authority; thus, a number of properties had to be transferred from the 
Privy Purse to the Ministry. In practice, however, there were several issues which arose 
occasionally during the first year of the enforcement of the Law. The leaders’ concept of crown 
property management sometimes was demonstrable by the method and approach they used to 
handle such instances. The first issue was the definition of the properties retained by the Privy 
Purse. After Parliament approved the Crown Property Bill in March 1937, the Minister of 
Finance, who was preparing for more work transferred from the BRH, raised a problematic issue 
concerning the monarch’s “consumables,” which Article 5 determined were the responsibility of 
the BRH.72 Initially, the Cabinet approved the definition suggested by Prince Wan that these 
consumables meant general consumer goods used by the monarch in ordinary everyday life, not 
those consumed as the head of state. According to the Prince’s definition, the royal regalia were 
not included in this category so were under the Ministry of Finance’s control.73 Such a definition 
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did not satisfy the Regent, however, since they wanted a more certain explanation.74 The issue 
then was passed to the CPCC, which suggested that the consumables in the royal court comprised 
those consumed by the King as an ordinary person and those which were used in royal affairs. 
The definition of the first category conformed to Article 5 of the 1936 Law, thus would be 
retained by the BRH, the committee argued, but the second group had to be controlled by the 
Ministry of Finance. However, for the sake of convenient usage, the committee suggested that 
some consumables in the second group should be kept by the BRH.75 This interpretation clarified 
the duties of the BRH and the Ministry of Finance under the Crown Property Law.  
According to Article 5 of the 1936 Law, those properties of the crown which were not 
consumable were controlled by the Ministry of Finance. The most important of these were the 
investment assets. In July 1937, before the Crown Property Law was promulgated, the BRH had 
submitted 122 accounts under the Privy Purse’s control to the Ministry for determination as to 
whether they were crown or private properties. The CPCC determined that, of the 122 accounts, 
28 accounts were properties of the crown and 94 accounts were private properties.76 
It is unclear how many properties of the crown were retained by the Privy Purse during 
the 1932 Revolution. During its prosperous period, the Privy Pure owned more than 20,000 rai of 
land in Bangkok and nearby areas. Chollada reports that the Privy Purse’s assets decreased in the 
two reigns after King Chulalongkorn due to changes in its investment policy and the economic 
downturn.77 Later documents indicated that the Privy Purse retained three groups of accounts: 
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private properties of King Prajadhipok, private accounts of other royals, and properties of the 
monarchy.78 This last was defined as crown property by the 1936 Law. 
The same document also indicated that properties of the monarchy included account 
number 1, account number 2 (the annual allocation the monarchy received from the state), the 
pension for the royal concubines (details of this budget will be explained in later chapter), and the 
income and expenses of the Ministry of the Royal Household. The pension for the royal 
concubines was initiated by King Chulalongkorn to provide for his inner court ladies, using 
revenues from real estate. Thus, of these properties, only account number 1 directly involved 
business investments. 
Another document further indicated that account number 1 contained the properties, 
profits, and incomes of the Privy Purse, including cash, lands, shophouses, stocks, and 
mortgages.79 Unfortunately, there was no evidence which clearly indicated the value of these 
properties. However, some documents after King Prajadhipok’s abdication indicated that in 1936 
and 1937 monies were transferred from account number 1 to account number 2 in the amounts of 
365,192.85 and 279,301.36 baht, respectively.80 According to the documentary evidence, those 
amounts constituted 40% of the revenue of the Privy Purse in each year, thus the Privy Purse 
retained properties which generated profits of 912,982.13 and 698,253.4 baht (respectively for 
the two years); these properties were transferred to the Ministry of Finance after the 1936 Act 
was enforced. 
The next group of asset the government examined was the royal residences and lands. 
Those royal areas were located throughout the country and were controlled either by the BRH or 
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each provincial committee. The BRH inquired concerning the categorization of those areas in 
accordance with the 1936 Law and whether the profits from those areas could be spent. Initially, 
the Minister of Finance suggested a criterion for consideration that the properties to be 
transferred to the Ministry of Finance should be those involving investments and that the BRH 
should retain only the assets without income. Phra Sarasaspraphant, however, contended that if 
the BRH did not receive some income for the royal residences, then it could not effectively 
maintain the residences. The Cabinet’s resolution comprised two points: agreeing with the 
criterion suggested by the Minister of Finance but determining the Ministry to allocate monies for 
the BRH to maintain those royal areas.81 
During the discussion in the Cabinet meeting there emerged some interesting thoughts 
concerning the maintenance of the royal residences. The Minister of Finance suggested that these 
expenditures should be allocated from the Budget of the Head of State. This suggestion implied 
that the Cabinet could determine how the Budget would be spent.  Prince Wan indicated that such 
an expense should be allotted from the private budget of the monarch, implying that the Cabinet 
could expand its authority to cover even the private allowance of the King. Actually, the royal 
court administration built by the People’s Party government after King Prajadhipok abdicated had 
already led to the Cabinet holding authority over the personal expenses of the monarch. 
According to the 1935 Law, the BRH was under the direct control of the Prime Minister and the 
1936 Crown Property Law assigned the BRH jurisdiction over the private properties of the King. 
Logically, therefore, the Prime Minister could legally manipulate the personal budget of the 
King. In other words, the system of royal finance and property management established by the 
leaders after the 1932 Revolution expanded the authority of the Cabinet beyond that imposed by 
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the English Civil List on the British monarchy. The Civil List separated the monarch from the 
power to control public finance but Parliament did not have any authority over the head of state’s 
private property. 
Another issue concerned the civil servants of the Privy Purse; some officers were retired 
from their positions, which also resulted in a delay in the property transfer. After the Crown 
Property Bill was approved by Parliament, the officials working for the BRH might have been 
aware of their uncertain future, so they were not willing to cooperate with the transfer. Even after 
the Law was promulgated in July 1937, the re-assignment had still not been completed. The 
Cabinet met to determine a deadline on 15 November82; however, they still did not collaborate.83 
According to the BRH’s information, of the approximately 200 officials working for the Privy 
Purse, 80 civil servants were relocated to the Minister of Finance to continue to work on crown 
property management and another 80 would remain with the Privy Purse, leaving 40 civil 
servants unassigned who were forcibly retired. The Regent expressed pity for these individuals.84 
The Cabinet tried to explain that these officials were selected for retirement because they met two 
criteria: they were older than 55 years and had worked for the bureaucratic system for more than 
25 years.85 
In sum, the transfer of crown property from the BRH to the Ministry of Finance in 
accordance with the content of the 1936 Crown Property Law carried with it some important 
issues. The Cabinet had to consider and decide the definitions of the properties, the asset accounts 
and the royal residences. During this process, there emerged some interesting thoughts of the 
leaders concerning the crown property management, namely that, under the People’s Party 
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83 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 22/1937 (Second Administration),  17 November 1937 
84 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 28/1937 (Second Administration), 18 March 1938 
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regime, for the Cabinet to control all crown property and royal finances seemed to be just 
common sense to the leaders, thus the government expanded its authority to all royal affairs, 
including even the private budget of the monarch. 
3.7 Limited Accountability 
The separation of the monarch from the power to control the royal affairs resulted in the 
applying of the principle concerning accountability in the management of the crown property and 
the royal finance. As discussed earlier, the investigation of the Privy Purse land case illustrated 
the accountability over the affair. However, the period in which the People’s Party was in power 
saw an important limitation: the political structure constructed after the 1932 Revolution in which 
the executive branch had more power than the legislative institution. Parliament could not really 
control the government. Accordingly, some significant cases reflected the unaccountable 
management of the crown property under the government’s power.  
In the English case, from which the Siamese leaders after the Revolution tried to imitate 
for the crown property management, the reform of the royal court finance was a significant factor 
which led to changes in the political structure. The Civil List had developed from the system 
which balanced the power between the royal court and Parliament to the structure in which the 
legislative branch had more power than the monarch. Since the early 19th century, the monarch 
had power only over his private budget and some royal court allocations, and other administrative 
allowances were controlled by Parliament. Changes in the management of the royal court finance 
thus reflected the development of the wider political structure and were a part of the initiation of 
the parliamentary supremacy. The Thai case was rather different, however. The reform of the 
management of the crown property did not lead to the parliamentary supremacy system. In this 
section, I describe another characteristic of the management of the crown property which 
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reflected the executive inclination of the post-1932 political structure. As a result, there emerged 
the limitation of the accountability principle in pursuing the affair. 
The payment of the Budget for the Head of State was informative. Article 6 of the 1936 
Law mentioned two categories of the crown property’s expenses: the budgets comprised of 
salaries, pensions, occasional payments, investment, and royal charities, and the Budget for the 
Head of State (the net profit of all incomes from the crown property). As mentioned above, 
Krissadeeka maintained that the Ministry of Finance could spend the monies determined in 
Article 6 without royal approval. Accordingly, the person who had authority over the Budget for 
the Head of State was a minister rather than the King or the Regent. This pattern of authorization 
was expressed through several instances in practice.  
As described above, during the first months of the 1936 law’s enforcement, the 
government could not exactly calculate the amount because the total budget of the royal court had 
not been settled. The Ministry of Finance had to provide a temporary loan for the BRH and a 
regulation to direct the payment of such a budget was issued. There was some evidence in early 
1939 which indicated that the net profits of the crown property in 1937 and 1938 were 416,573 
and 600,000 baht respectively, and those amounts were allocated as the Budget for the Head of 
State in each year. The 600,000 baht would be the amount the Ministry of Finance provided for 
the Budget in later years. There was no obvious evidence of how the Budget was spent in each 
fiscal year. Some documents suggest that the payment of the Budget for the Head of State 
comprised three categories: the routine expenses of the royal court, the residue payments, and 
special expenditures. Most of the payment of the first of these was the expense paid by royal 
mercy for persons in governmental and royal court circles. For example, in 1942, the amounts the 
royal court prepared to pay for this expense were 25,000 and 40,000 baht for the Prime Minister 
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and the Regent, respectively. The expense of the royal court was only 36,000 baht.86 The second 
category of the Budget included payments for the Norasinha building (which later became the 
House of Government), including its maintenance, which cost 540,000 baht.87 The last category 
was related to 150,000 baht borrowed by the Crown Property Bureau to pay the Civil Court’s fee 
for the legal case against King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni in 1940.88 It was noticeable 
that most of the Budget for the Head of State paid for functions of the government rather than 
those of the royal court. On the one hand, King Rama VIII was still young and did not 
permanently live in the kingdom, so the money needed to take care of the King was not so high;89 
on the other hand, the system of the management of the royal court in the post-1932 regime was 
the foundation of such a pattern of budget payment. 
In principle, the Budget for the Head of State was money the King could spend due to his 
position as the monarch, so it was not the King’s private budget. Thus, constitutionally, a 
minister held authority over these monies. Even if the King lived in the country, he could not 
spend the Budget without a minister’s approval. Practically, several documents indicated that the 
allocation of the Budget for the Head of State was not under the authority of the Council of 
Regency but instead belonged to the Cabinet. As mentioned above, in May 1938, the Minister of 
Finance suggested that expenses related to the royal residences should be paid by the Budget for 
the Head of State.90 Another example concerned the royal charity. The Phibul government in 
1939 approved the suggestion of Pridi Bhanomyong, the Minister of Finance, to pay (from the 
Budget for the Head of State) the electrical bills of three temples for the royal charity, which was 
                                                            
86 Royal Private Secretary to Cabinet Secretariat, 29 April 1942 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK 3.22.9/2   
87 Minister of Finance to Prime Minister, 17 February 1942 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK 3.22.9/2  
88 Royal Private Secretary to Prime Minister, 16 February 1942 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK 3.22.9/2 
89 Evidence in 1936 informed that Sangwal, mother of King Ananda, told the Regent that the King needed only 
80,000 baht a year, and she let the Regent authority to decide how to manage the 20,000 baht left. Office of the 
Cabinet Secretariat, SLK 3.22.9/2 
90 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 1/1938, 9 May 1938 
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ordered by King Chulalongkorn.91 These instances showed that the government could determine 
how the Budget for the Head of State was spent. 
In his article which analyses the enactment of Crown Property Laws, Parut Penpayap 
suggests that the World War II was the watershed which altered the direction of the crown 
property management. Before the War, the People’s Party managed the crown property “in 
accordance with the ideology of the constitutionalism.”92 Parut’s criterion is that the decisions 
concerning the crown property affair during the time were always approved by the Cabinet. On 
the contrary, when the War began in Thailand in 1941, the benefits of the crown property were 
spent for the government leaders’ intimates and its spending never acquired the Cabinet’s 
approval. In addition, according to a newly issued regulation, Prime Minister Phibul Songkram 
could spend the budget of the crown property even before the Council of Regency issued a royal 
approval. Parut ascribes this arbitrary control of the crown property to the dictatorial rule of Field 
Marshal Phibul Songkram. 
In another perspective, Eiji Murashima argues that the authoritarian administration was 
not only caused by the personality of the Prime Minister, but also by the structure of the political 
institutions stipulated by the Permanent Constitution itself. Murashima indicates that the 
appointed second-category members of Parliament determined by the supreme law became a 
principal mechanism the People’s Party deployed in maintaining its power. The Promoters of the 
1932 Revolution considered themselves as the genuine protectors of the Constitution and the 
democratic regime, and they always justified the undemocratic political structure by alleging that 
                                                            
91 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 4/1938 (Second Administration), 11 January 1939 
92 Parut Penpayap, “What is Crown Property?,” Fadeawkan 6: 3 (2008) 
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there still was a monarchist movement trying to overthrow the government.93 The effort to 
introduce the multiparty system in Thai politics emerged from the first year of the new regime; 
however, it would not be realized until 1946 when the new Constitution was enacted. 
Interestingly, the management of the crown property had a direct role in the preservation of such 
a structure.  According to Murashima’s evidence, Prime Minister Phibul Songkram provided the 
budget of the crown property for the members of the People’s Party for their services to the 
country. In addition, it was used in persuading the first-category MPs to vote for the extension of 
the interim provision by which the appointed members of Parliament would be maintained 
further.94 Compared to the constitutional process of the royal affairs, the principle of 
accountability would not be applied in such cases. 
The point which should be emphasized here is that the 1932 leaders succeeded in 
excluding the monarch from the power to manage the crown property and the royal finance, and 
could apply to some extents the principle concerning the accountability to the affair. However, 
the political structure after the Revolution resulted in some problems in the management of the 
crown property under the power of the government. Due to the absence of the parliamentary 
supremacy system, the executive branch administrated the crown property without a proper 
investigation of the legislative power. Thus, the accountability principle, initiated by the 
separation of the monarch from the management of the crown property, was limited by the 
political structure under the 1932 Permanent Constitution, and the rise to power of Phibul 
Songkram and the military wing of the People’s Party accentuated this inclination. 
 
                                                            
93 Eiji Murashima, “Democracy and the Development of Political Parties in Thailand, 1932-1945,” in The Making of 
Modern Thai Political Parties (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1991) 
94 Ibid., p. 48 
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3.8 The end of the New Principles 
The separation of the monarch from the power to control the properties of the crown 
lasted only a decade and a half. The principal cause of its end was the changing political 
situation; the People’s Party could not hold their power for long. The clash between its most two 
important leaders, Pridi Bhanomyong and Field Marshal Phibul Songkram, over the future of 
Thailand after World War II led to the breakdown of the Party. The conservative camp returned 
to Thailand’s political scene in collaboration with Pridi, but could not achieve their political goals 
as long as Pridi and his followers were still in power. The coup d’état on 8 November 1947 took 
Pridi out of Thai politics, and actualized the political agendas of the conservative group. One of 
those was to return the management of the crown property to the royal prerogative, which was 
realized by the promulgation of the 1948 Crown Property Law.  
Somsak Jeamtheerasakul is the first scholar who recognized the historical importance of 
the 1948 Law. He entitles the Law ‘the counter revolution’. Somsak indicates that the monarchist 
Democrat Party led by Kuang Abhaiwong succeeded in reverting an important principle of the 
1932 Revolution.95 The 1948 Law, according to Somsak, returned both the management of the 
private properties of the monarch and the Crown Property Bureau to be under the absolute power 
of the King. 
The royalists’ move began not long after King Ananda’s death. In July 1947, Yai 
Sawitcharti, a Democrat MP from Nokornsawan, submitted a Bill to Parliament intended to 
amend the 1936 Crown Property Law, which Yai indicated had many disadvantages. According 
to Yai, the Crown Property Committee had no real power, which led to possibilities of 
corruption. According to Murashima’s evidence mentioned above, Yai’s statements might 
                                                            
95 Somsak Jeamteerasakul, “What is Crown Property Bureau?,” p. 243 
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directly concern Phibul’s undertakings over the crown property.96 Further, Yai indicated that the 
determinations in the Law did not allow the monarch enough income to preserve his honor. Yai’s 
Bill provided for the King to control the committee and (more importantly) to spend arbitrarily 
the net profits from crown properties. It could be argued that Yai’s real purpose was to return the 
power to control the crown property to the King; thus, this move of the Democrat Party was a 
part of the conservative agenda. While considering Yai’s Bill, the Cabinet mentioned another 
draft of the Council of Regency.97 Although the draft’s content was not disclosed, it may be that 
the royal court had made an effort to revise the law. However, the majority of the MPs still 
supported the government. Thus, the Bill was not approved, and this effort of the conservative 
camp to push their political agenda was unsuccessful.  
The 1947 coup d’état changed the political landscape in the politics of Thailand. Pridi’s 
group, which represented the liberals, was ousted from the political scene. The authoritarian and 
conservative groups, characterized by the army and the royal family members and their 
supporters respectively, were still in power. Before the coup, in order to overthrow Phibul, Pridi 
had collaborated with the conservatives through the Free Thai Movement. When Phibul resigned 
from his positions due to his defeat in Parliament, Pridi, by then a Regent, became the most 
powerful figure in Thai politics. He and his liberal fellows tried to build a more open political 
arena, including the enactment of a new Constitution in 1946 and the elimination of the 
prohibition against royal family members’ involvement in politics. However, the conservatives 
returned to significant political roles. They established conservative political parties and wrote 
many documents, most of which directly countered the 1932 Revolution. In the meantime, the 
army (which had been eclipsed by the Free Thai Movement) began to recollect its strength. The 
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displeasure due to the mysterious death of King Ananda on 9 June 1946 weakened Pridi’s 
government. Eventually, the conservatives collaborated with the army in overthrowing Pridi’s 
group by launching the 1947 coup d’état.   
The 1948 Crown Property Law removed a significant constitutional principle of 
governance established after the 1932 Revolution. What changed due to the 1948 Law could be 
reduced to three main points: the management of the private property of the King, the 
organization responsible for the crown property, and the power to control the crown property.  
With regard to the first point, the 1948 Law re-assigned management of royal property to the 
royal prerogative; initially, when Kuang’s administration submitted the Bill to the Senate, the Bill 
only indicated that the private assets of the King were not covered by the new law.98 But this 
provision was opposed by a senator, so it was revised in the second reading so that the private 
properties of the King would be managed completely in accordance with his desire. 
In addition, the second reading also added a provision for management of the private 
properties of the King. An article determined how to appoint a manager of the King’s personal 
assets, which depended on the King’s preference. The Prime Minister had to publish the 
appointment through the Royal Gazette. Any transaction, according to the Bill, must not refer to 
the King’s name.99 This was a goal of those drafting the 1948 Law, since, as declared in the 
Law’s rationale, “the preservation of the private properties of the monarch was under the royal 
preference.”100 
What happened after the 1948 Law was promulgated showed how the royalists thought 
about the issue of the Cabinet controlling not only the properties of the crown but also the private 
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assets of the King. The very first response of the royal court when the 1948 Crown Property Law 
was promulgated illustrated that this was one of their first priorities. On 4 February, only a day 
after the Regent authorized the Law, Prince Rangsit, the President of the Council of Regency, 
sent a letter to King Bhumibol (who was then in Switzerland), attaching a copy of the Law and 
asking the King to appoint the manager of his private properties.101 This rush could be explained 
if the management of the private assets of the monarch had been an issue which the royal court 
wanted to fix for a long time.  
The next two issues were connected and were the reason why the 1948 Law was named 
counter-revolutionary. The power and the organization to manage the crown property were 
determined to be under the royal prerogative. The new Law returned to the Crown Property 
Bureau the ability to perform legal transactions by itself. The Crown Property Committee (CPC) 
would be appointed by the King, except the Minister of Finance who would be the Committee’s 
chairman.102 This meant that the organization responsible for crown property would be controlled 
by a committee chosen by the King himself. The 1948 Law also determined that the monarch 
could spend the net profits of the crown property in accordance with his preference. In principle, 
this provision resulted in the end of the separation between the monarch and power over the 
crown property, since, from a perspective of constitutional governance, the 1948 Law brought to 
the king not only the power to manage the properties of the crown but also the power over public 
affairs. This contradicted the constitutional principle of governance, which is why the 1948 
Crown Property Law was called counter-revolutionary. 
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Minister of Finance were in the Field Marshal’s circle. This ended in the 1957 when Pote Sarasin, the Prime Minister 
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The 1948 Law also led to confusion in the management during the six decades that 
followed. In his 2006 article, Somsak Jeamteerasakul examined the bewilderment over the 
interpretation of the legal status of the Crown Property Bureau; even Krissadeeka could not 
definitely conclude whether it was a state or private organization.103 If it was a state organization, 
its status would contradict the Law’s determination that the monarch could appoint the CPC and 
could spent the income of the crown property freely as he pleased. The Crown Property Bureau’s 
unclear status also posed a problem regarding the examination of its operations, which, as a state 
organization, should have been performed. However, if the Crown Property Bureau was held a 
private organization, its income should have been taxed. Somsak indicated that these confusions 
resulted from the Law itself. 
Furthermore, some parts of the new Law were ambiguous. During the consideration of 
the 1948 Crown Property Bill, the point widely discussed by senators was the change in the 
definition of the private property of the monarch. The 1948 Bill which was submitted to the 
second reading of the Senate defined the private property of the King  as any property the 
monarch obtained not because of his status as a King, unlike the first Crown Property Law under 
which this depended on the person from whom the monarch received the assets; although this 
was a more clear criterion, according to a Senate committee this definition could lead to some 
injustice for the King since, if he as a Prince succeeded to the throne from his father, the previous 
King’s private properties would be held as assets of the state, thus seemingly confiscated by the 
state.104 The proposed revision was opposed by several senators due to its ambiguity. A senator 
questioned how to decide, if a commoner gave the King a pair of trousers, whether the King 
received those assets as a monarch or as an ordinary person. Interestingly, the committee 
                                                            
103 Somsak Jeamteerasakul, “What is Crown Property Bureau?,” p. 240 
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answered that it would be considered the private asset of the King until there emerged anyone 
opposed to this, in which case they would be required to prove that it was crown property, and 
the contention would be judged by a court. 
This raises some important points. First, unlike under previous criteria, the assets under 
consideration would be held crown property until a claimant emerged. Second, bringing the case 
to the court as the committee suggested was almost impossible due to Article 3 of the 1949 
Constitution which prohibited anyone filing a legal case against the King. These were legal 
dilemmas brought about by the 1948 Crown Property Law. 
Conclusion 
Changes in the definition of crown property reflected two significant points of its 
management after the 1932 Revolution. First, the separation of the monarch from the power to 
manage public affairs, the core principle of the constitutional monarchy, was applied to the 
management of the crown property in the same way as the finance of the royal court. This 
principle was realized in practice by separating the private properties of the monarchy and those 
of the crown from each other. Second, the power was transferred to the new leaders. Transferring 
the assets to be under its authority, the government not only separated those properties, but also 
controlled to spend the incomes from crown property.  
As a result, this process brought accountability to crown property management. Unlike 
the Privy Purse's methods under the absolute state, the administration of the crown property by 
the government after the 1932 Revolution was open to public investigation. The scandalous Privy 
Purse's land sale was an exceptional instance. However, despite some limits, even this scandal 
demonstrated how a public affair was pursued, subject to parliamentary and public investigations.  
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The 1948 Crown Property Act, a product of the political changes after the World War II 
and the 1947 coup d'état, ended this. The Law provided the monarch with power over crown 
property. Thus, its management was no longer subject to public investigation. In principle, the 
separation of the monarch and the power to manage crown property was ended.  
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Chapter 4 
The Reform and the Royals 
 
Introduction 
The management of the properties and finances of the royal court under the 
constitutional monarchical governance affected not only the king, but also other royal family 
members. To study those royals’ views on changes in the royal affairs in general and their lives in 
particular might have led to more comprehensive understanding of the 1932 Revolution, 
especially of the anti-revolutionary opinions which later became a significant factor in the failing 
of the new regime. 
In this chapter, I examine changes in the management of the royal court’s properties and 
finances which involved royals other than the monarch. I focus on three cases: 1) Queen Savang; 
2) the annual monies for the royals; and 3) the management of the pensions for the royal 
concubines. These cases had some interesting points in common. In addition to changes which 
affected the royal family members in general, they also illuminated how the high ranking royals 
saw the new system of the management of royal property and finances. 
4.1 The Royals After the Revolution 
The royal families had high privilege in Thai society, due to being of the same blood as 
the King. After the monarchy centralized the state’s power in the mid-19th century, the royals’ 
birthright was more obviously emphasized.  During the absolute regime, the royal families 
controlled the administration of the state. The high ranking royals, i.e., King Chulalongkorn’s 
younger brothers and sons, were sent abroad for their studies and held important positions in the 
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government after they returned. The lower ranking royal family members also served as state’s 
officers. In comparison with the aristocrat group, which coexisted with them in Thai society for 
centuries, the royal family had upgraded their status through rituals, ceremonies, conventions, 
and language.1 This elevated position brought about social and economic privileges over other 
groups of elites. 
In the old regime, the fortunes of the royal family members were allocated by the King. 
Nakarin Mektrirat suggests that a common ideal thought to be held by the royals was their duty to 
the throne, so almost all male royals would gain positions as state officers after their graduation. 
Thus, their monthly income came from the state. Nevertheless, Nakarin argues, their incomes 
were not salary in the modern sense, because the royals held that the money they earned 
depended on the King’s mercy: it was not a payment for a job, rather, it was a reward from the 
monarch for their duties.2 In the meantime, the female royals did not serve as civil officers, due to 
the tradition of the period. Thus, they gained incomes only from the annuity award of monies 
which was also held to be by the monarch’s mercy; female royal family members in some special 
cases could also ask the King for money.3 The King also provided a pension for the female royals 
only. These income sources were not regulated in any way. They completely depended on the 
monarch who would decide how much each royal would gain. Nakarin suggests that such a 
pattern produced inequality among the royal family members. 
Additionally, some royals had turned to business investment, due to the economic 
chances resulting from the 1855 Bowring Treaty. The royals were the first elite group to invest in 
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2 Ibid. 
3 Some evidence indicated that King Chulalongkorn might have provided special money for some male royals as 
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Prince Boribhat to King Chulalongkorn, 20 March 1906 in Princess Siriratbussabong, Biography of Prince Boribhat, 
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real estate, paving no-man land for more areas of farming, constructing buildings for rent and 
sale, and other enterprises. Some royals close to the King would deposit their capital with the 
Privy Purse, which acted as their proxy in the investment. However, Chollada Watthanasiri 
suggests that the Privy Purse’s ventures declined in the 1920s compared to its activity in the Fifth 
Reign.4 This decline inevitably affected some royals’ fortunes. 
Nakarin has further suggestions. Most of the royal family members had encountered 
economic difficulties for a decade before the 1932 Revolution, due to the inequality of the royals’ 
incomes, failed investments, and their over-spending. Their expenses all stemmed from their 
luxurious royal life. In the residence of a high ranking royal there were many people living under 
their patronage. Festivities were always held in royal residences. Furthermore, each royal family 
member might have hobbies, such as book publishing or collecting antiques, all of which 
required large amounts of money.5 Thus, most royals were economically stagnant since the late 
old regime. 
In spite of their economic problems, the royals were still criticized by the public due to 
their royal privileges. Compared to other social classes, the royal family members enjoyed a 
higher living standard. In addition, many economic policies of the absolute government targeted 
groups other than the royals. For example, the middle rank civil servants were laid off and 
endured new taxation in Prajadhipok’s reign, yet the royal family members were immune. Such 
discrimination was one of the factors which triggered dissatisfaction toward the King’s 
government and the royals. As mentioned previously, the economic impotence of the government 
was a major explanation for the 1932 Revolution. Due to their perception about the political 
revolutions occurring in other countries, the royals were aware of their risks. Concern for their 
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physical safety, independence, and property security, were generally felt by the royal family 
members before and after the Revolution. 
When the Revolution took place, the royals were inevitably affected, both politically 
and economically. First, their political positions were abolished. High ranking royals who were 
ministers in the old regime were removed. In addition, the Constitution also prohibited the royals 
from participating in politics, which meant that the royal family members could not take any 
position either in Parliament or the Cabinet. This in turn led to some economic problems due to 
the loss of their monthly incomes.6 This also affected lesser royals because their lives depended 
on their superiors’ prosperity. Their royal luxurious lives had to be suspended. Further, the 
decrease in the royal court’s annual allocation eventually affected their annuity.   
The removal from government positions of the high ranking royals brought about a 
decrease in the influence of the royal family members in society. During the political conflicts 
after the Revolution, the royals gradually left Siam, especially after the Baworadej Rebellion. The 
most important royals who left were King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni: the royal 
couple departed for Europe in January 1934, only four months after the Rebellion. At that time, 
there were only a few significant royals in Bangkok. Prince Baribhatr, the most influential royal 
in the old regime, had left for Bandung since the Revolution took place. Prince Damrong, who 
always remained close to King Prajadhipok during the political conflicts, decided to move his 
family to Penang. After the departure of the King, there was only Prince Naris, the Regent, who 
remained in Bangkok working and negotiating with the People’s Party government. The most 
senior royal living in Siam was Queen Savang, but, for the most part she did not have any 
influence on the administration. 
                                                            
6 Thamsuk Numnond, The Political Drama of 24 June 1932 (Bangkok: Association of History, 2002), chapter 3 
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4.2 Queen Savang Vadhana and Crown Property Management 
During the absolute regime, the Privy Purse managed the private property not only of 
the monarch, but also of some high ranking royal family members, especially those close to the 
King. For example, Chao Phraya Sriphiphat, the Director of the Privy Purse, was also appointed 
as the manager of Queen Saovabha’s assets.7 This pattern endured until after the 1932 
Revolution. The Privy Purse, a department under the Ministry of the Royal Household, was still 
responsible for the management of the private property of King Prajadhipok and other royals. 
This was why those royals tried to have their assets returned to them when the government 
expanded its power over the crown’s property, especially after the promulgation of the 1934 Tax 
Exemption for the Crown Property Act. 
The transfer of the power to manage the crown property from the monarch to the 
government also brought about tensions between the administrators and other royal family 
members. The case of Queen Savang Vadhana, the grandmother of King Ananda and King 
Bhumibol, is a good example. Queen Savang (1862 – 1955) was born to King Mongkut and Chao 
Chom Peam; she and her sisters, married their half-brother, King Chulalongkorn. Savang gave 
birth to Prince Vajirunnahit, the first Crown Prince of Siam, who unfortunately died in 1894; 
after his death, the right in royal succession shifted to Queen Saovabha’s children. When King 
Prajadhipok, the last child born to Saovabha, abdicated in 1935, the right to succeed returned to 
Savang’s grandson, Prince Ananda. The Queen’s biography stated that her memory was poor 
during the last decade of her life. She reportedly did not even recognize the mysterious murder of 
King Ananda.8 After King Prajadhipok abdicated, King Ananda had been living in Switzerland 
                                                            
7 Chollada Wattanasiri, “Investment of the privy purse, 1890-1932,” p.23, and A Biography of Chao Phraya 
Sriphiphat (The Funeral Memorial Book) (Bangkok: Thai Kasem, 1958), p.12 
8 Somphop Chandaraprapha, Queen Srisawarinthira (Bangkok: Siam, 1968), p.512 
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for his studies, so Queen Savang was the highest rank of royal family members residing in Siam. 
The government had given her authority in some significant royal affairs, such as the decision to 
invite King Ananda to visit Siam. Some incidences in which the Queen was involved illustrated a 
high ranking royal’s view on the changes in power over the crown property. 
4.2.1 The Decision over the Crown Property 
During the investigation of the assets in the reservation of the Privy Purse in 1935, the 
CPCC found that there were coffers of royal property deposited to Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Bank. Prince Aditya, President of the Council of Regency, informed the CPCC that the assets in 
the coffers were the inheritance of Queen Saovabha.9 In the meantime, Prince Wan told the 
Cabinet that there a plane had crashed into the Grand Palace during the Boworadej Rebellion, 
after which thaow Worakhananan, a servant who looked after the royal properties, asked King 
Prajadhipok to deposit them to the bank. After the King agreed, Chao Phraya Woraphong, the 
Palace Administrator, and Chao Phraya Sriphiphat, Director of the Privy Purse, brought those 
assets to Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.10 The CPCC tried to obtain those coffers to investigate 
whether there were some properties of the crown inside. After negotiation with both the bank and 
the royal court, the committee was able to withdraw 11 coffers.11 After that, the CPCC held a 
meeting to consider the status of those properties. They invited Queen Savang to be the meeting’s 
chairwoman to recognize her honor. 
Examining the list of those who attained the meeting, this investigation seemed to 
matter to the royal court. People from the palace circle included Queen Savang, the Regent, and 
                                                            
9 Report number 1 of the Meeting to open the royal coffers, 14 July 1936 in N.A.(3)SR0201.65.1/6  
10 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 9/1936, 3 June 1936 
11 While thaow Worakhananand insisted that she would not give the documentation of the contents of the coffers to 
the government unless she was ordered to do so by King Prajadhipok, the bank was afraid that it would be held 
guilty if they let the coffers be withdrawn.  
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the representatives of those who claimed right over the inheritance of Queen Saovabha, namely, 
the proxies of King Prajadhipok, Prince Chula Chakkrabongse, Princess Phetcharat12, and 
Princess Sutthisirisobha13, as well as the palace’s servants who took care of the royal properties 
(thaow Somsak and thaow Songkandan). The delegates of the government were Phra 
Dulayatharn and Luang Damri from the CPCC. According to the report the CPCC submitted to 
the Cabinet, most of the conversation in the meeting was the contention between the two sides, 
especially Queen Savang, Prince Upaleesan, and thaow Somsak. The issue over which they could 
not reach agreement was the power to decide the status of the properties under consideration. The 
CPCC’s representatives tried to explain to Queen Savang that her opinions were only considered 
as guidance and the true authority of decision belonged to the Cabinet. However, the Queen and 
her followers insisted that what she indicated would decide matters.14 What the Queen 
understood of the meeting probably reflected that changes in the management of the crown 
property were not conceded by the royal family members. As a result, the constitutional project 
over the royal affairs the People’s Party tried to establish was pursued without the true 
collaboration of the royals, and in the end did not last long.  
Another issue concerned the recording and retaining of the properties in the coffers. 
Eventually the meeting complied with Queen Savang’s assertion that coffer number 5 was the 
personal asset of Queen Rambai Barni (see section 4.2.2). The CPCC wanted to record 
everything in the coffer in detail as much as possible. However, it contained very small items of 
jewelry, so the record could not be completed in time. The CPCC’s delegates suggested keeping 
the coffers at the Ministry of Finance, but the royal court did not agree with this suggestion, 
                                                            
12 The single daughter of King Vajiravudh 
13 Daughter of Prince Chudhadhut, a son of Queen Saovabha 
14 Chairman of the CPCC to Cabinet Secretariat, 21 July 1936 in N.A.(3)SR0201.65.1/6 
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since, if the coffer was considered to be the personal belonging of Queen Rambai Barni, it should 
not be held by the government. The result of this meeting was not decisive since the Cabinet had 
the final decision. 
The CPCC suggested to the Cabinet that coffer number 5 was the private property of 
Queen Rambai Barni as Queen Savang stated. Phraya Chaiyossombat, the Minister of Finance 
and the Chairman of the CPCC, encouraged the Cabinet to let Queen Rambai Barni receive the 
asset, for the government would not be perceived to be trying to seize private property of any 
royal. In addition, accommodating Queen Savang in this matter would make further investigation 
and categorization of the properties easier, the Minister argued.15 The Cabinet approval led to a 
formal ritual to deliver the assets to Queen Rambai Barni held.  The delivery ritual was held in 
the Grand Palace, attended by the Council of Regency, Phraya Charti Dejudom (the Lord 
Chamberlain), and thaow Somsak, who acted as the proxy of Queen Rambai Barni. Chao Phraya 
Woraphong and Chao Phraya Sriphiphat were witnesses. The delivery was recognized by the 
signatures of all parties and all assets were also formally recorded.  
In her interview published in 1973, Queen Rambai Barni stated that after King 
Prajadhipok’s abdication the government seized all of her personal assets including “a golden 
coffer King Vajiravudh gave me in my wedding ceremony.”16 The Queen did not mention the 
delivery of coffer number 5 described above, although the reason for her not mentioning it is not 
known (the CPCC did send her documents acknowledging the delivery and the list of all assets). 
 
 
                                                            
15 Ibid. 
16 Queen Rambhaibhani, “An Interview,” in The Beginning of Democracy: Memories of the Contemporaries, B.E. 
2475-2500, p. 15 
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4.2.2 Queen Savang’s Request for Her Personal Properties 
Queen Savang was one of the royal family members who deposited their assets with the 
Privy Purse. There was no evidence which indicated the value of her properties. The property 
held by the Privy Purse for the Queen most likely concerned business investments. The value of 
the Queen’s assets should be very great because in 1936 she claimed that the interest it produced 
amounted to 70,000 baht.17 In February 1936, Queen Savang requested the return of her assets 
held by the Privy Purse, which included: 1) her private assets, 2) Princess Phetchaburi’s assets, 3) 
Prince Songkhla’s inheritance, and 4) King Ananda’s properties. Prince Wan, the Cabinet’s 
advisor, suggested that the government should refute the Queen’s request. The Prince argued that 
if Queen Savang, who was the present King’s grandmother, were to withdraw her assets from the 
Privy Purse, it would tarnish the government’s image.  The Cabinet decided to delay the queen’s 
demand.18 However, Queen Savang again asked for her assets, this time through the Regent. 
Consequently, the government tried to negotiate with the Queen. 
Before the negotiation began, the Cabinet tried to define the legal status of the assets the 
Queen had requested. Prince Wan changed his position, and he suggested that the government 
should return the first two assets listed previously so that it would ‘not… be said the government 
trying to seized the Queen’s properties.’ Prince Wan also suggested that the Council of Regency 
should have power over the management of the third asset, a huge inheritance which Prince 
Sonkhla clearly specified that he wanted the monarch to control; the Regent should also, Prince 
Wan argued, have control of the fourth asset. The Prince suggested that it would have been 
against Prince Sonkhla’s intention if the government had given his heritage to Queen Savang.19 It 
                                                            
17 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 48/1936, 5 October 1936 
18 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 118/1935, 10 February 1936 
19 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 126/1935, 28 February 1936 
148 
 
was obvious that the Cabinet’s purpose in the negotiation was to persuade the Queen not to take 
these assets from the Privy Purse. 
However, the government’s effort at negotiation failed. Initially, the Regent suggested 
that to summon the Queen might have insulted her. Rather, the government’s delegates and the 
Regent should meet the Queen at her royal residence, and the Cabinet agreed.20 However, the 
Queen refused to allow the government’s representative to meet with her. Her reason was that to 
ask for her assets did not involve politics, so the government had nothing to do with it. The 
Regent tried to explain that the Privy Purse had already been transferred to be under the 
government’s control, and that the Regent’s work in the constitutional regime must be approved 
by the government, thus there always had to be a delegate of the Cabinet in the meeting. Queen 
Savang still insisted on her position. Consequently, the Cabinet abandoned the negotiation. 
The Queen’s position was perhaps understandable. Due to her long life experience 
under the absolute regime, in which only the King had control over crown property and other 
state affairs, it was unacceptable for her to see those affairs under the authority of the common 
people such as the People’s Party. This opinion seemed to diffuse among royal family members. 
This disagreement was significant, since it revealed that the effort of the new leaders to establish 
constitutional monarchy through the management of the crown property was pursued without the 
collaboration with the royal court. For this reason the constitutional pattern of crown property 
management did not last long in Thailand. 
4.3 Backgrounds of the Annuity and the Pension 
The annuity was regulated in the reign of King Rama V. Its precise history was 
unknown. However, the announcement publishing the regulation indicated that the King’s 
                                                            
20 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 127/1935, 2 March 1936 
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patronage provided for the royal family members formerly comprised money (payments on a 
yearly, half-yearly and monthly basis) and other objects.  According to the announcement, the 
previous payments were not properly regulated. The amount distributed to each royal differed:  
some were only granted an annuity but others also were given monthly payments. Moreover, the 
announcement indicated that some objects given to the royals were not useful. Thus, King 
Chulalongkorn issued an order to regulate the payment. The King collapsed all kinds of payment 
to only the annual basis. The regulation also abolished the giving of objects and converted their 
value to money. The annuity for each royal was different in value, based on their royal rank and 
length of service in the bureaucratic system. Generally, there were three ranks of annuity: 20 
chang (1 chang = 80 baht) (paid on a quarterly basis), 10 to 20 chang (paid once every six 
months), and less than 10 chang (paid once a year). The royal family members who were allowed 
to receive annuities had to acquire the money themselves at Ho Rassadadornphiphat.21 
Considering the period when the announcement was published (June 1891), only one year after 
the establishment of the Ministry of Finance and the Privy Purse Department, the regulation of 
the annuity for the royals was a part of Siamese fiscal reform. The King tried to systematize the 
royal court’s expenditures, as the regulation certainly determined the amount of money and the 
period of payment. 
However, it was not certain whether the annuity would be allocated from the budget of 
the Privy Purse, which was held as personal expenditures of the sovereign, or from the Ministry 
of Finance. As mentioned previously, the Privy Purse was established as part of the separation of 
the private budget of the King from the state’s budget. Although the announcement did not 
                                                            
21 “Announcement of the Annuity of the Royals,” Royal Gazette 8,12(21 June 1891): 92-93 
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mention this point, information published after the 1932 Revolution indicated that the annuity 
was paid from the Privy Purse.  
Regarding the pension provided for King Chulalogkorn’s concubines, it was another 
expenditure initiated by the King. In 1906, the King determined the amount of money to be 
provided for his consorts working in the inner royal court, because these court women were not 
able to receive the same pensions as the male bureaucrats. Consequently, the King allocated the 
rent from parcels of the Privy Purse’s land to finance the payment. Those who were named to 
have the pension were King Chulalongkorn’s queens and concubines, and their descendants were 
able to inherit the money as well. The right to acquire this money would last until the receiver’s 
royal rank was the lowest (mom luang), after which the rent would return to the Privy Purse. The 
King also determined conditions for not awarding the money. If any concubine had bad manners, 
then the money would be passed to her descendants. If any descendant had immoral behavior, 
then the money would be distributed to other rightful persons.22 The payment of the pension for 
King Chulalongkorn’s concubines lasted to the period after the Revolution, and the new leaders 
continued to manage the money in accordance with the King’s order.  
How important was the annuity for the royals? Since the royal family members, 
especially the males, believed that serving as civil officer was their royal duty, most of them 
worked for state organizations, thus the monthly money was their main income. The annuity was 
another source of income which helped to secure the royals’ economic stability since, as they 
were removed from their governmental positions after the Revolution, their monthly salary 
disappeared. The annuity was one of their remaining sources of incomes, but it did not suffice 
annuity to maintain the same way of life they enjoyed in the old regime. Suffering by economic 
                                                            
22 N.A. R.5 RL.6/5 
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difficulties sine the absolute era, the royals’ luxurious life was decisively ended by the 1932 
revolution. The changes in Prince Damrong’s life style were informative. According to Nakarin, 
the Prince had been paid 3,700 baht per month in the absolute period, and other sources indicated 
that his annuity was 6,000 baht; combining these figures suggests that Prince Damrong’s income 
was 4,200 baht a month. Nakarin indicates that the Prince had tended to overspend his income 
since the old regime, which inevitably affected his way of life: he could not recruit new servants, 
for instance. After the Revolution, Damrong was removed from his position of senior minister, so 
his remaining income was only the annuity (500 baht per month). Although the amount of the 
annuity was less than the monthly money he was formerly paid, in such a situation it could help 
the royals to live in the new regime. Certainly the royal luxurious life had to be suspended. 
The annuity also had cultural implications. Since it was reserved for the royal family 
members, the annual sum was a symbol of royal status. Designated by the King himself, it also 
represented the intimacy between the sovereign and the other royals. Receiving the annuity 
helped maintaining the royalists’ privilege. Its cultural aspect would be expressed during the 
debate between the Regent and the Cabinet over the authority to manage the annuity. 
4.4 The Power to Manipulate the Annuity for the Royals after the 1932 Revolution 
The changes in the management of the annuity, which were similar to those made 
elsewhere in the royal court’s management, were significant in the politics of Thailand’s modern 
history. The annuity, which had symbolized the prestige of being a royal family member, was 
now controlled by the Cabinet (comprising commoners) not by the Lord of Life. 
The power in management of the annuity was changed in accordance with the 
administrative and financial transformation of power of the royal court. During a year and a half 
after the Revolution when the Ministry of the Royal Household was replaced by the Office of the 
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Palace Administration, the annuity became one of the budgets that the government provided for 
King Prajadhipok, and the King managed such budgets himself without being subject to 
government investigation. Thus, during that time the management of the annual grant was still a 
royal power, which resulted in the 1932 budget undisclosed both in value and how it was spent. 
However, in a letter dated 7 August 1932, Queen Savang indicated that her annuity was reduced 
by 25 per cent.23 This letter has been often cited as evidence showing the effect of the Revolution 
on the members of the royal family.24 However, as mentioned previously, in early August 1932 
the budget for the monarch was still the same amount as before the Revolution. King Prajadhipok 
still managed the budget himself; thus, the decrease in the annuity of Queen Savang and other 
royal family members in 1932 was performed by the King. As mentioned previously, two months 
before the Revolution the absolute government reduced the budget for the monarch from 5 to 4.5 
million baht due to the economic downturn.25 Evidentiary documents in 1933 indicated that the 
annual grant was allocated for 286,386 baht as part of the 3 million baht the government provided 
for the King.26 Until the reestablishment of the Ministry of the Royal Household in December 
1933, the annuity for the royals had been a royal power the King could control as he wished. 
Changes in the Office of the Palace Administration led to changes in the power to 
manage the annuity. When the Ministry of the Royal Household was reestablished, the annuity 
was one of the budgets which were transferred to the government’s power. The power left to 
King Prajadhipok was only that over his personal allowance, which in 1934 was allocated 
                                                            
23 Queen Savang to  Princess Abhassarabha Devakul, 7 August 1932,  Princess Kaew (n.d.), no page number 
24 Nakarin Mektrairat, The Siamese Revolution B.E.2475, p.44 and Virayuth Peesalee, “’Feudalist Female 
Merchants’: The Adaptation of Female Royals after the 1932 Political Change,” Silapa Watthanatham 36,10  August 
2011): 77 
25 “The State Budget, B.E. 2475,” Royal Gazette 49(April 2475): 309-315 
26 Director of the Department of the Privy Purse to Minister of the Royal Household, 1 January 1934 in NA 
(3)SR.0201.4.1/4  
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600,000 baht. The annuity for that year was 279,000 baht.27 This change would not have brought 
about any argument if  some royals’ grants were cut completely, which raised the significant 
question  whether the power to provide the annuity still belonged to the monarch or it had been 
already transferred to the Cabinet. During late 1934 when Prajadhipok resided in England, there 
arose an argument between Prince Naris, (the Regent) and the Cabinet over the annuity. First, the 
Cabinet had canceled the annual grant for three royals who died in that year, contrary to the 
Regent’s orders. Second, the Regent had ordered that the annuity for those royal family members 
who were found guilty of involvement in the Baworadej Rebellion28 be reduced to the minimum 
amount.29 However, Phraya Manawaratchasewi, the Minister of Finance, disagreed with the 
Regent. According to the Ministry’s regulations, the salaries and pensions of the civil servants 
who were involved in any rebellion would be cut; thus, those royals’ annuity should be canceled, 
the Minister argued. Phraya Man submitted the issue to the Cabinet.30 The resolution of the 
Cabinet, which agreed with Phraya Man31, brought about conflict between the government and 
the Regent. 
The main focus of the argument concerned the power to allocate the annuity. Prince 
Naris insisted that although the royal court’s organization had been already transferred to the 
government’s command, the annuity remained one of the royal prerogatives, and the King 
performed his power through the Regent. Thus, to dismiss the annuity of those royals was 
                                                            
27 NA (3)SR.0201.4.1/4  
28 Prince Baworadej, Prince Sitthipon, Prince Sukhaprarop, Prince Wibulsawatwong, and Princess Phajongjit 
29 Naris to Chao Phya Sriphipatr, 24 September 1934, in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK 3.22/10 While 
Prince Baworadej and Prince Wibulsawatwong would receive 100 baht, other royals gained 40 baht each. 
30 Phraya Manawaratchasewi to Prime Minister, 16 November 1934, in Cabinet Secretary Office, (2) SLK 3.22/10 
Annual Sum of the Royals 
31 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 24/1934, 21 November 1934 
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intentionally against the King’s royal command, the Regent argued.32 The Cabinet claimed that 
the management of the annuity was no longer under royal power. The personal budget of the 
King had been separated from the royal court’s expenses. The annual grant for the royals was 
contained in the latter budget; thus, its allocation must be in accordance with the Ministry of 
Finance’s regulations.33 Unfortunately, the arguments ended without consensus upon King 
Prajadhipok’s abdication and the power to manage the annuity fell under the government’s 
control without true agreement from the royal court circle.  
After the abdication, the Cabinet controlled the palace’s budget. The government 
created a regulation to operationalize the payment of the annuity, which was initially suggested 
by the Fiscal Committee of the House of Representatives during the budget investigation for the 
1935 fiscal year. As previously mentioned, the royal court’s budget in the new reign was reduced 
and re-categorized. The committee proposed to have the annual grant decreased from 279,000 to 
200,000 baht. In addition, a set of conditions for receiving the annuity was also suggested. 
Firstly, a royal must be at least ‘mom chao’, the lowest rank of the royal family. Secondly, a royal 
must reside in Siam at least 6 months a year, except for those who were abroad for reasons of 
public service or education. Thirdly, the maximum amount of the annual grant was 3,000 baht. 
Lastly, the annual grant of the royal who had behaved badly would be canceled.34 These 
preliminary conditions would cause contention between the royal court and the new leaders even 
after Prajadhipok had abdicated. 
 
 
                                                            
32 Royal Private Secretary to Prime Minister, 7 February 1935 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK 3.22/10 
Annual Sum of the Royals 
33 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 62/1934, 18 February 1935 
34 Minister of Palace to Prime Minister, 18 March 1935 in N.A. (3) SR0201.4.1/4  
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4.5 The Annuity after the Abdication 
After King Prajadhipok abdicated, Prince Naris did not accept to the position of Regent 
for the next monarch. Parliament issued a resolution determining the Regency would be a group 
rather than one man. The House selected Prince Anuwatr Chaturont, Prince Aditya, and Chao 
Phraya Yommarat to form the Council of Regency. This Council was under pressure from its 
beginning due to its role as intermediary between the government and high ranking royal family 
members. Such pressure might be one of the reasons for the suicide of Prince Anuwatr on August 
12, 1935, only six months after he accepted to the position of the President of the Council of 
Regency. One of the conflicts over changes in the royal court was the regulation of the annuity 
for the royals. 
4.5.1 Transition and Conflicts 
Prince Anuwatr Chaturont (1883 – 1935) was born to Prince Chaturont Rassami, a 
younger brother of King Chulalongkorn. According to Princess Phunphissamai, Prince Anuwatr 
was unable to study abroad due to congenital poor health, so he studied in the Siamese military 
school. He then served as a royal guard for King Vajiravuth and Queen Saovabha. In the seventh 
reign the Prince worked for the Department of the Royal Secretariat. Phunphissamai noted that 
Prince Anuwatr was well-known as a follower of King Prajadhipok, so it was unclear why the 
government chose him to be the President of the Council of Regency.35  
There were two changes made to the annuity after the abdication. Firstly, it was re-
assigned from the Ministry of the Royal Household’s budget to the central budget. As a result, 
the government could directly control the allocation of the annuity. Secondly, the government 
                                                            
35 Princess Phunphissamai Dissakul, What I Have Seen: A History of the 1932 Political Change (Bangkok: 
Matichon, 2001), p. 169  
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began to regulate the annuity, beginning with royals who lived abroad, and later including all 
royal family members.   
Prince Wan, the advisor to the Cabinet, explained that: 
The committee considers this money [the annuity] as an 
amount for maintaining the royals’ honor in the country. Because they 
are members of the royal family, they have a special treatment in 
accordance with Article 11 of the Constitution.36 Thus, [the 
government is] providing this money for their honor only when they 
are in the country. Those royals residing overseas with the 
government’s permission will have this amount of money as usual, but 
the committee suggests that those going abroad without the 
government’s approval should be dismissed to receive their annuity.37 
Prince Wan’s explanation might be considered in two ways. Firstly, the Prince changed 
the base of legitimation of the annuity from the King’s mercy to a constitutional foundation. 
Secondly, the regulation was one of the means the government used to control the royal family 
members.  
The separation of the management of the annuity from the royal power led to 
disagreement between the Council of Regency and the new leaders. The Regent indicated that the 
committee’s proposals “were the intervention to the royal power”38 and claimed that the annual 
grant should be a part of the budget the government provided for the King which he could spend 
                                                            
36 According to Article 11 of the 1932 Constitution, the royals who had the royal rank of Mom Chao or higher were 
not allowed to be involved in official politics. 
37 Minutes of the National Assembly Meeting, 64/1934 (Regular), 30 March 1935 
38 Royal Private Secretary to Minister of the Royal Household, 19 March 1935 in N.A.(3)SR0201.4.1/4  
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as he chose. The Minister of the Royal Household maintained that a maximum amount of 3,000 
baht was too low. He also argued that the annuity used to under a royal power, so the Cabinet 
should refuse the committee’s suggestion and leave the power to determine the regulation to the 
Council of Regency.39 Arguments of the Regent and the Minister of the Royal Household were 
based on the absolutist principle that held the annual grant as a royal prerogative. Thus, they 
disagreed with the new regulation by which the annuity for the royals would be managed.  
The Cabinet agreed with the committee’s conditions, except the third.40 After that, the 
government and the committee met again to consider the Fiscal Bill, and reached agreement over 
the annuity: It would be re-assigned from the Ministry of the Royal Household’s budget to be a 
part of the central budget, which was directly controlled by the Cabinet. The third condition was 
dismissed.41 However, the Cabinet did not mention the remaining three conditions.  
Nevertheless, when the 1935 Fiscal Year Act was promulgated, the Cabinet had not yet 
initiated any formal regulation of the annuity. The Regent asked the Cabinet whether the 
committee’s conditions had been made into formal regulation, especially the condition 
concerning the grants of the royals residing abroad.42 The Cabinet, however, did not answer such 
questions directly. The new leaders only replied that the government would consider the 
provision of the annuity on a case by case basis rather than issue any formal regulations.43 
However, the regulation of the annuity was eventually performed first via a Cabinet 
resolution rather than by announcing a regulation. Since the schedule of payment was coming, 
                                                            
39 Minister of the Royal Household to Prime Minister, 18 March 1935 in N.A.(3)SR0201.4.1/4  
40 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 74/1934, 20 March 1935 
41 Minister of the Royal Household to Prime Minister, 23 March 1935 in N.A.(3)SR0201.4.1/4 
42 Minister of the Royal Household to Prime Minister, 20 April 1935 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK 
3.22/10  
43 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 9/1935, 29 April 1935 
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the Regent required of the Cabinet a quick consideration.44 In addition, Chao Phraya Woraphong, 
the Minister of the Royal Household, provided a list comprising those royals residing overseas 
for consideration by the Cabinet. The list did not include much detail but merely categorized the 
royals into four groups by the leader of each family.45 Those family leaders were Prince 
Boribhatr, Prince Sawati, Prince Bhurachatra, and Prince Damrong respectively. The Cabinet 
asked the Minister of the Royal Household to deliver a more detailed list.46 Chao Phraya 
Woraphong delayed for about a month before submitting a new list. The Minister also required of 
the Cabinet a quick consideration because there were some royals who did not have other sources 
of income besides the annuity.47  
After considering the new list, the Cabinet set a rule to determine the allocation of the 
annuity. This rule conformed to Prince Wan’s suggestion to Parliament during his discussion last 
year, and focused mainly on the royals who lived abroad. According to the rule, each royal’s 
annuity would be abolished unless they stayed in the country more than six months a year. 
Otherwise, they needed to submit a reasonable explanation to the government why they could not 
do so, and the Cabinet would consider the requirement on a case by case basis. In addition, the 
rule did not cover the royals who were students studying abroad.48 This was the first time the 
Cabinet had set a resolution for managing the annuity. 
 The Cabinet considered that there were 29 royals, both males and females, who did not 
meet the conditions. Some royal families are worth mentioning: Prince Damrong and those in his 
                                                            
44 Minister of the Royal Household to Prime Minister, 27 May 1935 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK 
3.22/10  
45 Minister of the Royal Household to Prime Minister, 24 May 1935, in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK 
3.22/10  
46 (copy) Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 17/1935 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK 3.22/10  
47 Minister of the Royal Household to Prime Minister, 25 June and 5 July 1935 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, 
(2) SLK 3.22/10  
48 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 35/1935, 8 July 1935 
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Dissakul family, Prince Sawat and his Sawatiwat family members, Prince Bhurachatra, and 
Prince Sinhawikrom. Most royals whose annuities were not dismissed were students, besides 
those in the Mahidol family, Prince Boribhat and those in his family.49 However, this 
determination was not finalized. The Cabinet ordered the Minister of the Royal Household to ask 
those royals to explain their reason for staying overseas. If the Cabinet considered those 
explanations valid their annuity would not be canceled. Although some royals continued to 
receive their grants through this process50, the Cabinet dismissed others’ requirements. 
  
                                                            
49 Cabinet Secretariat to Minister of the Royal Household, 10 July 1935 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK 
3.22/10  
50 Minister of Palace to Prime Minister, 31 July 1935 in Cabinet Secretary Office, (2) SLK 3.22/10, and Record of 
the Cabinet Meeting, 50/1935, 14 August 1935 
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Table 4.1: Royals whose annuities were dismissed in 193551 
 
  
                                                            
51 Cabinet Secretariat to Minister of Finance, 10 July 1935 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK 3.22/10  
Family Name Amount (baht)
Dissakul Prince Damrong 6,000
Prince Achawadis 40
Princess Phunphissamai 80
Princess Philailekha 80
Princess Phathanayu 80
Princess Raohinawadi 40
Sawatiwat Prince Sawat 6,000
Princess Abhabhani 1,200
Prince Supphasawat 80
Prince Sophonparadai 80
Prince Phirayosyukala 80
Prince Nondhayawat 80
Prince Nangkulsawat 80
Chatchai Prince Bhurachatra 6,000
Princess Prabhawasitnarumol 1,200
Princess Mayurachat 200
Princess Wimolchat 120
Princess Chatsuda 40
Princess Kanchanachat 40
Wutthichai Prince Sinhavikrom 6,000
Princess Suwaphapphraophan 100
Princess Kanthornsarangsi 80
Yukala Prince Bhanubhan 400
Princess of Prince Bhanuphan 40
other Princess U-thong 6,000
Princess Prawesworasamai 2,400
Princess Hemwadi 2,400
Prince Thawonmongkolwong 400
Prince Patiphanwong 40
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The decision to dismiss the annuity of those 29 royals had some consequences. First, in 
addition to those royals in the Mahidol family, Prajadhipok and Rambhaibhani, and the students 
whose annuities continued, the annual grants of Boribhatr family exiled in Bandung were 
retained as well. This might be due to the fact that Prince Boribhatr was a royal who had left 
Siam for Bandung after the 1932 revolution as a part of his arrangements with the new leaders.52 
Thus, the Cabinet in 1935 held that the Prince departed with the agreement of the government, so 
the Cabinet maintained the annuities of the Prince and his family. However, the royals whose 
annual grants were suspended had left Siam without the government’s approval. Some of them 
departed the country during the political crisis in which the royal family members and the new 
leaders confronted each other, such as Prince Sawati and Prince Damrong.53 Thus, the annuities 
of those families were cut. Secondly, some of the annulment decisions did not conform to the 
rule. According to the regulation, annuities of those royals who were students would not be 
dismissed; however, the annual grants of the daughters of Prince Bhurachatr, who followed their 
family to study in Singapore, were suspended. The Cabinet seemed to ignore this fact.  
How did the royal family members respond to the annuity regulation? After the rule was 
issued, Chao Phraya Woraphong, the Minister of the Royal Household, informed those royals 
whose annuities were dismissed, let them know the regulation, and asked them to explain the 
reason why they stayed abroad. Only 10 royals replied to the Minister. As mentioned previously, 
the significance of the annuity was different to each of the royals. Generally, its cultural 
implication was more important than its economic value: it was the symbol and privilege of being 
a royal. The King had formerly allocated the annuity directly, so it could be interpreted as a 
                                                            
52 Princess Siriratbussabong, Biography of Prince Boribhatr, pp.63 - 64 
53 The departure of Prince Damrong and his family for Penang in November 1933, a month after the Baworadej 
Rebellion was narrated in Princess Phunphissamai Dissakul, What I Have Seen (Last Episode) (Bangkok: Matichon, 
2003), pp. 102-107 
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signal of how close the monarch was to each royal. Economically, there were only 88 from 
almost 600 royals whose annual annuities were equal to or more than the lowest salary of the 
Siamese civil servants working for the bureaucracy at that time. Thus, most royals likely did not 
depend on the annuity as their primary source of income; instead, it served as a complement to 
other income sources. However, most royal family members had been removed from their 
bureaucratic positions, so the annuity’s economic importance increased, especially for those 
royals whose grants were large. They might not be indigent but their customary luxurious way of 
life could not be maintained. 
Prince Damrong and his family were good examples of this situation. In addition to his 
6,000 baht annuity, the Prince had a monthly pension and a special gift from King Prajadhipok of 
800 baht a year. Moreover, he had invested in the stock purchase. These incomes were used for 
his family’s expenditures. When Prince Damrong left Siam for Penang, the expenses of his 
family increased, so the annuity became an important income which made his hobbies possible. 
The Prince could go golfing and take vacation abroad. However, when he was informed that the 
Bhahol administration had issued a regulation with conditions for the annuity allocation, Prince 
Damrong dismissed it out of hand. Princess Phunphissamai, Damrong’s daughter, recorded the 
Prince’s response: “my father definitely [was] determined not to crawl back for the money.”54 His 
reply to the Minister of the Royal Household was only a notification: he neither mentioned the 
government’s conditions nor explained the reason he resided abroad. Prince Damrong’s response 
could be explained as followed. First, as a royal who had been a political antagonist of the leaders 
of the 1932 Revolution, the Prince could not comply with the latter’s conditions. Second, Prince 
Damrong prioritized the cultural meaning of the annuity over its economic value. When it was no 
                                                            
54 Ibid. p. 124 
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longer allocated by the King, the annuity had no meaning for the Prince. Moreover, it was now 
controlled by his political enemy, so to adhere to the government’s requirement was definitely 
unacceptable. For Prince Damrong, although the traditional annuity which was paid by the King 
would be decreased, he willingly accepted it. [He] “still felt it was a great royal mercy.”55 
Since his 6,000 baht annuity was canceled, Prince Damrong and his family had to adapt 
to a new situation. Living in Penang could not be as luxurious as before. Princess Phunphissamai 
indicated several expenses which had to be cut. The Prince had to give up golfing and travelling 
abroad. In addition, he decided to sell some assets preserved in his residence in Bangkok for 
more cash. This adaptation was effective. Prince Damrong and his family could continue to stay 
in Penang for years. 
As documented by letters and materials, royals who replied to the Minister of the Royal 
Household tried to explain why they needed to stay overseas more than six month a year. 
Princess U-thong, whose annuity was 6,000 baht, indignantly responded to Chao Phraya 
Woraphong, and explicated why she thought the government’s condition was unreasonable. She 
claimed that the annuity was exclusively for the royals and had been previously allocated no 
matter where those royals lived. According to the Princess, the annuity could not be canceled 
unless the royal rank of a royal was removed. Princess U-thong insisted that she had not done 
anything wrong. Traditionally, a royal had to be given permission by the King before leaving the 
country, and she had already complied with this convention. Interestingly, Princess U-thong also 
mentioned the Constitution and law in her justification. As a Thai, she claimed liberty to live 
anywhere she wanted, and there was no law prohibited so doing. The Princess explained that she 
had to stay in Bandung because its weather and peacefulness were suited to the elderly. She 
                                                            
55 Prince Damrong to Director of the Department of the Privy Purse, 2 October 1932 in N.A. SB2.52/475 cited in 
Thamsuk Numnond, The Political Drama of 24 June 1932, p. 94 
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concluded that “I do not think it is reasonable my annuity to be dismissed. I think we better off 
maintain good relationships, and should not hurt each other.”56 
Unlike Princess U-thong’s, Prince Bhurachatr’s reply to the Minister implied his 
willingness to have his grant. He explained that he left Siam for Singapore to fulfill King 
Prajadhipok’s wish to popularize Siamese goods in the Malay Peninsula. The Prince claimed that 
he had willingly co-operated with every request made of him by the Siamese government. 
According to Prince Bhurachatr, his annuity was for his children’s education. If it was canceled, 
then his family would suffer. The Prince ended his letter by appealing to the Minister of the 
Royal Household to let the Cabinet know of his situation.57 In addition, every royal in Prince 
Bhurachatr’s family replied to Chao Phraya Woraphong, trying to explain their difficulties. 
Princess Prabhawasit, Bhurachatr’s wife, claimed that she had to look after her children in 
Singapore. Furthermore, Bhurachatr’s children, Princess Wimolchatr, Princess Chatrasuda, and 
Princess Kanchanachatr, replied to the Minister as well. As recorded in the government’s 
documents, Bhurachatr family’s annuity was 7,400 baht, which could definitely affect the 
family’s ability to sustain themselves. 
According to the government’s condition, if the royals who stayed overseas explained 
their reason, the Cabinet would decide whether to return their annuity. There was only one 
instance in which pleading was successful. Prince Thawon Mongkolwong explained that he left 
Siam as the private doctor of King Prajadhipok, and the government repaid his annuity. Other 
royals’ replies were refused. The government’s justification was that those royals left the country 
                                                            
56 Copy of a letter autographed by Princess U-thong and Princess Hemwadi, 20 August 1935 in Office of the Cabinet 
Secretariat, (2)SLK 3.22/10 
57 Prince Burachatr to Minister of the Royal Household, 4 September 1935 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, 
(2)SLK 3.22/10 
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without any valid reasons.58 As mentioned above, this Cabinet resolution had some 
inconsistencies. According to the government’s rules, the annuity of royals in school would be 
maintained; however, the grants of Prince Bhurachatr’s children, who were studying in 
Singapore, were rejected. The Cabinet only generally mentioned the Bhurachatr family but did 
not specifically discuss their letters in the meeting. 
The annuity regulation worsened not only the relationships between the government and 
the royal family members, but also among the royals themselves. Acting as a mediator between 
the new leaders and the royals, Prince Anuwatr Chaturon, the Chairman of the Council of 
Regency, was in a dilemma. On the one hand, he had to conduct royal affairs in accordance with 
constitutional principles. On the other hand, he was perceived by the royals as unable to protect 
the crown’s honor and benefits. After his abdication, King Prajadhipok sent a telegram to Prince 
Anuwatr, expressing his concern about the suspended annuity of Prince Sawati, the ex-King’s 
father in law. Prajadhipok hoped that the new King could prevent it from being canceled. After 
Prince Sawati’s annuity had actually been rejected, the ex-King sent another telegram to the 
Regent. Overtly, he criticized the new King. He angrily questioned “whether it is shameful that 
the King does not patronize the senior member of the royal family?” However, for Prajadhipok 
and other royal family members, the Regent was the one responsible for royal affairs, so the ex-
King was implicitly criticizing Prince Anuwatr.  Rama VII also directly asked the Regent to 
return the annuity of his father in law.59 
The Council of Regency had tried their best to reduce the tension between the 
government and the royals, especially the repercussions from the latter who thought that Prince 
                                                            
58 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 72/1935, 4 October 1935 
59 N.A. SR0201.8.1/16 
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Anuwatr should not have accepted the position.60 For example, the Council of Regency issued a 
resolution to allocate the 6,000 baht annuity to the Mahidol family who stayed with King Ananda 
in Switzerland, including Prajadhipok and Rambai Barni. More explicitly, after the completion of 
annuity payments based on the government’s conditions, the Regent suggested that the annuity of 
each royal should be increased using the money remaining from the rejection.61 This was an 
attempt by the Regent to satisfy the royal family members. If the Cabinet had approved their 
suggestion, most royals would have received more money. However, it is unclear whether such 
an effort would have been effective.   
In sum, during the transitional period after King Prajadhipok’s abdication, the annuity 
was modified. First, its management was relocated from royal prerogative to the government’s 
power.  Second, the transformation drew attention to the different perspectives on the meaning of 
the annuity - a high privilege directly provided by the monarch reserved particularly for the 
royals or supported by constitutional principles.  These changes led to conflicts not only between 
the royal family members and the government, but also among the royals themselves.   
4.5.2 Annuity as a Political Apparatus 
The annuity allocation became one of the government’s mechanisms to control the royal 
family members, whom they held as political enemies. The annuity rule mentioned above focused 
mainly on the royals living abroad; those royal family members staying in Siam were not 
affected. However, the government initiated a new regulation which would cover all royals. In 
July 1936, Prince Wan noted in a Cabinet meeting that there were some royal family members 
not willing to pursue their duties assigned by the Regent. The Prince suggested that there should 
                                                            
60 Phunphissamai Dissakul, What I Have Seen: A History of the 1932 Political Change, p.166 
61 Royal Private Secretary to Cabinet Secretariat, 29 July 1935 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2)SLK 3.22/10 
167 
 
be a regulation concerning the annuity, so that the Regent could control those royals.62 The 
Cabinet let the royal court create the rule, most of the content of which was approved. 
The regulation comprised two parts: conditions for increasing and conditions for 
decreasing or dismissing the annuity. The amount of a royal grant could be increased if that royal 
created benefit for the country and the King, performed their royal duties, or became aged. There 
were eight conditions under which the annuity might be reduced or cut: behaving 
unconstitutionally, not performing royal duties, not respecting the King, damaging the crown’s 
dignity, being imprisoned, being bankrupted due to corruption, behaving with bad manner, and 
being removed from the royal ranks.63 This was the first written regulation concerning the 
annuity allowance both for the royals living abroad and residing in the country. However, there 
was no documentation showing how this regulation was applied. 
The regulation of the annuity came to be a political means when Luang Phibul 
Songkram ascended to the premiership. During January and February 1939, Phibuls’ government 
arrested many suspects for rebellion and treason. According to the government, these suspects 
had planned to replace King Ananda with Prajadhipok, the previous king, and support Phraya 
Song Suradej as the Prime Minister.64 After the arrest, some royals were prosecuted, including 
Prince Rangsit. The Prince was found guilty by the Special Court appointed by the government 
and was sentenced to death. However, his conviction was reduced to be dismissed from the royal 
rank and imprisoned for life.  
                                                            
62 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 18/1936, 13 July 1936 
63 Royal Private Secretary to Prime Minister, 29 September 1936 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2)SLK 
3.22/18 and Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 52/1936, 16 October 1936 Interestingly, of the conditions by which the 
annuity could be decreased, the regulation prioritized the unconstitutional behavior over irreverence to the monarch. 
64 Special Court Verdict B.E.2482 on the Rebellion (Bangkok: Propaganda Bureau, 1939) 
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The Cabinet ordered the dismissal of the annuity of some royals accused of being 
involved in the rebellion. Available documents indicate that it was likely issued between 
February and March 1939. An official document dating from early April 1939 mentioned an 
order authorized by the Council of Regency.65 There were 24 royals whose annuities were 
dismissed, including King Prajadhipok, Queen Rambai Barni, Prince Rangsit, Prince Boribhatr 
and his family, and the Sawasdiwatr family, because of their behavior which brought notoriety to 
the honor of the King and the royal family.66 As described above, when the Cabinet issued a 
resolution to regulate the annuity in 1935, there were some royals whose annuities were not 
dismissed, Prajadhipok and Boibhatr were among these. However, their grants eventually were 
dismissed due to a 1939 political cleansing.  
The decreases in annuities in 1939 also affected another allowance for some royal 
family members: the pension for the royal concubines. As mentioned previously, initiated by 
King Chulalongkorn during the beginning period of the absolute state, the provision of these 
pensions lasted until the 1932 Revolution. It was the government’s responsibility to pursue it in 
accordance with the late King’s order, as the command of a monarch in the old regime was 
usually held as a law. Although there was no contemporary document directly indicating its 
status during the transformative period, one document indicated that the pension became another 
of the allocations controlled by the Ministry of Finance.67 This might be due to by two factors. 
First, the organization responsible for the pension, the Privy Purse, came under the government’s 
authority. Second, the allocation of the pension was authorized by the Council of Regency, who 
                                                            
65 Royal Private Secretary to Prime Minister, 7 April 1939 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat (2)SLK 3.22/22 
66 Ibid. 
67 (Copy) Civil Court’s Judgement, 10 February 1945 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat (2)SLK 3.22/24  
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reported to Luang Phibul, the Prime Minister. Thus, the management of royal affairs in general, 
including the pension, was controlled by the government. 
The changes to the management of the pension in 1939 exemplified the methods the 
Phibul administration deployed in struggling with their political enemies. After the general 
arrests in January and February 1939, there were 24 royals whose annuities were dismissed. 
There was a question initiated by the royal court concerning whether the pensions of those royals 
had to be dismissed as their annuities, because those royals ‘had made themselves leading to the 
loss of the dignity of the Dynasty and the integrity of the King.’68 An important document the 
leaders mentioned in  reference to this was King Chulalongkorn’s royal command initiating the 
pension in March 1907, which determined not only how the amount was allocated, but also set 
conditions under which any recipient’s pension would be dismissed, including vile comportment. 
The Director of the Department of Attorney, assigned by the Cabinet to provide a legal 
recommendation, argued that the royal command had to be held as a law because it was issued by 
a sovereign in the absolute state.69  
This interpretation became the legal foundation for the government’s decisions in this 
matter. In the first place, Phibul himself approved the report; however, no decision was made 
concerning whose pensions were to be dismissed.70 Too few documents exist to indicate the 
process of decision. About a month later, an official document from the royal court indicated that 
the pensions for three high ranking royals would be renounced, including King Prajadhipok, 
Prince Boribhatr, and Prince Rangsit. Citing the royal command of King Chulalongkorn as its 
legal reference, this document was authorized by the Council of Regency and countersigned by 
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Luang Phibul Songkram.71 There were no other details as to the reasons why these three royals 
were chosen while others were not. Arguably, however, it was likely that the new leaders 
arranged for the pensions to be their political tool to control the royal family members.  
In conclusion, the regulation of the annuity during the two years after the abdication of 
King Rama VII was a product of the transformation of the royal court financial management from 
one of the royal prerogatives to a budget of the Ministry of the Royal Household, and finally, to 
the direct control of the government.  Culturally, this changed the status of the annuity from a 
symbol of the royal privilege to a state budget controlled by the non-royal leaders.  The 
regulation of the annuity provided the government a means by which they could control the royal 
family members. The 1935 rule economically and culturally affected the royals living overseas 
and the 1936 regulation did the same for all royals. When Luang Phibul Songkram became Prime 
Minister, the annuity and the pensions for royal concubines became the government’s tool for 
eradicating their political enemies. Thus, it could be argued that the regulation of the allowances 
for the royals after the 1932 revolution was not only a practice of constitutional monarchical 
principles, but also a political tool which was deployed by the new leaders to control their 
opposition. 
4.6 The Postwar Turning Point 
The Pacific War, which began in Thailand in December 1941, led to changes in the 
country’s political landscape. Field Marshal Phibul Songkram’s decision to lead Thailand in 
collaboration with the Axis Powers resulted in a conflict between him, his supporters, and Pridi’s 
group. After the Alliance Treaty with Japan, Pridi was dismissed from his position in the Cabinet. 
However, his new position as Regent brought him independence and capability to resist the 
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Japanese and Phibul’s authority.72 The conflict between the two powerful figures had profoundly 
altered the development of Thai politics. To defeat Phibul’s clique, Pridi collaborated with the 
royalists, who saw him as their true enemy because he was the leader of the 1932 Revolution in 
which the royal honor was severely damaged. The Seri Thai Movement, which acted both to 
resist the Japanese and to destroy Phibul’s regime, illustrated this collaboration.  This political 
rearrangement resulted in the return of the royalist to formal politics, Pridi having the highest 
power, and Phibul losing his position.  
The cooperation between Pridi and the royalist led to some agreements related to 
previous political conflicts. In the earlier period of the War, the anti-Japanese operations in 
Thailand and abroad encountered difficulty in communicating with each other. Pridi sent groups 
of people to China to work with the Allied Powers, but they had become lost in the Indo-China 
wilds. The Regent’s effort finally succeeded with the journey of Chamkat Palangkul in 1943, 
which resulted in the Allied Powers acknowledging the internal movement led by Pridi.73 Prince 
Supphasawat Sawatiwat, the coordinator of the Seri Thai in England, flew from Delhi to Junking 
in China to meet Chamkat, and they exchanged information about the situation inside and outside 
Thailand. During the conversation, the Prince inquired about the political prisoners. Chamkat 
informed the Prince that there was an agreement among the leaders in-country that the political 
prisoners would be released.74  Prince Supphasawat might have had in his mind ex-Prince 
Rangsit who had been imprisoned for life since 1939. The imprisonment of a high ranking royal 
such as Rangsit had probably been the greatest concern of the royal family members. In addition, 
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committing to release political prisoners was the decisive point which made the collaboration 
between Pridi and the royalists possible. 
At this point, the management of the annuity and the pension was involved in the 
political changes yet again. Generally, although the royalist’s purpose was not to return Thai 
politics to the absolute regime, they had tried to undo the political legacies of the People’s Party, 
especially those concerning the royal court. The conversation between Prince Supphasawat and 
Chamkat was a significant part of the royalists’ political agenda and was the beginning of several 
important changes. In July 1944, Prime Minister Phibul Songkram was replaced by Kuang 
Aphaiwong, whose administration promulgated an Amnesty Law for all political prisoners 
sentenced due to the rebellions in 1933, 1935, and 1939.75 The collaboration between Pridi and 
the royalists, which led to a general amnesty, brought about the reconsideration of the annuity 
and the pension. 
4.6.1 Prince Boribhatr 
Prince Boribhatr (1881-1944) was a son of King Chulalongkorn and Queen Sukhumala. 
He left Siam to study in Europe when he was 14. The Prince graduated from a military school in 
Germany and returned to the country in 1903. He began his state service in the Army; however, 
King Chulalongkorn appointed him the commander of the Navy.76 His last position under the 
absolute state was as the Minister of Interior (1928 – 1932). Prince Boribhatr had been said to be 
the most powerful royal during the last phase of the old regime, so he was one of the royals who 
were kidnapped during the military operation on 24 June 1932.77 Negotiating with the 
revolutionary leaders, the Prince permanently moved to Bandung in the early July 1932. His 
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annuity was not dismissed in the regulation in 1935 even though he had stayed overseas. 
However, during the 1939 purge, Prince Boribhatr was one of the royals who were accused of 
attempting to overthrow the government, and consequently his family’s annuity was rejected as 
was his pension which he used to gain through his mother’s right because she was one of King 
Chulalongkorn’s wives.  
Prince Boribhatr’s pension again became important when he died in Bandung in early 
1944. Prince Chumbhot, Boribhatr’s son, required the government to provide the expenses of the 
funeral ceremony and to coordinate with the Japanese for his journey to Bandung. In addition, the 
Prince asked Phibul’s administration to renew the Prince’s pension. The Prime Minister approved 
Chumbot’s request. According to Phibul’s order, the pension of the Boribhat family would be 
allocated from the date the Prince died, but his personal annuity remained rejected since he had 
been accused of rebellion. Phibul did not indicate his reason. Acknowledging Phibul’s decision, 
Prince Chumbot urged the government to pay the money, as his family in Bandung needed more 
income. Furthermore, the allocation process would have not been pursued unless an authorized 
document was issued.78 The government seemed not to consider the case so urgent, however. It 
took more than a half of a month before the Prince’s request was submitted to the Cabinet 
meeting, which did not lead to any concrete order. The Cabinet left it to the Minister of Finance 
to decide.  
During the government indecisive consideration, Prince Chumbot made his next move. 
He warned the government to quicken the process. Some sentences in his letter implied that he 
would take legal action if his request was not granted. 
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Because I am very afraid of offending Mr. Prime Minister and worried the 
case will be delayed, I have to disturb you again. I would like to completely 
end the case without any lawsuit.79 
The Cabinet asked Krissadeeka to provide a legal comment on the Prince’s request 
(likely due to his attitude). The latter’s opinion might have agitated the leaders, for the secretariat 
of Krissadeeka stated that the 1939 royal command, which stated that the three high ranking 
royals had a vile comportment, could be sued.80 However, during that time, Phibul’s 
administration lost a vote in Parliament, forcing the Field Marshal out of office. His government 
was replaced by Kuang Abhaiwong’s. Thus, the pension of Prince Boribhatr was still not settled. 
Krissadeeka submitted a further opinion to the new administration. A majority of 
Krissadeeka’s meeting suggested (to the advantage for the Boribhatr family) that the right to 
receive the pension was not a hereditary right but was instead the recipient’s own right due to the 
royal command of King Chulalongkorn. Although a rightful royal had been dismissed due to 
their behavior, the next beneficiary (the royal’s son) was still legitimate because his right had 
been already determined. The minority suggested that the right to the pension was hereditary. If a 
royal’s pension was rejected, then the right could be denied and the pension should be retained by 
the Privy Purse.81 The Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice agreed with the majority’s 
opinion,82 which was eventually approved by the Cabinet. According to the Cabinet’s resolution, 
Prince Boribhatr’s pension was rightfully recovered and would be paid to his family starting on 1 
August 1944.  
                                                            
79 Prince Chumbhot to Cabinet Secretariat, 9 May 1944 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat (2)SLK 3.22/24 
80 Memoir of the Council of State, 13  June 1944 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat (2)SLK 3.22/24  
81 Secretariat of the Council of State to Cabinet Secretariat, 15 August 1944 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat 
(2)SLK 3.22/24 
82 Minister of Finance to Cabinet Secretariat, 18 September 1944, and Minister of Justice to Cabinet Secretariat, 9 
October 1944 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat (2)SLK 3.22/24 
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One reason for the delayed decision regarding Prince Boribhatr’s pension was a 
financial limitation the Privy Purse faced. According to King Chulalongkorn’s command, the 
pension for his concubines was the revenue obtained from a specific piece of land and the amount 
to be paid for each concubine had been determined by the same command. When the pensions of 
King Prajadhipok, Prince Rangsit, and Prince Boribhatr were dismissed, they were added to other 
21 royals. A document from 1944 indicated that after the allocation, there would be only 21,000 
baht available;83 however, Prince Boribhatr’s annual pension was 40,000 baht, which meant that 
even if Phibul’s government had approved the requirement of Prince Chumbhot, the available 
funds were insufficient. When approving the repayment of the Boribhats’ pension, Kuang’s 
administration also issued a resolution to cancel the added money for the 21 royals. After that, the 
remainder of the pension funds was 50,000 baht, which was adequate to allocate to the Boribhat 
family. 
However, to have his father’s pension repaid did not satisfy Prince Chumbhot, for he 
also wanted the amount dismissed between 1939 and 1944 to be reimbursed. The Prince 
eventually sued the Ministry of Finance on 17 November 1944 for 245,000 baht (including 
interest). Prince Chumbhot claimed that the defendant illegitimately dismissed his father’s 
pension. In other words, he accused the Council of Regency in 1939 of having ordered the royal 
command illegally. This legal action might have resulted in an outcome the leaders did not 
intend. 
The Court rejected two arguments by the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance 
first claimed in their defense that the 1939 royal command was pursued in the name of the King 
(to which the Ministry only complied), thus the Ministry was not responsible for the result. The 
                                                            
83 Minister of Finance to Cabinet Secretariat, 13 May 1944 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat (2)SLK 3.22/24  
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Court did not agree with that assertion. According to the Court’s opinion as stated in their 
sentence, the 1939 royal command was not a law, so it could be rejected. The Court also rejected 
the claim that the Ministry was not responsible on the grounds that, after the Crown Property 
Law was promulgated in 1937, the Minister of Finance became responsible for the management 
of the crown property. If any abnormality occurred in the allocation of the pension during this 
time then the Ministry could be sued. 
The most important part of the Court’s judgement concerned the 1939 royal command 
which accused Prince Boribhatr of vile comportment. The Court judged that King 
Chulalongkorn’s document did not allow latter kings to expand the meaning of the term ‘vile 
comportment’; rather, the King’s document had precisely determined its definition. According to 
King Chulalongkorn’s command, the pension would be dismissed if any royal “commits vile 
comportment, smokes opium, being criminally sentenced, and gets married with improper 
husband.” The deeds of King Prajadhipok, Prince Rangsit, and Prince Boribhatr did not include 
any of those behaviors, so there was no reason to dismiss their pensions, the Court stated. Thus, 
Prince Chumbhot’s lawsuit against the Ministry of Finance was legally legitimate. According to 
the Court, the Minister of Finance, as the defendant, did not provide any evidence to refute the 
plaintiff’s indictment, in contrast to Prince Chumbhot who had arranged witnesses and evidence 
to validate his accusation. Thus, the Court judged that the Ministry of Finance had to reimburse 
Prince Boribhatr’s pension dismissed during 1939 and 1944. This judgement resulted in not only 
the payment of the dismissed pension, but also the reversal of the official accusation authorized 
by the 1939 royal command, which served to accomplish one of the items on the royalist agenda 
to dismantle what the 1932 revolutionary leaders had done. 
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4.6.2 Prince Rangsit  
Prince Rangsit (1883 – 1951) was the 52nd son of King Chulalongkorn. He had been 
nurtured by Queen Savang since he was 10 days old because his mother, mom Nueng, passed 
away. He left Siam to study in Germany when he was fourteen. After his graduation, Prince 
Rangsit returned to the country and served as a high ranking bureaucrat in the Ministry of 
Education in the Sixth Reign. He was well-known as a supporter of medical education in modern 
Thailand.84 However, the Prince’s most notorious political role was his authorization of the 1947 
coup d’état and the military Constitution when he was a Regent. As I argue in Chapter 3, Prince 
Rangsit’s rapid response to the revised Crown Property Law in 1948 illustrated how the royals 
saw the management of the properties of the crown during the People’s Party era. In this section I 
describe Rangsit’s attitude towards the 1932 Revolution through his role after World War II.  
 Prince Rangsit was one of the royals whose annuities were rejected (in addition to 
being a target of the purge in 1939) and the pension he gained through his mother’s right was also 
dismissed. The Special Court sentenced him to death, but his punishment was reduced to life 
imprisonment. His royal rank was also removed, so in the prison he became just Mr. Rangsit. His 
example was a trauma to many of the royals and their supporters. Queen Savang’s feeling over 
the case published in her biography was well known.85 Prince Rangsit himself naturally was 
resentful towards the purge in particular and towards the Revolution in general. He expressed his 
feelings about the 1939 purge in an unpublished document composed during the postwar period: 
I did not do anything illegal as the attorney of the plaintiff accused me. I 
have consistently refuted the case. Even now I still insist that I was innocent. 
                                                            
84 The Celebration of General HRH Krom Phraya Chainart Narenthorn (Bangkok: General HRH Krom Phraya 
Chainart Narenthorn Foundation, 1971) 
85 Somphop Chandaraprapha, Queen Srisawarinthira, pp. 440-441 
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Yet, the Special Court punished me the dead penalty. Its sentence was 
decisive, that the defendant could not appeal. I was unwillingly admitted the 
punishment which was unfair to me.86 
Formally, this document was sent to King Rama VIII, but it was practically submitted to 
Pridi Bhanomyong as the Regent, who was one of the core leaders of the People’s Party and was 
in Phibul administration during the Prince’s case was pursued. Prince Rangsit’s attitude towards 
his situation and the Special Court might help to explain his general views on the 1932 revolution 
and the new leaders. It also explained some changes in Thai politics after the death of King 
Ananda, especially the royal court’s role in the 1947 coup d’état. 
Regarding the annuity, after Field Marshal Phibul Songkram was replaced by Kuang 
Abhaiwong in mid-1944, Rangsit, who was remitted a year previously, was reappointed to royal 
rank on 30 September.87 The government reinstated his full rights as a Prince at that time, so the 
Prince’s annuity was allocated again at the same amount. There was no direct evidence of the 
decision of the government in this matter. However, a document indicated that Pridi himself 
determined that the amount the Prince would gain was set at 6,000 baht annually (also beginning 
on 30 September).88  Thus, the Prince gained his annuity almost as quickly as his royal status. 
The government also reinstated his pension. This restoration, again, was initiated by 
Pridi acting in his capacity as the Regent. The royal court sent a formal dispatch to the 
government inquiring whether it was proper to pay the pension to the Prince.89 This effort by 
Pridi probably was an effect of Prince Chumhot’s lawsuit. The Regent naturally did not want 
                                                            
86 (copy) Prince Rangsit to King Ananda, 19 July 1945 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2)SLK 3.22/22 
87 “Announcement to Return the Royal Rank to Mr.Rangsit Prayurasakti na Ayuthaya,” Royal Gazette 61:59 (20 
September 2487): 848-851 
88 Royal Private Secretary to Prime Minister, 30 September 1944 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2)SLK 
3.22/22 
89 Ibid. 
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Prince Rangsit to take legal action, so he proposed a resolution on his own. The Cabinet issued a 
resolution to pay Prince Rangsit his pension at 12,000 baht a year which was the same amount he 
received previously.90 
In the middle of the following year, Prince Rangsit submitted a dispatch to King 
Ananda asking for payment of his pension which had been denied during his imprisonment. The 
Prince insisted that the punishment he received was unfair because he had nothing to do with the 
rebellion. Moreover, he claimed that King Chulalongkorn’s order only denied the pension for the 
royal who was found guilty, so their heirs and families could still legitimately receive their 
annuities and pensions. Thus, Prince Rangsit required the pension which had been denied to his 
sons and daughters.91 The government was uncertain how to proceed, so they asked Krissadeeka 
to consider his request. The question concerned whether Prince Rangsit’s demand was legal and 
whether the Prince’s offspring could legitimately be paid.92   
The opinions of Krissadeeka benefited Prince Rangsit. First, Krissadeeka took Prince 
Boribhatr’s case as an example, and concluded that his descendants were lawfully able to receive 
his pension based on their interpretation of King Chulalongkorn’s royal command. Second, the 
1939 royal command was illegal because it rewrote the definitions contained in King 
Chulalongkron’s command, Krissadeeka indicated.93 
Consequently, although the Court reinstated the pension of Prince Boribhatr, the 
reinstatement of Prince Rangsit’s pension was authorized by the Regent, Pridi Bhanomyong’s 
command. The Minister of Finance suggested that the 1939 royal command could not be reversed 
by any order lower than a royal command, so the Cabinet asked the Regent to issue a new order. 
                                                            
90 Cabinet Secretariat to Minister of Finance, 8 November 1944 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2)SLK 3.22/22 
91 (copy) Prince Rangsit to King Ananda, 19 July 1945 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2)SLK 3.22/22 
92 Minister of Finance to Prime Minister, 21 August 1945 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2)SLK 3.22/22  
93 Memoir of the Council of State, 5 November 1945 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2)SLK 3.22/22 
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Eventually, Pridi as the Regent issued the necessary royal command to reimburse Prince 
Rangsit’s pension. 
In sum, the example of Prince Rangsit showed how the annuity and the pension of his 
mother were involved in the politics of reconciliation after the War. When Pridi collaborated with 
the royalists, one of whose political agenda items was to reverse the hinges made by the People’s 
Party to royal affairs, the allocation of the two allowances was altered. However, the management 
of the annuity and the pensions remained a political mechanism, but instead of a tool used to 
eliminate enemies of Phibul’s government it became a means for collaboration between Pridi and 
the royals. 
4.6.3 After King Ananda’s death 
After King Ananda’s death, the royals in the Boribhatr family gradually moved back 
from Bandung to Thailand. Although the Prince’s pension had been reinstated, the denial of each 
royal’s annuity was still enforced. The combination of the Boribhatr family’s return and the 1945 
Amnesty Law (which led to the release of all royals held in prison) triggered the royal court’s re-
examination of the Boribhatr family’s annuity allocation and consideration of whether the former 
royal prisoners’ annuities should be restored as well. The limited evidence available does not give 
a clear picture of the government’s opinion of the royal court’s proposal to reinstate the annuities. 
All available documents indicated that both the royal court and Luang Thamrong’s government 
agreed on this point. An official dispatch composed by the royal court indicated that the Prime 
Minister himself did not oppose the royal court’s proposal.94 However, Thamrong’s 
administration expressed its discomfort during its consideration of the nominee for the position of 
                                                            
94 Royal Private Secretary to Prime Minister, 29 July 1946 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK3.22/10 
181 
 
Lord Chamberlain suggested by the royal court.95 Thus, the only part which could be confirmed 
was that the government approved the reinstatement of the annuity to all royals. In the case of 
Prince Wongnirachorn Dewakul, the government was required to return him to royal status 
before reinstating his annuity.96 There were a total of 15 royals whose annual grants were 
approved in 1946. 
The reinstatement of the annuity had significant political implications. The royals 
whose annuities were restored could be categorized into three groups: 1) those royals involved in 
the rebellions in 1933 and 193497; 2) those who were purged in 1939; and, 3) the royals whose 
annuities were denied because they had stayed overseas. The annuity of the first two groups was 
denied certainly for political reasons. However, the rejection of the last group’s annuities was in 
accordance with the regulation the People’s Party government established in 1935 (which could 
be justified on a constitutional basis). Prince Wan once stated that the royals deserved the annuity 
to compensate for their disadvantages because the 1932 permanent Constitution did not allow 
them to be involved in politics. The Prince argued that such a privilege should be provided only 
when they were in the country and the government issued their regulation in keeping with his 
suggestion.  According to the royal court’s document, however, politics was the only reason for 
the denial of the annuities of those royals. In other words, the leaders in 1946 ignored the 
constitutional basis of the annuity regulation. Perhaps unfortunately, the political disadvantage of 
Pridi’s group after King Ananda’s death resulted in their inability to defend any constitutional 
principle. Pridi himself resigned from the premiership to express his responsibility for the 
sovereign’s death and Luang Thamrong replaced him. When the royal court offered proposals for 
                                                            
95 See Chapter 2. 
96 (copy) Announcement of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Return of the Royal Rank and Royal Insignia in 
Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK3.22/10  
97 Royal Private Secretary to Prime Minister, 29 July 1946 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, (2) SLK3.22/10 
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changes to the management of royal affairs, the Cabinet seemed not to be able to oppose these 
suggestions, but instead only comply with what the royal court wanted. This might have been 
part of the revival of the monarchy in Thai politics after the 1932 Revolution. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I describe how royal family members were affected by changes in the 
management of the properties and finance of the royal court, and the separation of the monarch 
from the power to manage those affairs. Most royals were required to leave the political society 
of the country due to a provision in the Constitution. Influential royal family members gradually 
left Siam due to the Revolution and the ensuing political conflicts between themselves and the 
new leaders. The government expanded their power over the annuity for the royals, one of the 
budgets of the palace court remaining from the absolute state. The new leaders decreased the 
amount of the annuity and established a constitutional basis for its continuation (rather than 
perpetrate the tradition that it was a royal privilege awarded under the benevolence of the King).  
However, the political struggles between the leaders also mattered. The provision of the 
annuity and the pensions which determined by King Chulalongkorn, another budget inherited 
from the old regime, became not only based on the constitution but also became a political tool 
used by the government to control the royals.  Later, when the government began its general 
purge in 1939, they employed the provision of the grants to punish their political enemies, along 
with the legal process which led to the aggressive denunciation of King Prajadhipok and some 
other royals (including the sentencing of a high ranking royal to death after the removal of his 
royal rank). The development of the provision of the grants worsened the relationships between 
the royals and the new leaders. 
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In addition, the high ranking royals did not submit to these changes or collaborate with 
those who made the changes; instead, they held that the new leaders were not legitimate in 
control of royal affairs nor was the constitution considered legal or legitimate.  The cases of 
Queen Savang and Prince Damrong demonstrated this point. 
These beliefs might explain the royals’ roles in Thai politics after the war. After 
returning to power, the royals reversed the changes in the control of their lives and royal affairs to 
which they had never really agreed. One of their accomplishments was the restoration of the 
annuity and the pension for the royal concubines which had been denied during the People’s 
Party’s era. High ranking royals such as Prince Rangsit, who had been treated violently during 
the 1939 purge became key figures in the 1947 coup d’état which was the beginning of the 
military authoritarian and royalist politics in Thailand. 
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Chapter 5 
Financial Prosecution of King Prajadhipok 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I focus on the lawsuit which led to the confiscation of the properties in 
Siam of King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni during the Phibul administration. This event 
marked another significant change (as yet unexamined critically by academicians) in the 
management of the crown’s finances and properties of the crown. Some political document 
concerning the 1932 Revolution, especially those published by those with perspectives adverse 
towards the People's Party, mention this event. In addition to Prajadhipok’s departure for Europe 
due to conflicts with the new leaders which ended in his abdication, this lawsuit was usually 
depicted as an example of the malevolence the leaders of the new regime harbored towards the 
ex-King.  
The main source of most works discussing this lawsuit is Silpchai Charnchalerm (Nai 
Honhuai)’s biography of King Prajadhipok. This book was first published in the 1950s when the 
royalist intellectuals could begin to publicly express their opinions. Thongchai Winichakul 
suggests that the most important of the royalist publications was an academic text published by 
Prince Dhani Niwat.1 Arguing that the traditional governance of Siam under the Buddhist King’s 
rule was democratic, the Prince had suggested ways by which the Revolution could be attacked.2 
                                                            
1 Thongchai Winichakul, “Going Beyond the 14 October Democracy,” The Democracy with the King above the 
Politics: on the Modern Political History of Thailand (Nondaburi: Fadiewkan, 2013), pp. 37 - 38 
2 Prince Dhani Nivat, “The Old Siamese Conception of Monarchy,” in Collected Texts of Krom Muen 
Bhidhayalapphruthiyakorn (Bangkok: Phrachan, 1974), pp. 99 - 113 
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Silpchai’s book was one of the gradually emerging texts criticizing the 1932 Revolution and 
supporting King Prajadhipok.3 He initially published his work in 1948 in Seriphap, a daily 
newspaper, then re-printed it as two books the following year, and finally published the two 
books as one book in 1952;4 he re-published his book some 35 years later, entirely rewriting it 
and adding some important documents.5  His text might have been the first to mention the 
lawsuit. Remarkably, no other contemporary text with his political perspective (glorifying King 
Prajadhipok and attacking the People’s Party) mentions the lawsuit. Since Silpchai’s text is the 
only work providing information about the lawsuit, it has become the main source for later texts. 
A master’s thesis in law, for example, cites his work for analyzing some legal aspects of the 
lawsuit.6 Other texts use some significant content from Silpchai without obvious reference; 
however, the presence in these texts of errors committed by Silpchai indicates that those works 
are based on the same source.7  
In early 2010, the Supreme Court issued a judgement to confiscate the assets of Thaksin 
Shinawatr, the ex-Prime Minister self-exiled due to the 2006 coup d’état, which resulted in his 
supporters (including the red-shirts movement) conducting public demonstrations later violently 
                                                            
3 For example, see Premjit Watcharangkul, Phra Pokklao and Thai Nation (Bangkok: Bangkok Printing, 1946). For 
the discussion of the politics of this genre of texts, please see Somsak Jeamteerasakul, “The Abdication Royal Text 
of Rama 7: the Biography of a document,” in The History which has just been Created, pp. 20 – 30, and Prajak 
Kongkirati, “24 June in the 14 October Movement: Politics and Power of History,” in Chanvit Kasetsiri (ed.) 
Thammasat University and the Space of Politics in Thailand, 1932 – 2004 (Bangkok: Social Sciences and 
Humanities Textbooks Project, 2005), pp. 115 - 178 
4 Nai Honhuai, Prince Prajadhipok: the King Who Departed (Bangkok: Odeon Store, 1952) 
5 Nai Honhuai, Prince Prajadhipok: the King Who Departed (Bangkok: P. Samphanphanich, 1987) 
6 Sakuna Thewaratmaneekul, “The Management of the Crown Property,” MA Thesis, Faculty of Law, Thammasat 
University, 2000, 33 - 39 
7 For examples, Suphoj Jangrew, “The Confiscation Case of King Prajadhipok’s Properties,” Silpa Watthanatham 
23: 8 (June 2002): 63 - 80, Bunruam Theamchan, Suing Rama VII (Bangkok: Thanpundit, 2011), and all internet 
texts. Silpchai misread the 1936 Crown Property Law that it was enforced on 15 June of that year, as indicated by the 
date 15 June appearing on the first page of the Royal Gazette which actually indicated when the Council of Regency 
authorized the bill. The true date when the bill was formally enacted was 19 July 1937. 
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taken down by the state’s forces.8 During this circumstance, internet texts emerged which 
mentioned the lawsuit against King Prajadhipok.9 Ironically, one of these texts mutually 
supported Thaksin and King Prajadhipok and condemned the administrations both of the People’s 
Party and the 2006 junta (who allegedly masterminded the confiscations of the assets of both 
Prajadhipok and Thaksin).10 Except for an interview of Queen Rambai Barni and other texts, 
there was no information from those who were directly involved in the lawsuit. Their funeral 
memorial books, which normally contained their full biography and what they did when they 
were alive, did not mention the lawsuit. For example, the biography of Luang Kajsongkram did 
not mention his duty as the chairman of the Crown Property Audit Committee (CPAC), which 
had a significant role in suing King Prajadhipok.11 Similarly, the roles of Phraya 
Atthakareeniphon and Luang Chamrunnetisart as the plaintiff’s attorney and the judge who 
issued the ruling that King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni were guilty (respectively) did 
not appear in their funeral books.12  
Using Silpchai as the main source, the events leading up to the confiscation lawsuit 
were as follows. After King Prajadhipok abdicated, the People’s Party government took over the 
management of royal affairs. They promulgated the first Crown Property Law in 1936 and began 
                                                            
8 Thongchai Winichakul, “The ‘germs’: the reds’ infection of the Thai political body,” 
(http://asapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/05/03/thongchai-winichakulon-the-redgerms), Nick Nostitz, “The 
Red Shirts: From Anti-Coup Protesters to Social Mass Movement,” in Pavin Chachavalpongun (ed.), “Good Coup” 
Gone Bad: Thailand’s Political Developments since Thaksin’s Downfall (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2014), pp. 170 - 198 
9 For examples, “Confiscation of King Prajadhipok’s Assets: the Absurd Judiciary,” 
(https://www.facebook.com/notes/tongrob-sunontalad), “King Prajadhipok: the first Monarch whose Assets were 
confiscated,” (http://oknation.nationtv.tv/blog/anakkumlangbai/2010/03/04/entry-3), and “Asset Confiscation Cases, 
1941 to 2010: from Kangaroo Court to the Supreme Court,” 
(https://www.prachachat.net/news_detail.php?newsid=1266209818) 
10 Wadtawan Suphanphesat, “They dared to ‘confiscate’ the King’s assets!!!,’ 11 February 2010, 
http://www.vattavan.com/vatta/detail.php?cont_id=203 
11 Memorial in the Funeral Ceremony of General Kaj Kajsongkram (Thean Kengradomying), 20 April 1967 
12 Memorial in the Funeral Ceremony of Phraya Atthakareeniphon (Sith Chunnanond), 17 July 1978 and Memorial 
in the Funeral Ceremony of Luang Chamrunnetisarti, 21 October 1975  
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to separate the properties of the crown from the private assets of the King. During this process, a 
committee of the Phibul administration found that Prajadhipok had transferred some assets of the 
crown to his own accounts. The Ministry of Finance, under Pridi Bhanomyong as Minister, then 
sued the ex-King. Since the transfer took place before the enactment of the Crown Property Act, 
Silpchai strongly argued that the lawsuit was a retrospective use of the law. The Ministry of 
Finance also asked the Civil Court to confiscate Prajadhipok’s assets in Siam. The plaintiff’s 
request was denied twice due to Phra Sutthiatthanarumon, the Director of the Civil Court. 
However, the Court of Appeal reversed his judgement, which resulted in the confiscation of 
Prajadhipok’s assets in Sukhothai Palace led by Luang Kajsongkram. In addition, Phra 
Sutthiatthanarumon was eventually retired due to his ruling, which apparently angered the 
authorities. In September 1941, a few months after Prajadhipok died, the Civil Court found guilty 
both the late King and Queen Rambai Barni and determined that they were required to pay the 
plaintiff approximately 6,000,000 baht. Silpchai concluded his narrative by indicating that the 
lawsuit was eventually settled by a compromise negotiated by Pridi between Luang Thamrong’s 
government and the defendants.13  
In this chapter I examine the lawsuit against King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni 
and I describe another incident during which the King was almost sued, the lawsuit of Klai 
Kangwon palace. Based on recently discovered documents, I investigate how the new leaders 
addressed the issue when the king did not comply with their requirement that the monarch could 
not perform any state affair without the approval of a minister. I suggest that constitutional 
monarchical principles of governance as applied to the management of the crown property and 
the royal court’s finance were demonstrated in the lawsuit. In addition, I will examine whether 
                                                            
13 The judgement of the Civil Court and documents concerning Phra Sutthiatthanarumon did not appear in the 1952 
version. This fact confirms that Silpchai’s book in 1987 is the edition later texts use.  
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the process of separating the monarch from the power to manage the crown property was applied 
to the lawsuit. I also explore the decision of the new leaders to sue the ex-King and their reasons 
for doing so. I will further analyze the negotiation between the plaintiff and the defendant, 
including the Civil Court’s judgement and the process by which the compromise was achieved, 
neither of which, to my knowledge, have been discussed previously, thus, my work may lead to 
the development of new perspectives concerning the lawsuit and instigate further studies on the 
topic. 
5.1 Suing the King in the Constitutional Monarchy 
The lawsuit against King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni was a significant 
example of how to treat the monarch in a constitutional monarchy. Although he had already 
abdicated when the Ministry of Finance started the prosecution in 1939, the transfers of assets 
which led to the lawsuit took place during Prajadhipok’s reign. It could therefore be argued that 
the target of this prosecution was a deed of a reigning monarch.  
The problem with prosecuting the King under constitutional governance was a topic 
discussed among the constitutional lawyers, and a case took place in the early stage of the 
Revolution as part of the conflict between the royal court and the new leaders, which led to civil 
war in the form of the Baworadej Rebellion.  
5.1.1 Interpretations by the Constitutional Lawyers 
During the early decades after the 1932 Revolution, number of texts emerged 
concerning public law, especially the interpretation of the Constitutions. This might have been a 
result of governmental change which needed some explanations. Some of the authors became 
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significant scholars on the topic.14 Due to the provisions concerning the sovereign’s immunity in 
the Constitution these texts contained relevant explanations which changed based on what was 
determined in each supreme law.  
The temporary Constitution of Siam published on 27 June 1932 indicated in Article 6 
that “the King cannot be prosecuted in the criminal suit in the court. It is the duty of the House of 
Representatives to consider.”15 Luang Chakkrapani, a conservative legal intellectual, argued that 
the Constitution prohibited criminal suit against the monarch in the court since a monarchically 
traditional principle, ‘the King can do no wrong,’ provided a unique privilege to the sovereign. 
However, the supreme law did not mention civil prosecution, which meant that the monarch 
might be prosecuted via a civil suit, Chakkrapani argued. He expressed his hope that the Siamese 
Constitution would be revised in accordance with the English system under which, according to 
Chakkrapani, the sovereign could not be sued.16  Luang Prajurd Aksornlak, in his 1934 lecture on 
Constitutional law for the newly established Thammasat University, did not disguise his 
agreement with Article 6 under which he thought it was possible to pursue a civil suit against the 
monarch. Luang Prajurd emphasized that the Constitution did not prohibit the criminal 
prosecution: it just stated that Parliament must pursue such a lawsuit. In addition, he suggested 
that there should be two types of criminal suit for which the monarch might be prosecuted: the 
general cases outlined in the Criminal Code and those involving the state administration, e.g., a 
violation of the Constitution or international agreement which caused harm to the country.17 
However, Luang Prajurd did not clarify how to pursue such cases in detail.  
                                                            
14 For example, Yud Saeng-uthai and Phairoj Jayanam 
15 “The Temporary Constitution of Siam, B.E.2475,” Royal Gazette 49(27 June 1932): 166 - 179 
16 Luang Chakkapani Srisilwisut, The Explanation of the Siamese Constitution Comparing to other Countries 
(Bangkok: King Prajadhipok’s Institute, 2004[1932]), pp. 27 - 30 
17 Luang Prajurd Aksornlak, The Constitutional Law: an Undergraduate Lecture (Bangkok: Thammasat University, 
1934), pp. 74 - 75 
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 Regarding the sovereign’s immunity, the 1932 Permanent Constitution’s Article 3 
stated that “The person of the King is sacred and inviolable.”18 Thus, the public lawyers 
discussing this topic had to begin with this Article. Luang Prajurd criticized Article 3 for being 
ambiguous because it did not obviously contain information regarding whether the King could be 
prosecuted.19 In addition, he contended that this Article provided more prerogatives to the King 
than the provisional Constitution had provided.  Yud Saeng-uthai contended that the inviolable 
status of the monarch was possible because the sovereign was above politics. The King could not 
conduct any public activity without the approval of a minister (who was accountable for the 
activity), so that he was immune from criticisms, Yud argued.20 The King was inviolable in three 
areas: constitutional, criminal, and civil. First, the monarch could not be critically mentioned in 
any parliamentary discussion. Moreover, there could not be any suggestion by the House to 
abolish the monarchy. Yud argued that the revolution was the only way to eradicate the 
institution. Second, the King could not be criminally prosecuted. No crime committed by the 
King either before or after his enthronement could be pursued. However, Yud remarked that the 
King might abdicate due to pressure from society. Lastly, if the King committed a civil affront, 
the sufferer could not sue him, but could only submit a petition of right and wait for the 
monarch’s mercy. Yud argued that in Thailand the plaintiff could sue the Crown Property Bureau 
and the Privy Purse.21 Article 3 of the 1932 Permanent Constitution would be the referent 
provision for the judgement of the Civil Court in King Prajadhipok’s lawsuit. 
                                                            
18 “Constitution of the Kingdom of Siam,” Royal Gazette 49(10 December 1932): 529 - 551 
19 Luang Prajurd Aksornlak, The Constitutional Law: an Undergraduate Lecture, p. 110 
20 Yud Saeng-uthai, The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E.2489 (Bangkok: Prachaniti, 1946), pp. 38 - 40 
21 Ibid., pp. 40 - 44 
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The 1949 Constitution more clearly indicated the intent of its drafters with a new 
Article which stated that “Anyone cannot accuse or prosecute the King.”22 Yud, the secretary of 
the Drafting Committee of the Constitution, indicated that this Article was an extension of the 
previous Article which determined the inviolable status of the King.23 Both Yud and Phairoj 
Jayanam stated that the new article protected the King from any prosecution.24 However, Yud 
and Phairoj suggested that the plaintiff in a civil suit could sue either the CPB or the PPD. 
In sum, changes to the content of each Constitution resulted in different interpretations 
regarding the sovereign’s immunity. The 27 June 1932 Constitution indicated that prosecution of 
the monarch, either criminal or civil, was possible. However, the 1949 Constitution definitely 
eliminated such a possibility. The ambiguity contained in the first Permanent Constitution 
arguably led to multiple interpretations and this resulted in a situation in which the post-
Revolution leaders had to decide whether the King could be prosecuted.  
5.1.2 The Example of Thawat Ritthidej 
In this section I describe an incident which was a part of the post-Revolution leaders’ 
discussion concerning the possibility of the prosecution of the King. This example began with a 
text published in the name of King Prajadhipok criticizing the Economic Plan Pridi Bhanomyong 
had been attempting to realize in March 1933. The subsequent political conflicts between the 
leaders, the closing of Parliament25, the coup d’état in June26, and the civil war in October were 
                                                            
22 “Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand,” Royal Gazette (special volume) 17, 66(23 March 1949): 1 - 80 
23 Yud Saeng-uthai, An Explanation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Bangkok: Uthai, 1950), p. 18 
24 Ibid., p. 19, and Phairoj Jayanam, A Comparative Explanation of Constitutional Laws, Vol.2 (Bangkok: 
Aksornniti, 1952), pp. 282 - 284 
25 Weena Manopimoke, “Conflicts within the People’s Party,” Master of Arts Thesis, Department of History, 
Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University, 1977 
26 Thamrongsak Petchlert-anand, The 1932 Revolution and a Year after (Bangkok: Asian Studies Institution, 2000) 
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ascribed to the far-left and authoritarian aspects of Pridi’s Plan.27 King Prajadhipok criticized the 
Tram Worker Foundation and its founder Thawat Ritthidej. In September 1933, a newspaper 
reported that Thawat planned to sue the King for defaming him.  Thawat tried to submit the suit 
to Parliament through an MP instead of to a court. 28 However, the House denied his request, and 
the government prosecuted him for the crime of lèse majesté. This ended when the King 
summoned Thawat and accepted his asking for pardon. The Department of State Attorney 
withdrew the lawsuit due to an order of the government.  
In addition to being one of the reasons for the Baworadej Rebellion, Thawat’s lawsuit 
also frustrated King Prajadhipok. The King asked the government and Parliament to interpret 
Article 3 of the Permanent Constitution and to clarify whether the monarch could be sued under 
this Article.29 Parliament suspended its session to consider Article 3 twice and eventually 
reconvened after the Baworadej Rebellion ended. 
Somsak Jeamteerasakul suggests that the Rebellion forced the government to pursue 
what the King wanted. Pridi Bhanomyong submitted the agenda himself. The Cabinet had drafted 
the interpretation in advance and assigned delegates to meet with the King and ask for his 
approval. The Cabinet’s draft interpretation began by indicating that Parliament had no power to 
rule on a lawsuit involving the monarch. Thus, Article 3 was interpreted to indicate that if the 
monarch was sued in a civil suit, then the plaintiff was required to pursue the lawsuit in court and 
the defendant would be the Minister of the Royal Household instead of the King. In regards to 
criminal prosecution, the monarch could not be sued, but “Parliament had power to pursue the 
                                                            
27 Somsak Jeamteerasakul, “Pridi Phanomyong’s historical fallacy,” in Prawattisat thee phoeng sang (Bangkok: 6 
Tula Ramluek, 2001), pp. 3-8 
28 Somsak jeamteerasakul, “The legal case against King Prajadhipok by Thawat Ritthidej,” Silpawatthanatham (May 
2005): 100 - 120 
29 Prime Minister to House Speaker, 28 September 1933 cited in Somsak jeamteerasakul, “The legal case against 
King Prajadhipok by Thawat Ritthidej,” 
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lawsuit in accordance with the Constitution for maintaining the justice.”30 The House approved 
this interpretation without any discussion. This interpretation of Parliament would be mentioned 
by the Civil Court in its judgement concerning the confiscation lawsuit against King Prajadhipok. 
Somsak remarks that the example of Thawat proposed a crucial issue for constitutional 
monarchical governance: how to address the public affairs conducted by the King without any 
approval from a minister. According to Somsak, the true problematic issue of this case was that 
King Prajadhipok published the review of Pridi’s Economic Plan with his own name without a 
minister’s approval, which was unconstitutional. Regrettably, in order to maintain good 
relationships with the royal court after the Baworadej Rebellion, the interpretation which the 
House approved did not address such a crucial issue, Somsak argues. In addition, it contained 
some ambiguities and contradictions. Although the interpretation indicated the Parliament could 
not pursue a legal case involving the monarch, it stated that the House should conduct criminal 
prosecutions in accordance with the Constitution, leaving the unresolved question of how to 
manage such a lawsuit “in accordance with the Constitution”. In sum, Somsak contends that the 
leaders at that time ignored serious discussion of the core issue in order to achieve a compromise 
and sustain their relationships.  
5.2 The Klai Kangwon Palace Example  
A palace named Klai Kangwon was located in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province. Its 
construction started in 1926. Klai Kangwon palace was well-known because it was where King 
Prajadhipok stayed when the Revolution took place. It was also used as a haven by the King and 
other royal family members during political conflicts between them and the new leaders.  Its 
                                                            
30 Somsak jeamteerasakul, “The legal case against King Prajadhipok by Thawat Ritthidej,” 
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name, Klai Kangwon (far from worry) has the political implication that the King wanted to avoid 
the turbulent capital of Bangkok with its many politicians. 
The Klai Kangwon example involved the management of the Crown Property. During a 
Cabinet meeting in 1936 considering the assets preserved by the Privy Purse, there was a 
question whether Klai Kangwon was a property of the Crown. The government also had to decide 
whether King Prajadhipok should be sued due to a debt he had incurred but could not pay. Since 
whether the palace was an asset of the crown or of the King was unclear, the new leaders had to 
decide two issues simultaneously.  
Some indication of the confusion surrounding this issue became apparent in an 
interview of Queen Rambai Barni published in 1973. What the Queen recalled involving the 
lawsuit was as follows: 
The things is my father was indebted to Sri Maha Racha Company for 
200,000 baht….The King gave me the Klai Kangwon palace, and every stuff 
in there was inscribed my acronym. The accuser [the government] asked us 
to exchange the palace for the debt. The King warned them that the palace’s 
price was more than 200,000 baht. However, if they really wanted to do so, 
then they should assess the palace’s price and to compensate the settlement. 
But they did not reply.31  
It should be noted here that Queen Rambai Barni told the above story together with that 
of the confiscation lawsuit as if they were the same. As a matter of fact, the two lawsuits 
happened separately. This lawsuit, however, seemed to weigh heavily on the Queen’s mind, 
                                                            
31 Queen Rambai Barni, “An Interview,” in The Beginning of Democracy: Memories of the Contemporaries, B.E. 
2475-2500, p. 13 
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probably because it involved both King Prajadhipok and Prince Sawati (her father). In addition, 
she was recollecting events decades after they took place, so it was normal her memories would 
not conform to the details as laid out in contemporary documents. Some points in the Queen’s 
interview were misleading with respect to the Klai Kangwon example. 
Ultimately, the Klai Kangwon case was a result of the separation of the private 
properties of the king from the crown property.  The case, however, did not concern a deed of the 
monarch but of the ex-King as an individual. However, the fact that Prajadhipok used to be a 
monarch affected the government’s decision. As indicated by source documents, the People’s 
Party government tried to negotiate with Prajadhipok instead of suing him. When this effort 
failed, due to the ex-King’s stance and the political situation, the government was forced to end 
the lawsuit by compromise. 
This example illuminated the method used by the new leaders to resolve conflicts over 
crown property. They usually began with their constitutional principle, then they would 
stubbornly negotiate with the royal court. However, when the political situation changed, such 
negotiations would change accordingly. It could be said that those negotiations ended with 
politics rather than principles. 
 The CPCC determined in August 1936 that Klai Kangwon Palace was a property of the 
crown.  Prince Upaleesan Jumbhalal, the representative in Siam of King Prajadhipok, however, 
claimed that it was the ex-King’s personal property.  To make its determination, the committee 
compared the income of the account to its expenses and suggested that most of the income were 
not from the ex-King’s personal budget; further, the committee held that it was built, decorated, 
and maintained by the budget of the crown’s property, so it should be a property of the crown.32 
                                                            
32 CPCC Chairman to Cabinet Secretariat, 15 August 1936, in N.A. (3)SR0201.65.1/5 
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The Cabinet did not approve this suggestion but instead asked the CPCC to review its decision. 
However, when the committee asserted its recommendation33, the Cabinet eventually approved 
it.34 This Cabinet approval formally made the Klai Kangwon palace a property of the crown and 
would be the basis for the positions of the government and the ex-King in later conflicts. 
King Prajadhipok, who still held the palace his private residence, did not agree with the 
government’s decision, which is likely the reason why Queen Rambai Barni remembered that the 
ex-King gave her the palace.35 This led to the dispute between the ex-King and the government. 
When the Cabinet issued the resolution, Prince Upaleesan resided in the palace. The BRH 
informed the Prince of the Cabinet’s resolution as part of its effort to commandeer the Palace. 
However, Prince Upaleesan said that he would not move out unless he was formally notified to 
do so by the government.36 The CPCC composed a letter in accordance with the Cabinet’s order 
to the Prince and warned him that he had to turn the palace over to the government by September 
1936. However, the Prince’s answer demonstrated that he did not want to move out of the palace. 
He maintained that there were two conditions, either of which would result in his leaving the 
palace: King Prajadhipok’s demand or a court order. Furthermore, the Prince said that he would 
not inform the ex-King unless the Cabinet provided him a reasonable explanation as to why he 
had to move out. The Cabinet realized that it was useless to negotiate with him, and assigned 
Phra Dulayatharn, the minister commanding the BRH, and an official from the State Attorney to 
find legal resolution.37   
                                                            
33 CPCC Chairman to Cabinet Secretariat, 20 August 1936, in N.A. (3)SR0201.65.1/5 
34 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 33/1936, 24 August 1936  
35 Queen Rambai Barni, “An Interview,” p. 13 
36 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 35/1936, 31 August 1936 
37 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 38/1936, 11 September 1936 
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The Cabinet’s effort to take over the Klai Kangwon palace became involved with a debt 
of which the Privy Purse Bureau (PPB) was the loaner. In May 1936, the BRH reported that the 
Sri Maha Racha Company owed the PPB for 200,000 baht. Sri Maha Racha was a hardwood 
forest concession company established in Chulalongkorn’s reign by Chao Phraya Surasakmontri, 
which had borrowed 200,000 baht from the PPB in 1898.38  The company was in debt to the PPB 
until Surasakmontri died in 1931, at which point the PPB took control of the company under the 
command of Prince Sawati, the father in law of King Prajadhipok. There is no other document 
containing information about the debt discovered by the BRH in 1936. However, a record of the 
Cabinet meeting in 1936 indicated that the debt was 250,012.24 baht including the interest. This 
suggests that the BRH might have discovered a different debt because the 1898 debt should have 
accumulated more interest if it still had not been settled by 1936. The company claimed that they 
had already settled the debt via Prince Sawati; however, there was no proof.  After that, the 
government indicated that King Prajadhipok had pledged he would be responsible for the debt 
himself. Phraya Manawaratchasewi, the Acting Director of the PPB, suggested that the debt 
should be disregarded otherwise the monarchy’s honors would be impugned. The Regent 
disagreed with him, however. When the Cabinet was informed that the debt was borrowed from 
an account which was a crown property budget, the leaders decided there was no reason to 
dismiss the debt.39 
After that, the BRH cautioned the ex-King to settle the 200,000 debt. However, 
Prajadhipok did not recognize the BRH, according to Prince Upaleesan. The State Attorney 
confirmed to the government that there was enough evidence to file a lawsuit against the ex-
                                                            
38 Lagsamee Rattasampant, “Field Marshal Chao Phya Surasakmontri and His Business Enterprise, 1885-1931,” MA 
Thesis, Department of History, Graduate School, Chulalongkorn University, 1980, pp. 80-81 
39 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 7/1936, 20 May 1936 
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King. The Cabinet was apparently reluctant to sue the former monarch, so they demanded that the 
BRH find other ways to resolve the issue.40 However, the State Attorney suggested that there was 
no other way to solve the problem, so the government had to file a civil suit against the ex-King. 
Pridi Bhanomyong, the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed to settle the lawsuit through 
compulsory arbitration. The Cabinet agreed with him and offered this option to Prajadhipok.41 
However, to pursue this method required the approval of both sides. The ex-King apparently did 
not want any negotiation, since he did not reply to the government’s offer. The Cabinet was 
forced to ask the Siamese Ambassador based in London to notify him.42 Prajadhipok still kept 
quiet. This left the government with two options: sue him or to cancel the debt without any 
compensation.  
At this point the 200,000 baht debt became enmeshed with Klai Kangwon Palace due to 
Prajadhipok’s offer in March 1937 (when the BRH was preparing to occupy the royal residence) 
through Prince Upaleesan to the Regent to give Klai Kangwon Palace to the government to settle 
the debt. The Regent then asked the Prince to write a formal letter to the government.43 
It is unclear whether Prince Upaleesan’s actions were taken under the ex-King’s 
guidance. As he was the manager of Prajadhipok’s property in Siam, the Prince was probably in 
frequent contact with the ex-King. It seems impossible that Upaleesan would make any important 
decision without Prajadhipok’s approval. However, it was a formal offer Prajadhipok submitted 
to the government. The Cabinet, at their meeting on 26 March 1937, considered his letter offering 
Klai Kangwon palace to settle the 200,000 baht debt.  
                                                            
40 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 55/1936, 23 October 1936 
41 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 57/1936, 28 October 1936  
42 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 66/1936, 23 December 1936 
43 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 85/1936, 15 March 1937 
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As the Cabinet ordered the Bureau of the Royal Household to occupy the Klai 
Kangwon palace, the representative of King Prajadhipok has been noticed to 
leave to palace since the 23th. The occupation has been pursued. In addition, 
Prince Upaleesan brought the letter of the King offering to settle the debt with 
the Klai Kangwon palace.44  
It was obvious that the documents provided a different depiction of events from that of 
Queen Rambai Barni’s memory. The offer to resolve the 200,000 debt with Klai Kangwon palace 
did not come from the government as the Queen recalled it; rather, it was from King Prajadhipok.  
Prajadhipok imposed some conditions on his offer. He reserved the rights to the jewelry 
of Queen Rambai Barni and to a house occupied by two princes which was located in Klai 
Kangwon palace. The ex-King also asked the government to pay for workers in the palace to 
continue to maintain it. The government’s response was predictable: 1) they denied Prajadhipok’s 
offer, insisting that Klai Kangwon Palace was a crown property not an asset of the ex-King; 2) 
the Cabinet maintained that Prajadhipok had to pay the debt unconditionally; 3) the government 
refused to allow the two princes to stay in the palace because it was a crown property; 4) the 
Cabinet approved to return only those of Rambai Barni’s ornaments on which the Queen’s 
acronym was inscribed; and 5) the Cabinet maintained that they could not guarantee to provide 
jobs for the workers in Klai Kangwon palace and indicated that the continuation of these jobs was 
dependent on individual bureaucratic departments.45 However, the 200,000 baht debt remained 
unresolved. 
                                                            
44 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 88/1936, 26 March 1937  
45 Ibid. 
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In sum, the basis of the conflict between the government and Prajadhipok over Klai 
Kangwon Palace was the separation of the personal property of the King from the property of the 
crown. From Prajadhipok’s point of view, Klai Kangwon Palace was still his personal asset that 
he could dispose of as he wished, which might explain why the ex-King did not accept the 
government’s offer.  Simultaneously, the government was attempting to enact the Crown 
Property Act approved by Parliament and to settle the scandal of the Privy Purse’s land sale, and 
this process lasted until July 1937. Thus, it was not until August when the Klai Kangwon issue 
and the 200,000 baht debt were considered again, but at this point the government apparently was 
reconsidering over the lawsuit. 
The changing political situation might be the most important factor which affected the 
new leaders’ position. The notoriety of the Privy Purse’s land sale seemingly undermined the 
stability of the government and decreased the confidence of the new leaders in their control of 
royal court affairs. A Cabinet meeting in late August had an agenda item for the 200,000 baht 
debt; at this time, the government approved Pridi’s idea to end the lawsuit through arbitration, but 
the ex-King had not replied. Khun Samaharnhitakhadi (hereafter Khun Samaharn), the Deputy 
Minister of Finance (acting as the Commander of the BRH), suggested the government should 
temporarily confiscate Prajadhipok’s personal assets until the 200,000 debt was settled. He also 
asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to contact Prajadhipok again. At this point, Pridi 
Bhanomyong, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that to reissue the lawsuit required another 
dispatch from the BRH, ‘because the last time [contacting the ex-King] Klai Kangwon palace had 
not been decided crown property.’46 However, Pridi’s memory concerning this was not accurate, 
since by the time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted Prajadhipok regarding the Klai 
                                                            
46 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 8/1937 (Second Administration), 25 August 1937 
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Kangwon lawsuit in October 1936, the Cabinet had already decided that the royal residence was a 
property of the crown.  
Khun Samaharn, whose responsibility directly concerned the royal court, was 
apparently worried about the lawsuit. On the one hand, he had just been appointed a minister of 
the new government after the Privy Purse land sale. On the other hand, the 200,000 baht debt had 
not been settled for months. To resolve the debt, Khun Samaharn resubmitted the lawsuit to the 
Cabinet meeting in October, and suggested again that the government should seize Prajadhipok’s 
private properties until the debt was settled.47 However, the Cabinet decided to wait for 
Prajadhipok’s response. 
In late October 1937, the government decided to compromise, which led to the 
reconsideration of Klai Kangwon palace’s status. In a Cabinet meeting, Khun Samaharn reported 
that Prajadhipok’s representative had asked again for some of the ex-King’s private property. He 
also warned the government to settle the 200,000 baht debt and the Klai Kangwon lawsuit. Prince 
Wan indicated that there was definite evidence showing that Prajadhipok really guaranteed the 
200,000 baht debt. However, the Prince suggested that the government needed to reconsider 
whether the Klai Kangwon Palace was crown property. According to Prince Wan, the 
expenditures for the construction and maintenance of the palace might have come from 
Prajadhipok’s private money. If the amount was close to 200,000 baht, then the debt could be 
remitted.48 No minister disagreed with the Prince’s suggestion. Luang Narthnitithada said that 
“[I] really want the case settled. The King also spent his money in the construction of Klai 
Kangwon. His stuff should be returned to him, so that the case can be ended.”49 The Cabinet 
                                                            
47 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 15/1937 (Second Administration), 13 October 1937 
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apparently agreed to end the lawsuit as soon as possible, even if the government lost money. Pridi 
even suggested that the Cabinet should issue a formal compromise agreement. The government 
approved the suggestion and appointed the Minister of Finance and the Director of the State 
Attorney to complete the agreement. 
However, the lawsuit could not be settled as soon as the government intended. Due to 
parliament procedures, the Cabinet’s term in office expired in November 1937. After the general 
election, Bhahol was again voted by the MPs to be Prime Minister. Khun Samaharn was replaced 
by Phra Sarasaspraphan. However, the 200,000 baht debt and the Klai Kangwon lawsuit 
remained unresolved, and Phraya Bhahol then ordered Phra Sarasaspraphan to revive the 
compromise agreement.50 His report submitted to the Cabinet comprised two significant parts: 
the assessment of Prajadhipok’s involvement in the 200,000 baht debt and how to settle the debt. 
Phra Sarasaspraphan tried to assess the likelihood of the government winning the 
lawsuit if it was submitted to the court. According to him, the commitment of King Prajadhipok 
in the 200,000 baht debt had an alternative interpretation: although his letter certainly guaranteed 
the debt, it was not an unconditional pledge, and further, due to his offer to exchange Klai 
Kangwon palace for the debt, his previous guarantee might then be void. This interpretation 
suggested that the Sri Maha Racha Company in debt to the Privy Purse. Thus, King Prajadhipok 
might avoid being accountable for the debt and the lawsuit against him might not be worth 
pursuing. 
Phra Sarasaspraphan’s suggestion resolved the issue of the lawsuit. He argued that there 
was only one way for the 200,000 baht debt to be remitted: the institution of the monarchy, as the 
creditor, should provide the mercy to Prajadhipok, its debtor. Sarasaspraphan indicated the 
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Cabinet that Prajadhipok had sent a letter to the Council of Regency in the previous September 
asking for immunity from the debt. The government should comply with the ex-King’s request, 
Sarasaspraphan argued. The government did not disagree with this suggestion, but they offered a 
condition that Prajadhipok had to accept that Klai Kangwon palace was crown property. 
According to the Cabinet meeting record, no minister questioned this; Prince Wan indicated that 
he had reviewed Phra Sarasaspraphan’s proposal and he did not have any objection. Eventually, 
the Cabinet issued a resolution approving the remittance of the 200,000 baht debt. Four months 
later, Prajadhipok reportedly accepted the government’s offer. The lawsuit was resolved in 
September 1938.  
In conclusion, the Klai Kangwon lawsuit was an immediate result of the separation of 
the private property of the monarch from crown property. The government held that the palace 
was a property of the crown. King Prajadhipok did not recognize this resolution and tried to 
maintain the occupation of the palace, but later offered the palace to the government to settle the 
200,000 baht debt. The government initially declined his offer because the palace had been 
determined to be crown property. However, the government’s decreasing stability due to the 
scandal of the Privy Purse’s land sale caused it to reconsider the Klai Kangwon lawsuit. In the 
end, the government remitted the debt by applying the traditional principle of royal mercy and 
required the ex-King to accept that Klai Kangwon was crown property.  
Prajadhipok never accepted that Klai Kangwon palace was crown property, which 
might reflect his opinion concerning the management of crown property in general, i.e., neither 
he nor other royal family members accepted the exclusion of the monarch from the power to 
manage the crown property, which led to conflicts between the royals and the government. 
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5.3 The Confiscation Lawsuit 
In Bhahol’s administration, the CPCC managed the crown’s property, especially the 
separation of the private properties of the monarch from crown properties. This committee’s 
duties ended when Bhahol resigned. When Phibul established his first administration in 
December 1938, Prince Wan suggested that this committee was no longer necessary due to the 
promulgation of the 1936 Crown Property Law.51 According to the Law, an advisory committee 
was to replace the CPCC. However, the management of properties of the royal court had not been 
completed, and this investigation led to the assignment of what would later become the Crown 
Property Audit Committee (CPAC). The CPAC would take a significant role in the financial 
prosecution against King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni. 
The inquiry into the unfinished duties of the CPCC was the reason for the existence of 
the CPAC. Two months after Phibul became Prime Minister, the Office of the Royal Private 
Secretary (ORPS) reported to the government that there were properties withdrawn from the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in 1936 which were still unexamined. As mentioned previously, 
the last examination of such assets occurred during the meeting for which the CPCC invited 
Queen Savang to be the chairwoman. In addition, there were reportedly some properties of the 
crown scattered in several places. The ORPS recommended that the government should retake 
those properties. The Cabinet ordered the BRH to hand over any remaining assets in its control to 
the Ministry of Finance.52 Accordingly, the government also appointed a group responsible for 
collecting those scattered properties which included an officer of the Auditor General, Prayun 
Bhamornmontri, Luang Wichit Wathakarn, Khun Samaharn, and the royal private secretary.53 
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About a month after its appointment, the group became the CPAC, whose chairman was Luang 
Kajsongkram, the Deputy Minister of Finance. The CPAC’s first proposal was to exhibit crown 
properties to the public which later became the royal museum.54 However, the most significant 
duty of the CPAC was to initiate a lawsuit against King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni. 
Two months after its appointment, the CPAC discovered some abnormalities in the 
crown property accounts. According to the committee’s report, Prajadhipok transferred some 
assets of the crown to his own bank accounts, including one bank account in London and one 
bank account located in the United States of America which had been initiated in the reign of 
King Chulalongkorn, each of which contained 100,000 pounds. The owner of those accounts was 
originally named ‘King of Siam.’ According to the committee, in October 1932 King Rama VII 
had this name changed to ‘King Prajadhipok’.55 Moreover, the committee discovered some 
documents indicating that Prajadhipok had bought several insurance policies abroad by using 
money of the crown and put Queen Rambai Barni’s name and his own as the beneficiaries.56 The 
amount of money was 1,925,134.12 baht. These two financial transfers would become the main 
grounds for the lawsuit. 
Initially, the Cabinet asked the CPAC and the State Attorney to propose their legal 
opinions concerning the CPAC’s findings. Phraya Atthakareeniphon57, the Director of the State 
Attorney, suggested that the government should try to take the assets back. There were several 
                                                            
54 Prakan Klinfoong, “Royal Museum and Nationalism of the People’s Party,” in Isara Chusri (ed.), Museum 
Refocused (Bangkok: National Discover Museum Institute, 2016), pp. 191-207 
55 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 2/1939, 8 April 1939 
56 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 24/1939, 5 July 1939 
57 Phraya Atthakareeniphon (1895-1977) was a well-known bureaucrat in the state attorney circle.  He was appointed 
the Director of the Department of State Attorney in the decade the People's Party was in power. After the 
revolutionary government faded from Thai politics, Phraya Atthakareeniphon had been one of the legal advisors of 
the military cabinets. He was a member of the Constitution Drafting Assembly which originated the 1949 royalist 
Constitution, and was reportedly the one who created the notorious Article 17 of the 1959 temporary Constitution 
which provided great power to the dictator Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. See Yuenyad Jaisamut, Ancestors of the 
Thai State Attorneys (Bangkok: Siam, 1994), pp.99 – 105, and Memorial in the Funeral Ceremony of Phraya 
Atthakareeniphon (Sith Chunnanond), 17 July 1978 
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ways for the Cabinet to do this, including a negotiation with Prajadhipok or a legal mechanism. 
Although ministers did not reach agreement, they issued a resolution in accordance with an 
opinion suggested by Pridi and Phibul that they should first try to negotiate. However, the 
Cabinet also appointed the CPAC and the State Attorney to prepare for the legal procedure.58 
This resolution of the Cabinet showed that the government’s leaders tried to avoid the lawsuit, 
and that they preferred to compromise with the ex-King. 
Furthermore, the new leaders tried not to break the legal principle concerning 
retrospective law, about which the People’s Party was often critiqued by royalist texts; their 
claim was that King Prajadhipok transferred those assets before the Crown Property Law was 
promulgated thus to prosecute him in any way for this involved retrospective law, ‘which there 
was no any human did like this.’59 Pridi himself mentioned this point the first time the lawsuit 
was submitted to the Cabinet and warned that it was unclear whether King Prajadhipok had any 
power over the properties of the Crown before the enactment of the first Crown Property Law. It 
was also problematic whether the government could recall those assets, Pridi cautioned. Phraya 
Atthakareeniphon, the Director of the State Attorney, suggested that Prajadhipok’s deed was 
wrong even if there was no Crown Property Law because it was not a normal transaction. Rather, 
Phraya Atthakareeniphon contended that the ex-King intentionally transferred the properties of 
the crown to his personal authority. The indictment the Ministry of Finance submitted to the Civil 
Court did not mention the Crown Property Law but instead cited the first two Constitutions 
which were enforceable during the transactions as the legal foundation of the accusation. Thus, 
this lawsuit was not an ex post facto legal procedure. 
                                                            
58 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 13/1939, 9 June 1939 
59 Nai Honhuai, Prince Prajadhipok: The King Who Departed, p. 658-659 
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The confiscation of Prajadhipok’s properties was also criticized by the royalist texts. 
Indeed, seizing the assets of the defendant before the Court issued its judgment was an ordinary 
process mandated by Article 254 of the Siamese Code of Civil Procedure intended to prevent 
defendants from hiding their assets. Initially, however, Phibul’s government did not immediately 
decide to hold Prajadhipok’s properties.60 After the Department of Lands reported that Prince 
Upaleesan tried to transfer ownership of the ex-King’s land, the government still chose not to 
seize his assets but to negotiate with him instead61; however, as a result of this attempt, the Prime 
Minister approved the CPAC to initiate a lawsuit against Prajadhipok and to ask the Civil Court 
to confiscate the ex-King’s assets in Siam. The authors of the indictment were Luang 
Kajsongkram, who was the CPAC’s chairman, the Director of the State Attorney, the Auditor 
General, and Pridi Bhanomyong.62 Eventually, the Ministry of Finance, as the plaintiff, submitted 
the indictment to the Civil Court on 17 July 1939. 
The indictment comprised two main parts: the accusation and the request for the 
confiscation. In the accusation, the indictment provided detail of each transaction, all of which 
were ordered by King Prajadhipok and claimed that Prajadhipok had no rightful power to enact 
these transactions because all transfers took place when the country had been already changed to 
constitutional government and had been performed without the approval of a minister. In the 
request, the indictment detailed specific parts of Prajadhipok’s land which the Court should 
confiscate to prevent their being transferred.63 The Civil Court accepted the indictment64; 
however, the request to seized Prajadhipok’s properties was rejected.65 
                                                            
60 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 13/1939, 9 June 1939 
61 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 25/1939, 7 July 1939 Nai Honhuai, Prince Prajadhipok: The King Who Departed, 
p.662 did not know of such a transfer, so he claimed that “no matter how the lawsuit would lasted, with the honors of 
the ex-King of the Chakri Dynasty, the transfer might have not easily happened.” 
62 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 28/1939, 17 July 1939 
63 Prachachart, 18 July 1939, pp. 1 and 33, and Prachachart, 19 July 1939, pp. 1, 2, 4, and 32 
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The Civil Court refuted the plaintiff’s requirement because there were only witnesses 
providing verbal testimony to the Court concerning the transfer. According to the Civil Court, to 
confiscate the defendant’s assets required more textual documentation that Prajadhipok 
transferred his lands in order to avoid the Court’s jurisdiction. However, citing Article 255 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, the Appeal Court judged that the witnesses’ testimony sufficed. 
Furthermore, the transfers of Prajadhipok’s lands had been completed and one of the recipients 
was a brother of Prince Upaleesan, the defendant’s representative. Thus, the Appeal Court saw 
the plaintiff’s requirement as valid and issued an order to confiscate Prajadhipok’s assets in Siam. 
Such an order also covered any interest monies the ex-King might have obtained.66 This meant 
that the profits Prajadhipok received from his private investments would be confiscated as well. 
According to the Code of Civil Procedure, the purpose of the confiscation of the 
defendant’s properties was to prevent the defendant from transferring their assets from the 
Court’s jurisdiction so that, if they were found guilty, their property would still be sufficient for 
compensation to the plaintiff. The confiscation began on 23 August 1939, only two days after the 
Court of Appeal issued its order. Luang Kajsongkram, as the chairman of the CPAC, cooperated 
with officials of the Division of Law Enforcement in seizing assets in the royal residence of 
Sukhothai and Prajadhipok’s investment office. They also made a list of Prajadhipok’s properties 
and assessed the value of most items. The seized assets comprised real estates, chattels, cash, and 
stocks, all of which were about 4,030,000 baht.67 After the confiscation, the properties were not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
64 Prachachart, 20 July 1939, pp. 1 and 35 
65 Prachachart, 19 July 1939, pp. 1 and 2 
66 Khao Khosanakan 6: 2 (25 August 1939): 3-7 
67 Chairman of the CPAC to Prime Minister, 30 October 1939 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK 3.22.9/6 This 
indication contrasted to Nai Honhuai who assessed the seized properties as being worth slightly more than 3 million 
baht. 
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under the control of the Ministry of Finance; rather, they were controlled by the Division of Law 
Enforcement.  
 
Table 5.1: Values of King Prajadhipok's Assets confiscated in 193968 
 
 
The highest value item among Prajadhipok’s properties was real estate. According to 
Luang Kajsongkram’s report, his team had seized 75 pieces of land and buildings, probably 
including Sukhothai palace, which amounted over 2.7 million baht, or more than a half of the 
value of all confiscated assets. Moreover, there were more 6,000 rai of lands in provincial areas 
whose prices had not been assessed. The next highest value item was the income from mortgage, 
loaning, rent, and interest, the sum of which was more than 500,000 baht. Cash and stocks 
constituted 100,000 baht each. The remainders, small items (chattel) from Sukhothai palace and 
other places, were valued more than 280,000 baht. After the confiscation, the CPAC suggested 
that the office of Prajadhipok’s investments should be allowed to operate as usual. The 
committee only examined its monthly interest and provided this monthly amount to the Division 
of Law Enforcement. As recorded in the supporting documents, the business profits of 
Prajadhipok’s investment office were regularly submitted between August 1939 and December 
                                                            
68 Chairman of the CPAC to Prime Minister, 30 October 1939 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK 3.22.9/6  
Types Value (baht)
Cash 102,693.33
Chattels 289,223.10
Stocks 155,560.00
Lands and Buildings 2,720,727.00
Mortgage, loan, etc. 546,801.13
Other 223,382.00
Total 4,038,386.56
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1940. The monthly net profits were reportedly between 5,000 and 7,000 baht, with periodic 
maxima of more than 10,000 baht and periodic minima of only 1,000 baht.69 According to the 
CPAC’s report, the profit from Prajadhipok’s investment office constituted income from rents of 
land and buildings (90,000 baht in the first six months of the office’s control by the Division), 
along with interest from mortgages (20,000 baht in the same time period). Moreover, the office 
made profits from stocks and fees, as well as other sources. This information illustrated how 
King Prajadhipok obtained an income independent of the yearly budget provided by the 
government. He had operated his own personal businesses since he was a prince, and his pattern 
of investment – obtaining income from rental rather than direct venture in any company or 
industrial enterprise – was similar to that of other high ranking royal family members. In 
addition, the expenses of Prajadhipok’s businesses included expenditures of Sukhothai palace and 
the payments for those under the ex-King’s patronage.   
In sum, in this section I have illustrated how the new leaders decided to initiate a 
lawsuit against King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni based on the unconstitutional transfer 
of properties (contrary to some political commentary) which lacked the approval of a minister; 
the lawsuit was not a retrospective lawsuit as it was generally understood. The Cabinet did not 
really want to sue the ex-King; rather, they first tried to settle the lawsuit through negotiation and 
by asking Prajadhipok to return those transferred assets. However, King Rama VII did not 
recognize the government’s offer and tried to change the official ownership of some of his 
properties in Siam. At that point, the Cabinet was forced to initiate the lawsuit and to ask the 
Civil Court to confiscate those assets of the ex-King. 
 
                                                            
69 N.A. ST0701.1/27 
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5.4 Prajadhipok’s Thought 
As described previously, King Prajadhipok had insisted throughout the conflicts with 
the government that Klai Kangwon Palace was his personal asset, which was the reason he 
offered the Palace to settle the 200,000 baht debt. He also indicated in his will that the palace 
would be given to Queen Rambai Barni after he died. During the lawsuit, King Prajadhipok also 
tried to claim his prerogative over the disputed assets. This indicated that the ex-King did not 
recognize the new system of crown property management the People’s Party had established in 
Siam after the Revolution. 
There was no document directly showing Prajadhipok’s thoughts concerning the 
lawsuit; however, evidence from his intimate circle who communicated with the government 
during the lawsuit provided some useful information. In her interview with the press in 1973, 
Queen Rambai Barni recalled that after the government initiated the lawsuit against him, King 
Prajadhipok asked to return to and reside in Thailand to handle the lawsuit. Unfortunately, the 
government did not approve his request. The ex-King requested permission to move to India, but 
the government refused this request as well.70 Queen Rambai Barni’s memory is corroborated by 
a document containing a record of a Cabinet meeting, in which the ministers debated a telegraph 
from Prajadhipok asking to return to the country. As documented in the record, the Cabinet 
realized that the ex-King had the right to reside in the country; however, they did not want him 
doing so. Pridi Bhanomyong said that he was not worried about the lawsuit, yet he was concerned 
about the political effects. Luang Wichit Wathakarn even argued that there was no country which 
allowed an abdicated king to return. The Cabinet handled the ex-King’s request by passing it to 
                                                            
70 Queen Rambai Barni, “An Interview,” p. 13 
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the Council of Regency.71 In the end, Prajadhipok did not move back to Thailand to plead the 
lawsuit nor did he move to India.72  
Prajadhipok’s thoughts were more obvious in the document Prince Upaleesan submitted 
to Khun Nirandonchai, the Royal Private Secretary, in January 1940. Nirandonchai had asked 
concerning the possibility of negotiating a compromise to end the lawsuit; the Prince informed 
the ex-King, who replied that he himself was not opposed to negotiation. However, in his view, it 
would not be possible unless the Regent were to be the mediators. In the same document, Prince 
Upaleesan offered 6 conditions for the compromise, with which (later documents indicated) the 
ex-King absolutely agreed. 
The most important condition was that the government had to admit that Prajadhipok 
had a rightful prerogative to manage properties in the Privy Purse, and he could spend those 
properties as he pleased. Next, his representatives in Siam could investigate the Privy Purse 
financial accounts, so that they could examine whether the assets Prajadhipok transferred to his 
personal bank accounts were already compensated. (The government would benefit from these 
conditions because Prajadhipok would reimburse the money by estimation of his personal assets 
in Siam. However, Prajadhipok himself would be the one who chose which asset would be used 
in the compensation). There were other conditions concerning items to be handled after the 
negotiations were complete. The ex-King asked the government to make public the compromise 
and he required that the workers in Sukhothai Palace could maintain their jobs if the palace was 
to be transferred to the government’s control.73 It was obvious that in Prajadhipok’s view, those 
                                                            
71 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 47/1939, 2 September 1939 
72 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 49/1939, 8 September 1939 
73 (copy) Prince Upaleesan to Royal Private Secretary, 24 January 1940, in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, 
SLK3.22.9/6  
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disputed properties were his private assets, and the government had to comply with his view if 
they wanted any compromise.  
How Prajadhipok pleaded the lawsuit also showed his thought about the lawsuit in 
particular and the new system of crown property management in general. In June 1940, the 
Ministry of Finance, as the plaintiff of the lawsuit, submitted both documents and personal 
evidence to the Civil Court and the lawyer for the defendants declared to the Court that all facts 
in the indictment of the plaintiff were true. In other words, the defendant decided to plead the 
lawsuit only on the basis of the principles of law;74 this implied that from Prajadhipok’s point of 
view, his transfer of the Privy Purse’s properties was not illegal at all and he had the right to do 
so. Accordingly, before the investigation process began, Prajadhipok asked the Court to judge 
one of his arguments. He claimed that his deeds contested by the government were performed 
during his reign, so he himself as the King could not be prosecuted at all. Thus, the plaintiff could 
not sue him. Had the Court accepted this argument, the lawsuit would have been dismissed. Other 
arguments Prajadhipok submitted to the court were similar to the above one. 
In sum, evidences showed that Prajadhipok’s thoughts about the prosecution of the 
lawsuit in several occasions were consistent: he had the right to manage the properties in the 
Privy Purse as he pleased and the transfer of those properties to his personal bank accounts was 
not illegal.  
5.5 The Government s Efforts to Compromise 
Phibul’s government tried several times to negotiate with King Prajadhipok to end the 
lawsuit prior to the court’s judgment. However, the ex-King insisted that he would not discuss it 
                                                            
74 (copy) Chairman of the CPAC to Prime Minister, in N.A. ST0701.1/27 
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unless the government agreed to his conditions. Prajadhipok’s stance gave the government no 
choice but to let the lawsuit proceed to judgement. 
In any civil lawsuit, the litigants could negotiate a resolution under certain conditions. 
In addition to the ex-King’s six conditions, the government had some of its own conditions. 
Prime Minister Phibul Songkram asked the plaintiff in the lawsuit to persuade the defendant to 
compromise.75 In April 1941, the CPAC invited Prince Upaleesan to negotiate a compromise. 
Initially, the Prince offered a condition under which the government returned two pieces of land 
and 200,000 baht cash to King Prajadhipok in exchange for the remaining properties confiscated 
by the Division of Law Enforcement. The conciliation seemed to come true; the CPAC therefore 
let Prince Upaleesan ask King Prajadhipok to appoint his authorized representatives to make the 
compromise.76 
However, the conciliation failed. Prajadhipok replied that the plaintiff had to agree with 
his six conditions.77 Understandably, the government could not accept Prajadhipok’s offer. 
According to the CPAC, if those conditions were approved, then the lawsuit was initially wrong. 
The ex-King also did not mention his insurance which was paid with the Privy Purse’s money. 
Pridi argued that the conditions should not be accepted. Phibul said that the government needed 
to be kind in the people’s eyes, thus the compromise might be necessary. The Prime Minister 
offered a new condition, under which the disputed money Prajadhipok would be required to pay 
was reduced by 25%, and this offer became a Cabinet resolution78 (financially, this arrangement 
would have been to the government’s disadvantage). This decision showed the government’s 
                                                            
75 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 29/1941, 31 March 1941 
76 Record of the CPAC Meeting, 26 April 1941 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
77 (copy) Prince Upaleesan to Chairman of the CPAC, 13 May 1941 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, 
SLK3.22.9/6 
78 Record of the Cabinet Meeting, 29/1941, 31 May 1941 
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effort to reconcile with Prajadhipok even though the ex-King was so stubborn. However, this 
offer was not sent because King Rama VII had already passed away.  
However, the government still tried to negotiate with the ex-King’s inheritors. Before 
he died, Prajadhipok had appointed his inheritance managers which comprised of Prince 
Upaleesan, Phraya Thepwithul, and Phraya Sriwisanwaja. The inheritors of Prajadhipok were 
Queen Rambai Barni and Prince Jirasakti. After Prajadhipok died, the Prime Minister ordered 
government officials to negotiate a further compromise over the lawsuit.79 The CPAC organized 
a meeting with Prince Upaleesan. The Prince himself proposed that the reconciliation might be 
possible if the government reduced the disputed amount by half. The CPAC seemed to willingly 
accept this condition. However, the inheritors of Prajadhipok, who then resided in England, 
maintained that they would not negotiate unless all conditions of the ex-King were reified. The 
CPAC realized that any compromise with the defendant was useless. The government decided to 
let the lawsuit end in the court.  In her interview decades later, as with other significant incidents 
of the lawsuit, Queen Rambai Barni did not refer to this negotiation with the government. 
5.6 The Judgement 
The Civil Court issued its sentence on 30 September 1941. Parts of this judgement have 
often been quoted in previous texts on the lawsuit. King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni 
were found guilty and the Civil Court ordered them to pay more than 6,000,000 baht to the 
Ministry of Finance. Two factors make this judgement interesting. First, the method by which the 
judgement was published reflected the politics of the lawsuit. Second, the reasons the Civil Court 
provided for its judgement rendered this not only a verdict of a general civil lawsuit but also an 
illustration of this unique period in Thailand’s modern history during which actions of the 
                                                            
79 Handwritten note of Prime Minister, 3 June 1941, in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
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monarch could be found guilty by a court of justice. This made the judgement exceptional. How 
the court judged each of Prajadhipok’s arguments and the reasons the court used in its discussion 
constituted reflections on the monarch in the legal system of the constitutional monarchy.80 
The sentence comprised four main parts. The first part was the plaintiff’s accusation and 
request to confiscate Prajadhipok’s assets. The second part was the nine arguments of the 
defendants. In the third part, the Court provided its responses to those arguments. The last part 
contained the court’s judgement. The most interesting part was the third because it revealed the 
Court’s arguments against the defendants. 
No text on the lawsuit has ever published or analyzed the full account of the sentence.  
The first text which excerpted some parts of it was Silpchai Chanchalerm’s political commentary 
mentioned previously. Silpchai depicted the lawsuit as one of the tragedies King Prajadhipok 
encountered due to the 1932 Revolution and one of the frauds of the People’s Party in efforts to 
despoil the King’s properties. The enactment of the 1936 Crown Property Law was a significant 
part of this plan, Silpchai argued.81 He claimed that the Civil Court pursued the lawsuit in secret, 
publishing only the plaintiff’s indictment and concealing Prajadhipok’s arguments. In his text, 
Silpchai quoted only some parts of the Court’s sentence: the indictment, the confiscation request, 
and the arguments of the defendants. He indicated that he could not find the other parts. As his 
work has been the only source available for later texts, the omission of the Court’s reasons 
against each argument of the defendants from Silpchai’s book was significant. The readers could 
not consider the reasons why the Court decided to judge the defendants guilty. Since the 
incomplete sentence was juxtaposed with the theme under which Prajadhipok had been badly 
                                                            
80 The judgement described here has been preserved by the Office of the Cabinet Secretariat and was obtained from a 
copied document attached in a report the CPAC submitted to the Cabinet.  
81 Nai Honhuai, Prince Prajadhipok: The King Who Departed, pp.658-666 
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treated by the new leaders, the lawsuit could have been understood to form a part of those 
injustices.  
The Court’s arguments against the contentions of the defendants are as follow. The nine 
arguments of King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni could be categorized into three groups: 
the prescription of the lawsuit, the King’s power to manage the crown property, and other points. 
Regarding the last group, the defendant cited several Articles of the Civil Code to insist that the 
transfer of money was not illegal. For instance, in the fourth argument, the defendant cited 
Article 1382 of the Civil Code concerning adverse possession and claimed that they had 
peacefully and openly managed those assets for some time thus the contended properties legally 
fell under their ownership. However, the Court did not agree with this argument. In order to 
apply Article 1382, the Court stated, the occupation of the properties had to be against the rights 
of the owner; Prajadhipok had legitimately controlled the money due to his position as a 
monarch, thus this article could not be applied to the lawsuit and this argument was dismissed. 
The Court also dismissed the fifth argument in which the defendant claimed no responsibility for 
the results of the transfer of money since, according to the defendant, the order for the transfer 
was legally issued, stating that without proof of the order (and Prajadhipok did not provide any), 
the Court considered this argument invalid. 
Regarding the argument about the prescription of the lawsuit, the defendant interpreted 
some legal provisions to reach conclusion that each accusation was expired. For example, the 
second pleading indicated that the defendant’s deed could be applied to the Article 406 of the 
Civil Code which was about the undue enrichment. The third pleading claimed that the plaintiff’s 
suit was about the illegal occupation of the assets. Both pleadings argued that the indictment was 
expired. However, the Court determined that the lawsuit was neither about undue enrichment nor 
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illegal occupation; rather, the plaintiff sued the defendant because the latter transferred the 
properties to his personal assets. The lawsuit concerned the ownership rather than the right of 
occupation, the Court stated. Furthermore, if the lawsuit had been about undue enrichment and 
illegal occupation it would not have expired due to the legally-determined time limits. Thus, this 
group of arguments was dismissed as well. 
Another group of the defendant’s arguments involved the principles concerning royal 
prerogatives of the King in the constitutional monarchy. The first argument contended that since 
Prajadhipok had transferred the money when he was King, according to Article 3 of the 
Constitution which stated that “the person of the King is sacred and inviolable,” the plaintiff 
could not sue him. If the Court had accepted this argument, according to Article 24 of the Civil 
Code Procedure, the lawsuit would be ended and the defendants would be innocent. In its 
judgement, the Court cited Parliament’s 1933 interpretation of Article 3 to the effect that if there 
was a civil lawsuit against the monarch, then the plaintiff had to sue the Minister of the Royal 
Household but noted that since Prajadhipok had already abdicated and the Minister of the Royal 
Household was therefore no longer his representative, thus the defendant could be sued for his 
post-abdication actions as a private citizen and the argument was invalid, leading to a wider 
perspective that the King’s undertakings in the constitutional monarchy could be sued. 
In the sixth argument, Prajadhipok argued that he had the right to transfer the contended 
assets to his personal bank accounts. According to the Court, the disputed properties were not 
private assets of the ex-King, and the defendant conceded this point. What had to be decided was 
whether Prajadhipok had a royal prerogative to manage those properties. The Court cited Article 
7 of the 27 June 1932 Constitution (enforceable at the time of the transfer), which stated that 
“Any performance of the King has to be countersigned by a minister with the consent of the 
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People’s Committee, otherwise it is invalid.” Since the disputed properties were inherited to 
Prajadhipok due to his kingship, the Court considered the transfer of money as an action of the 
King and thus void because there was no countersignature of a minister. The Court therefore also 
dismissed this argument. 
The court’s statements concerning the first and sixth arguments were important for the 
understanding of the constitutional monarchy during the People’s Party period. First, the practice 
of countersigning was not only a written provision of the Constitution limited to royal and state 
affairs but instead embodied the concept that the ruler could not perform any public affairs 
without the consent of the government, as realized in the management of crown property during 
this period. Second, the judgement of the Civil Court indicated that any deed of the King in a 
constitutional monarchy could be undone if it was considered unconstitutional. However, this 
example had some limitations. In his article about Thawat Ritthidej, Somsak Jeamteerasakul 
remarks that what Parliament missed in the interpretation of Article 3 of the 1932 Constitution 
was to address the unconstitutional deed in which Prajadhipok performed a public affair without 
any minister countersigning it. In its judgement, the Court indicated that the result of the transfer 
had to be held void because Prajadhipok did it himself, but did not state whether his action was 
legal (no one among the leaders raised this point either). 
Next, the Court’s judgement also cited several documents the claimant provided during 
the lawsuit. Those documents were official letters exchanged between the Privy Purse and some 
international banks and insurance companies. Their contents illuminated the process of 
transferring the properties in the Privy Purse to the personal bank accounts of Prajadhipok and 
Rambai Barni. Chao Phraya Sriphiphat, the former Director of the Privy Purse, had a significant 
role in the documents. In order to complete what Prajadhipok had ordered, Chao Phraya 
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contacted the international banks. Based on their contents, all of these documents could be 
categorized into three groups: 1) documents involved in the relocation of the Privy Purse’s 
money to the defendants’ private assets; 2) documents concerning the life insurance of 
Prajadhipok and Rambai Barni; and, 3) documents concerning a tax refund paid to the defendant. 
For the first group, the patterns of the process were quite similar. The process began 
with a letter from Chao Phraya Sriphiphat asking a bank to close an account of the Privy Purse 
and deposit the money to the accounts owned by Prajadhipok and Rambai Barni. After that, a 
letter from the bank would be sent to Chao Phraya notifying him that his request had been 
completed. For example, the portfolio of documents included two letters from Chao Phraya 
Sriphiphat to Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and Charter Bank of India on 8 July and 23 August 
1932, asking the banks to close the Privy Purse’s bank accounts valued at 10,000 pounds and 
75,000 Singapore dollars, respectively. Chao Phraya Sriphiphat also asked those banks to open 
new deposit accounts in the names of the defendants using the money from the closed accounts. 
There were letters from the banks indicating the transactions were accomplished. The money 
transfers described in the documents of this group amounted to approximately 3.6 million baht of 
all transferred assets of 4.2 million baht. The second group of documents concerned the expense 
accounts of the Privy Purse showing payments paid to the insurance companies. There were also 
documents from those firms indicating that they received the corresponding payments. The most 
important documents in this group were the letters signed by Chao Phraya Sriphiphat submitted 
to the insurance companies asking to have the interest deposited to Prajadhipok’s bank account. 
The ex-King purchased his insurance for about 450,000 baht. The third group included a letter 
sent by the Siamese Ambassador in London to Chao Phraya Sriphiphat indicating that the Privy 
Purse’s bank account in England received the tax refund (approximately 110,000 baht) and that 
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Table 5.2: Documents concerning the Asset Transfer mentioned in the Civil Court's Judgement82 
 
 
  
                                                            
82 Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
Date Bank/Company Amount
1 18 July 1932
Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank, 
London
11,951 pounds        
8 shillings 8 pence
document from Chao Phraya Sriphiphat        
(8 July 1932) to HSBC asking for closing the 
PPB's account and depositing the money in 
the defendants' names
document from HSBC (19 July 
1932) informing that the 
requirement had been done
2 20 July 1932
National 
Provincial Bank
29,430 pounds        
 6 shillings
document from Chao Phraya Sriphiphat        
(8 July 1932) to National Provincial Bank 
asking for closing the PPB's account and 
depositing the money in the defendants' names
document from National Provincial 
Bank (20 July 1932)  informing 
that the requirement had been done
3 27 July 1932
National City 
Bank, New York
367,653 USD       
84 cents
document from Chao Phraya Sriphiphat (8 
July 1932) to National City Bank, New York 
asking for closing the PPB's account and 
depositing the money in the defendants' names
document from National City 
Bank, New York informing that 
the requirement had been done
4 25 August 1932
Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank, 
London
544,680 bath        
85 satang
document from Chao Phraya Sriphiphat (9 
August 1932) to Siamese Ambassador to 
England asking for tranferring 500,000 
pounds from HSBC to the defendants' bank 
accounts
document from Siamese 
Ambassador to England (25 
August 1932) imforming that the 
requirement had been done
5 29 August 1932
Charter Bank, 
Singapore
75,0777 SD          
59 cents
document from Chao Phraya Sriphiphat (23 
August 1932) to Charter Bank asking for 
closing the Privy Purse's bank account and 
depositing the money in the defendants' names
document from Charter Bank (5 
September 1932) informing that 
the requirement had been done
6 6 September 1932
Charter Bank, 
London
28,554 pounds        
3 shillings 3 pence
document from Chao Phraya Sriphiphat      
(23 August 1932) to Charter Bank, London  
asking for closing the Privy Purse's bank 
account and depositing the money in the 
defendants' names
document from Charter Bank, 
Bangkok (4 October 1932) 
informing that the requirement had 
been done
7 22 September 1932
 tax refund in 
England
10,455 pounds      
14 shillings 7 pence
document from Siamese Ambassador to 
England (29 September 1932) to Chao 
Phraya Sriphiphat informing of the tax refund 
which had already been deposited to the 
defendant's bank account in London
8 8 October 1932
Manufacturer Life 
Insurance 
Company 300,000 baht record of the payment,     8 October 1932
document from Manufacturer Life 
Insurance Company informing that 
the insurance contract had been 
complete
9 22 October 1932
Manufacturer Life 
Insurance 
Company
159,820 baht        
26 satang record of the payment,     8 October 1932
receipt issued by Manufacturer 
Life Insurance Company (22 
October 1932) acknowledging the 
money from PPB
10 18 June 1934
Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank, 
London 100,000 pounds
document from Chao Phraya Sriphiphat (18 
June 1934) to HSBC asking for transferring 
money from PPB to the defendants' bank 
account
document from HSBC (19 June 
1934) to Chao Phraya Sriphiphat 
informing that the requirement had 
been done
Materials
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the Ambassador had already deposited the refund to the defendants’ accounts.   
The importance of this evidence was unmistakable, since it confirmed that Prajadhipok 
had transferred properties of the Privy Purse to his private assets. Although the original 
documents are now missing, their details described in the Court’s sentence proved that 
Prajadhipok did transfer the Crown’s property. The knowledge of the documents cited by this 
previously-unpublished part of the sentence might have changed how the lawsuit has been 
perceived. For example, according to Queen Rambai Barni’s 1973 interview, there were two 
budgets involved in Prajadipok’s expenditures during his stay in the country, i.e., his private 
budget earned as a royal since he was still a prince and the state annual allowance he was paid 
when a king. According to Rambai Barni, before leaving for England, “His Majesty had issued a 
formal letter ordering that his private money be reimbursed with the state’s deposits he would 
spend abroad.”83 Prajadhipok and Rambai Barni left Siam for England in January 1934. The 
Queen’s interview implied that the contested money had not been spent yet. However, according 
to the documents cited by the court, almost of the transfers of the Privy Purse’s assets took place 
in 1932.  
During the lawsuit, the defendants did not refuse the authenticity of those documents: 
their arguments emphasized only legal principles. The Court considered this evidence as fact. 
When all arguments of the defendants were dismissed, the Court sentenced Prajadhipok and 
Rambai Barni to pay the original 4,195,895.89 baht plus an annual 7.5 percent interest and the 
lawyer’s fee of 20,000 baht, for a total of 6,592,713 baht. 
 
 
                                                            
83 Queen Rambai Barni, “An Interview,” p. 12 
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5.7 After the Judgement 
The financial confiscation against King Prajadhipok and Queen Rambai Barni did not 
end with the judgement of the Court. In general, the legal process ended when the antagonists 
complied with the judgement, after which there was a law enforcement procedure. However, the 
enforcement for this lawsuit could not be accomplished because of failed negotiations until the 
end of World War II. 
The possibility to end the lawsuit emerged immediately after the judgement was issued. 
The Court did not approve the appeal of the defendants. Stating that the defendants did not have 
enough money, Prince Upaleesan asked the plaintiff to accept the confiscated assets as settlement 
of the amount owed instead of selling the assets at public auction which, the Prince claimed, 
would lead to the dishonor of the Crown.84 However, Luang Kajsongkram, the Chairman of the 
CPAC, disagreed with the Prince, explaining that to accept the proffered assets (which had a 
value less than the amount owed) was not right since, in addition to the value being less, if any 
assets of the defendants were discovered in the future, then the plaintiff would not be able to 
request anything further. Consequently, the government did not accept the Prince’s offer85 and an 
announcement of the public auction of the confiscated assets was published in newspapers. The 
announcement indicated that those assets comprised royal ornaments and stock documents and 
that the auction would take place between the 8th and the 18th of January 1942.86 However, the 
auction was cancelled by another announcement issued in late December 194187 because the 
Cabinet decided to accept Prince Upaleesan’s offer and remitting the remainder of the debt.88 
                                                            
84 Prince Upaleesan to Prime Minister, 27 November 1941, in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
85 Chairman of the CPAC to Secretary of the Prime Minister, 22 December 1941 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, 
SLK3.22.9/6  
86 Suphoj Jangrew, “The Confiscation Case of King Prajadhipok’s Properties,” pp. 76-77. 
87 Ibid., p. 78 
88 Cabinet Secretariat to Chairman of the CPAC, 2 January 1942 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6  
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Although there was no detail of the discussion in the Cabinet meeting, this resolution reflected 
the leaders’ effort to end the lawsuit even though the solution might have disadvantaged the 
government.  
However, the result was not as expected. The resolution of the Cabinet determined that 
the assets which would be brought to settle the debt included the inheritance of Queen Saovabha 
Phongsri, of which Prajadhipok was one of the heirs. Since there were a number of beneficiaries, 
the inheritance had been managed by a committee until it was transferred to the Privy Purse in 
1927. Its initial recipients were King Vajiravuth, King Prajadhipok, Prince Asdang, Prince 
Chakrabongse, and Prince Chuthathuth. By 1942, when it was brought back to the intention of 
the government due to the financial prosecution lawsuit, the inheritance’s liquid assets had been 
already distributed to the heirs; the remainder included real estate, stocks, and the interest of the 
money from rentals and loans. The question for the government was whether Prajadhipok’s 
allotment in the inheritance could be included in the debt settlement; the Cabinet asked the 
Department of the State Attorney to determine how to proceed. 
Phraya Atthakareeniphon, the Director of State Attorney, cited a document issued by 
King Prajadhipok in 1931, which ordered the Director of the Privy Purse to establish the 
inheritance of Queen Saovabha to be a collective fund and to share its interest with each 
beneficiary every six months. It was a royal command in the absolute regime, so its status was a 
law, Atthakareeniphon argued. Hence, the inheritance had to be preserved further as the 
collective fund, and the government could not include it in the debt settlement. However, because 
King Prajadhipok obtained part of the interest the government could collect those monies as part 
of the debt settlement. Phraya Atthakareeniphon suggested two options to the government. First, 
the plaintiff could sell all of the confiscated assets to settle the debt; for the next 10 years, if other 
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properties of Prajadhipok emerged, the government would confiscate them as well. Second, the 
government could end the lawsuit by accepting the assets already seized and not ask for more in 
the future.89 
This suggestion almost led to the end of the lawsuit. Initially, the Prime Minister 
approved the second option, including Prajadhipok’s part of the inheritance of Queen Saovabha.90 
This choice was also approved by the Regent and Prajadhipok’s representatives. The Deputy 
Minister of Finance held a meeting with Prince Upaleesan and Phraya Manawaratchasevi to 
discuss a draft version of the contract to end the lawsuit.91 However, this effort failed. Luang 
Kajsongkram immediately conceived a second thought that if the plaintiff collected Prajadhipok’s 
part of the inheritance, it might prompt other heirs to do the same, which might lead to a lawsuit 
against the government.92 Luang Kajsongkram’s concern caused the Prime Minister to change his 
mind. He ordered that Queen Saovabha’s inheritance be excluded from the contract. The Cabinet 
asked Krissadeeka to make a recommendation concerning the lawsuit.  
Deoun Bunnag, the secretariat of Krissadeeka, suggested that Queen Saovabha’s 
inheritance had already become a property of the crown, due to Prajadhipok’s management of the 
inheritance during the absolute regime and the King’s transfer of the allotment of the late Prince 
Asdang to his own accounts. Deoun interpreted these changes to mean that only the King could 
manage the inheritance, so it became crown property and no heir could claim a right to the 
inheritance.93 If this interpretation had been approved, the government would have been able to 
manage Queen Saovabha’s inheritance in the same way as other properties of the crown. 
                                                            
89 Director of the State Attorney to Cabinet Secretariat, 30 Marc 1942 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, 
SLK3.22.9/6 
90 Cabinet Secretariat to Royal Private Secretary, 21 April 1942 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
91 Director of the State Attorney to Deputy Minister of Finance, 11 May 1942 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, 
SLK3.22.9/6 
92 Deputy Minister of Finance to Cabinet Secretariat, 11 May 1942 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
93 Secretariat of Krissadeeka to Cabinet Secretariat, 17 June 1942 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
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However, the Cabinet was not confident concerning this recommendation, so Krissadeeka was 
asked again to reconsider the lawsuit.94 As a result, the lawsuit was not resolved. 
Deuon took a year to reconsider the lawsuit thus it could not be ended as early as 
expected, which meant that the confiscated assets could not be fully managed. For example, the 
Ministry of Public Healthcare which relocated to the Sukhothai Palace could not utilize all of the 
buildings because the ex-King’s possessions still remained in some. In addition, the price of the 
assets might be higher than the value of the debt of the defendants. Luang Kajsongkram was 
concerned that the plaintiff might be misconstrued as taking advantage of the defendants.95 He 
therefore asked Krissadeeka to hasten its consideration. 
The later consideration of the secretariat of Krissadeeka was different from the first. 
Although Deoun held that Prajadhipok’s demand to settle the inheritance as a collective fund was 
a law, Deoun did not conclude that the fund became crown property. Rather, he said that the 
government had to maintain the collective status of the inheritance. However, Deoun indicated 
that the plaintiff could collect Prajadhipok’s interest from the inheritance to settle the debt.96 This 
recommendation was quite the same as of the Director of State Attorney in 1942. For now, the 
Cabinet agreed with Deoun and approved the Ministry of Finance to negotiate with the 
representatives of the defendants.97 
However, the lawsuit still could not be settled, because the representatives of the 
defendants did not agree with the plaintiff’s offers and claimed that the values of the confiscated 
assets were higher than the government’s estimates. If they accepted the deal, then Prajadhipok’s 
heirs would be truly disadvantaged. They therefore offered a new draft of the settlement, in which 
                                                            
94 Cabinet Secretariat to Secretariat of Krissadeeka, 10 July 1942 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
95 Deputy Minister of Finance to Cabinet Secretariat, 19 April 1943 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
96 Secretariat of Krissadeeka to Cabinet Secretariat, 7 May 1943 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
97 Cabinet Secretariat to Royal Private Secretariat, 3 June 1943 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
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the defendants would settle the debt with all the seized assets except two pieces of land, all 
shares, and 150,000 baht cash.98 This offer made Luang Kajsongkram very angry; he blamed the 
representatives of the defendants for being selfish and dishonest.99 The Cabinet’s resolution over 
the lawsuit reflected the government’s anger as well, insisting that if the defendants did not 
compromise, then all confiscated assets would be publicly auctioned as part of the settlement.100  
At this point, the only item which could be confirmed was that the effort to settle the 
debt in 1943 had failed. In sum, after the Civil Court issued its judgment in September 1941, all 
attempts to settle the lawsuit failed albeit for different reasons. Thus, the lawsuit could not be 
ended almost two years after the Court’s judgement. 
The end of the lawsuit was eventually realized after the war. The new political clique 
following Phibul had different views on the lawsuit. However, the defendant still maintained 
their stance. Prince Upaleesan, now a manager of King Prajadhipok’s inheritance, submitted a 
request to Kuang Abhaiwong’s government but there was no response. 101 The Prince submitted 
the same request in November 1945 to Seni Pramoj’s administration. The Prince’s offer was that 
the defendant would settle the debt with 19 pieces of land (the combined value of which was 
approximately 4.7 million baht) in addition to 1 million baht cash. Due to the changing exchange 
rate of money, the debt the defendant had to pay in 1945 was now about 8.4 million baht (from 
6.6 million baht at the beginning). Thus, if the offer was accepted, the plaintiff would lose about 
2.7 million baht. Although Phibul’s government would have refused the offer given this 
                                                            
98 Prince Upaleesan to Luang Kajsongkram, 12 June 1943 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
99 Luang Kajsongkram to Cabinet Secretariat, 16 June 1943 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
100 Cabinet Secretariat to Luang Kajsongkram, 21 June 1943 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
101 Royal Private Secretary to Cabinet Secretariat, 14 November 1945 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, 
SLK3.22.9/6 
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condition, the postwar Cabinet’s consideration was not restricted to only the value of the 
settlement. 
On seeing Prince Upaleesan’s offer, the Ministry of Finance (Luang Kajsongkram was 
no longer Deputy Minister) had a remarkably different view. Direk Jayanam, the new Deputy 
Minister of Finance, indicated that this lawsuit was the first legal action in which the King had 
been sued, thus it was truly scandalous. If the confiscated assets had been brought to public 
auction, the lawsuit would have been more disgraceful. In his opinion, the best way was to end 
the lawsuit as quick as possible no matter how much the plaintiff would lose; the political 
benefits far outweighed the loss.102 Although Phibul’s government also wanted to end the 
lawsuit, it did not wish to do if the plaintiff could have been disadvantaged. In contrast, the 
government’s leaders after the War prioritized the notoriety of the lawsuit over the benefit of the 
plaintiff. 
In December 1945, only two months after Prince Upaleesan submitted his offer, the 
Cabinet approved the Ministry of Finance’s agenda.103  A later political document indicated that 
the contract was finally completed on 26 November 1946104, almost a year after Seni’s Cabinet 
approved the offer. The author of the document did not provide details of the contract other than 
indicating that the government did not gain more than what had been seized. Due to the lack of 
evidence, it is not clear that the final contract in 1946 was the same as the offer in the previous 
year. What can be confirmed here is that the postwar government had stronger intention than 
Phibul’s Cabinet to compromise with the defendant. This was arguably one of the results of the 
changing political landscape of Thailand after Phibul Songkram’s era.  
                                                            
102 Minister of Finance to Cabinet Secretariat, 19 December 1945 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, SLK3.22.9/6 
103 Cabinet Secretariat to Royal Private Secretary, 27 December 1945 in Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, 
SLK3.22.9/6 
104 Nai Honhuai, Prince Prajadhipok: The King Who Departed, p. 680 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I approach the problem from a different perspective. While in previous 
chapters I examine how the new leaders applied the principles of a constitutional monarchy to the 
management of the crown property and royal finances, in this chapter I consider the results of 
applying the new system not via the Constitution. The prosecution was a civil lawsuit; however, 
it raised constitutional issues, i.e., the transferred assets became problematic because King 
Prajadhipok exercised his power unconstitutionally. Initially, the new leaders’ thoughts 
concerning the lawsuit were uncertain, but they became clear in the indictment the Ministry of 
the Finance submitted to the Civil Court, in which the Constitutions were cited as the foundation 
of the suit. The reasons by which the Civil Court found the defendant guilty accordingly 
emphasized this point: the transfer became void because the King did not have any constitutional 
prerogative to perform it. 
However, the verdict of the Court considered and judged only the result of the transfer 
and did not examine how to address the unconstitutional deed of the King. According to Luang 
Prajurd Aksornlak, any undertaking of the monarch which was in contradiction to the 
Constitution must be held as a fatal administrative mistake resolvable only by Parliament.105 As 
Somsak remarks, one of the limitations of this lawsuit might be that King Prajadhipok had 
already abdicated, so he was prosecuted as an ordinary person. Somsak also suggests that if the 
suit had happened when Prajadhipok was still King, Parliament might have taken the 
responsibility to consider the lawsuit instead of the Court.106 
                                                            
105 Luang Prajurd Aksornlak, The Constitutional Law: an Undergraduate Lecture, p. 75 
106 Somsak jeamteerasakul, “The legal case against King Prajadhipok by Thawat Ritthidej,” Silpawatthanatham 
(May 2005): 100 - 120 
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In this chapter, I also show that constitutional principles were not the only factor which 
determined the management of the crown property and royal finance. Rather, the circumstances 
of Thailand’s political development altered the new system. Somsak’s remark on the mysterious 
death of King Ananda might be applied to explain the lawsuit of Klai Kangwon palace and the 
lawsuit here. He observes that if the murder had taken place in the 1930s in which the People’s 
Party had power, the results would have been different. There were three phases in the history of 
Thailand after the 1932 Revolution which affected how the new leaders treated the potential 
lawsuits against King Prajadhipok. Under Phraya Bhahol’s administration, although the 
constitutional direction of the management of royal affairs (especially after King Prajadhipok’s 
abdication) was clear, the determination of the leaders to control the crown property and royal 
finances was reduced by the instability of their government (as expressed through the 
compromise over the lawsuit of Klai Kangwon palace). Under the first premiership of Luang 
Phibul Songkram (1938 – 1944), the collective strength of the government arguably reached its 
peak. Their enemies faded from the political scene due to the new leaders’ mechanisms of 
control; at this point, suing a former monarch such as King Prajadhipok was possible. However, 
the Second World War destroyed their strength, and resulted in the third phase in which Pridi’s 
group chose to collaborate with the royalists in order to overthrow Phibul, thereby compromising 
the financial confiscation lawsuit.  
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Conclusion 
 
Based on contemporary documentary materials, this dissertation explores the 
constitutional implication of the management of properties and finance of the Siamese crown 
after the 1932 Revolution. The overthrowing of the absolute regime initiated a new kind of state. 
The country was ruled by the Constitution, the supreme law, rather than the sovereign as in the 
old regime. New institutions such as the Cabinet and the House of Representatives were 
introduced to the Siamese politics. However, the monarchy was maintained. Establishing the 
revolutionary political structure, the new leaders also tried to reform the institution of the 
monarchy. I argue that this reform was pursued in accordance with the 1932 Revolution’s 
interpretation of the principles of the constitutional monarchy, and it was illustrated in the 
management of the crown property and the royal court’s finance. 
This study is in a sense an investigation of the history of constitutional monarchy in 
Thailand. As history is a discipline studying the specificity of a topic in a particular period, the 
constitutional monarchy in this dissertation contains specific meaning. To the 1932 leaders, to 
rule by the Constitution did not mean only that there was a written supreme law for 
administrative reference. Rather, the constitutional monarchy during the revolutionary period was 
the limitation of the royal power. In other words, the monarch was excluded from the state 
affairs. Behind this proceeding was the principle which held that the unelected Head of State, 
whose loyalty based on tradition, could not take any accountability, thus the position must not 
exercise any power which could affect the public, as to expressing opinions over the economic 
issues. Accordingly, the power to pursue every public performance of the monarch belonged to 
the minister, the representative of the people, who countersigned the affair instead of the King. 
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This scheme was applied not only to the state’s administrative and legislative areas, but also the 
royal affairs.   
As a result, the palace court administration and finance were also excluded from the 
royal prerogatives. After the Revolution, King Prajadhipok had gradually lost his prerogative to 
control the royal court. Eventually, after the King’s abdication, the administrative level of the 
Ministry of the Royal Household was reduced, and it became the BRH. Further, the highest 
commander of the Bureau was the Prime Minister. This meant that the new leaders changed the 
palace court organization from the royal prerogative to their manipulation. Accordingly, this 
pattern was also applied to the management of the crown property. The 1934 Tax Exemption for 
Crown Property Law provided the government access to the palace’s assets, and the 1936 Crown 
Property Law established state organization with the power to control properties of the crown.   
Due to the reform, it was the first time in Thai history in which the principle concerning 
power and accountability was applied to the management of the royal court, the crown property, 
and the royal budget. This meant that the royal court’s affairs became open to investigation. The 
budget for the palace was treated in the same fashion as other state finance. Its administrators 
operated their duties being subject to Parliament. As discussed in chapter 3, crown property 
management was scrutinized both by the House and the public, and, in spite of a significant 
limitation, even the Regent could not avoid this process. This could not have been possible if the 
constitutional reform had not happened. 
Accountability of the management of the royal affairs was illuminated through the 
administrative command of the royal court, the parliamentary process of the annual royal budget, 
and the investigation of its undertaking. First, since its beginning, the BRH’s highest commander 
was the Prime Minister. In practice, a minister would be appointed to be responsible for the 
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Bureau. Moreover, all appointments of its officials were determined by the power of the Cabinet. 
This hierarchically made the royal court’s affairs subjected to the House of Representatives.  
Second, the annual allowance of the palace became treated as part of the state budget. It was 
initiated by the Cabinet, reviewed and reduced by the House committee, and even criticized by 
the MPs. This parliamentary process made the royal budget an affair of the state rather than the 
private expenditure of the King. Lastly, as it was treated an affair of the state, if some mistakes 
happened to the management of the royal court, the exploration process could be pursued. Had 
the affairs of the palace court remained royal prerogative, the investigation as to the Privy Purse’s 
land sale could not have taken place, let alone the lawsuit against King Prajadhipok and Queen 
Rambai Barni. 
In addition to changes of power, the royal court reform had effects on the political 
culture of the royals. As discussed previously, the relocation of power to provide the annuity to 
the new leaders made the grant lost its privilege meaning in which the King arranged it only for 
the royals. When the annuity became provided by the Cabinet, some royals refused to comply 
with the government’s conditions, even though they would not be allocated. This implied the 
significance of the former meaning of the grant.  
Comparatively, the management of the royal court was the model the leaders after the 
1932 Revolution duplicated from the English Civil List system. After the new system was 
established, there were both similarities and differences compared to the English model. First, the 
exclusion of the monarch from the power to manage the finance of the royal court was a 
similarity. However, while the English Civil List covered only the management of the finance of 
the royal court, the Siamese expanded it to that of the crown property. Further, for the Great 
Britain, Parliament did not control the private budget of the sovereign: it remained a royal 
234 
 
prerogative. Rather, the administrative reform after the Revolution in Siam made the royal 
organizations, by which the personal expense of the King was managed, under the government 
control. The bureaucratic hierarchy of the BRH under the People’s Party provided power to the 
government even to manage the private budget of the King. Further, the executive inclination of 
the political structure after the Revolution limited the accountability principle over the crown 
property management as illustrated during Field Marshal Phibul Songkram’s premiership.  
In addition, change in the management of the finance in the English royal court was a 
significant cause of the political structure in which Parliament had more power than the palace 
court. Contrastingly, the reform of crown property management in Thailand did not lead to the 
parliamentary supremacy system. Rather, it was a reflection of the executive power in Thai 
politics. After the 1932 Revolution, the main conflict was between the royals and the new 
leaders. Structurally, they were old and new executive branch struggling for power in the 
constitutional regime. However, under the political structure built by the new leaders, the 
executive was obviously determined superior to the legislative branch. The temporary 
Constitution provided more power to the House: the Cabinet was parliamentary appointed to 
work as a committee of the House and could not dissolve it. Nevertheless, the first permanent 
Constitution turned around this pattern. It provided the Cabinet the power not only to dissolve 
Parliament but also to appoint the second-category members. This made the executive could 
control the legislative branch.1 Further, the conflicts after the Revolution which led to the civil 
war brought about the rise of the young military leader as Phibul Songkram. Given this situation, 
                                                            
1 Nakarin Mektrairat, The Siamese Revolution B.E.2475, chapter 8, and Thamrongsak Petchlert-anand, The 1932 
Revolution and a Year after (Bangkok: Asian Studies Institution, 2000), chapter 2 
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the political party, a significant component of the parliamentary system, had not been settled until 
1946.2  
Accordingly, the management of the royal affairs, including the crown property and 
royal finance was transferred from the monarch to the Cabinet. The establishment of the BRH 
was obvious: it was determined under the power of the Prime Minister. In addition, the crown 
property which became held the asset of the state was controlled by the Ministry of Finance 
rather than Parliament. Thus, the political structure of Thailand did not develop the parliamentary 
supremacy as in England. 
As described previously, the constitutional reform of the royal affairs encountered 
several limitations which eventually resulted in its failure. One of the major causes of this was 
that the new system of the royal court management was never really accepted by the people 
involving the palace, both royal family members and royalists. The true acceptance, which 
secured the reform, could have taken place when all players participated in the negotiation as in 
Great Britain in which Kings and Parliament had bargained over the management of the Civil 
List for decades and led to the parliamentary supremacy which was accepted by all sides. 
Contrastingly, in the Thai case, during the fifteen years when the constitutional management of 
the royal court was established, there was almost none king permanently residing in the country, 
and the major royals had gradually faded away from politics. This made the constitutional reform 
of the royal court a system which was pursued only by the new leaders. 
This situation brought about unexpected results when the People’s Party lost their 
power: the reform of the royal court became one of the principal agendas which the royalists 
really wanted to undo. The reshuffling of political power due to the World War II paved the way 
                                                            
2 Eiji Murashima, “Democracy and the Development of Political Parties in Thailand, 1932-1945,” in The Making of 
Modern Thai Political Parties (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1991) 
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for the royalist to come back by collaboration with their former enemies to accomplish the real 
goal. The management of the royal affairs had gradually lost its constitutional implication. The 
administration of the royal court and the power to control the crown property eventually became 
royal prerogatives. 
However, it did not mean that the royal affairs after the regime of the People’s Party 
were turned back to what had been in the absolutist state. Some institutional formats of the 1932 
era were maintained despite the abolishment of the constitutional essence. After the 1947 coup 
d’état, there had always been a Constitution or a Charter used as the country’s supreme law, and 
the general elections were held during the country was not directly ruled by the military. Further, 
even the countersignature process was maintained. However, the constitutional implication 
introduced by the 1932 Revolution was abandoned. First, the exclusion of the monarch from the 
public affairs was ended. In other words, the power to manage those affairs was united with the 
King. On the one hand, some significant public affairs in the revolutionary period were 
reinterpreted and turned to the private undertakings of the monarch, the management of the 
crown property and the royal court for instance. On the other hand, some initiated state affairs 
which should have been public were made under the royal prerogatives, for example, the 1949 
Constitution provided the power to appoint the senators to the King, and it also determined that 
the appointment of the Speaker of the National Assembly was countersigned by the Privy 
Council’s President who was not accountable to the people.  
Second, the remaining process of countersignature had been pursued without the 1932 
implication of constitutional monarchy. As discussed previously, the power over the affair 
exercised by the monarch was held truly belonged to the countersigner, a minister who was 
accountable to the House. After the People’s Party’s era, the countersignature became a process 
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which protected the King from any accountability in spite of his power over the affair. The 
provision in the 1948 Crown Property Law might illustrate this point. In a formal form, to spend 
the budget of the crown property had to gain royal authorization with a countersignature; 
however, the Law determined that the net profit of property of the crown would be expended in 
accordance with the king’s wish. This meant that the countersignature process had lost its 1932 
meaning. It just camouflaged the power of the monarch under the constitutional process.  
From a wider perspective, the 1950s was an interval period between the 1932 
constitutional era and the military dictatorship of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Actually, as 
discussed previously, the constitutional principles of the royal affairs began alteration due to the 
situations after the War ended, especially the death of King Ananda. The collective strength of 
the promoters of the 1932 Revolution, who were the main agencies supporting the constitutional 
ideas, had weakened. Several practices of royal affairs were revised after since, one of which was 
the management of the crown property and royal finance. The promulgation of the 1948 Crown 
Property Law was a starting point which altered the constitutional principles over the royal 
affairs. How to frame the King’s public performances in the 1950s became uncertain. From a 
historiographical view, writings on the constitutional law which promoted the 1932 principles 
published during that decade might have reflected such uncertainty. The case of Yud Saeng-
uthai’s radio broadcast in 1956 which directly aimed at King Bhumibol’s public speech was 
arguably a decisive moment in which the two ideas about the exercise of the royal affairs clashed. 
On the one hand, the King’s speech which performed without any countersignature embedded 
with the ideas which allowed the monarch to exercise public affairs by himself. On the other 
hand, Yud promoted the constitutional principle in which the true power of the royal affairs 
belonged to the countersigner. Ironically, the first idea eclipsed the second one by force due to 
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the 1957 coup d’état. It was the beginning not only of the military regime, but also the pattern to 
exercise royal affairs which completely ignored the constitutional monarchical principle. The 
remark of this change was a royal command appointing Sarit, the leader of the Army who stated 
the 16 September 1957 coup d’état, as the Military Caretaker of the Capital, in which there was 
no anyone countersigned. The King exercised the sovereignty by himself. After that, the 
countersignature had lost the constitutional implication: it was pursued only to complete the 
process of royal authorization. 
Regarding the crown property management, in addition to its provision to locate royal 
prerogatives over the properties of the crown, the 1948 Law led to confusion in practice. Somsak 
argues that the legal status of the Crown Property Bureau could not be certainly identified, and 
even Krissadeeka whose responsibility was to interpret laws was also confused.3 This was the 
situation of crown property management during the Ninth Reign.  
In 2017, a few months after King Bhumibol passed away, important changes happened 
to the Thai royal court. An Act was promulgated, determining a new kind of regulation regarding 
the palace's administration, power, and finance. According to the new Law, the palace's 
undertakings would be completely held private affairs of the King. The Law obviously separated 
affairs of the state and the royal court from each other. It united bureaus concerning the palace 
court which used to be under other state organizations, such as the Department of Royal Guards 
of the Ministry of Defense, into a single agency. The new Law relocated the servants whose 
duties involved the royal affairs to be directly commanded by the monarch. Regarding the power 
in controlling the royal court, the Law determined that all its affairs would be pursued in 
                                                            
3 Somsak Jeamteerasakul, “What is Crown Property Bureau?,” Fadeawkan 4: 1(2006). 
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accordance with the King’s wish. Financially, the new royal bureau would be allocated by state 
budget; however, its incomes were not handed over to the state budget.4 
Further, in July 2017, a new Crown Property Law was enacted. The Act clearly 
indicates that every operation of both private assets of the monarch and the properties of the 
crown must be exercised only in accordance with the King’s wish. Further, the Law also 
determined the Crown Property Committee as an organ completely under the King’s power.5 
Regarding the framework of this dissertation, what happened to the Thai royal court was the 
unity between the monarch and the management of the royal affairs, the crown property and royal 
finance. The constitutional principles of the royal court management were completely avoided. 
How this absolute power takes place in the Twenty-First Century Thailand involves the history of 
the constitutional thought and practice during the previous reign.  
 
  
                                                            
4 “Regulation of the King’s Private Affairs Act, B.E. 2560,” Royal Gazette 13, 48(1 May 2017):  1 - 5 
5 “Crown Property Act, B.E. 2560,” Royal Gazette 134, 75 Ko(16 July 2017): 1 - 4 
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